Mothers and Children of the International Drug War by Fleetwood, J & Torres, A

Children of the Drug War

Children of the Drug War
Perspectives on the Impact of Drug Policies on Young People
Damon Barrett, editor
International Debate Education Association
New York, London & Amsterdam
Published by
The International Debate Education Association
400 West 59th Street 
New York, NY 10019
Copyright © 2011 by International Debate Education Association
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/deed.en_US
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Children of the drug war : perspectives on the impact of drug policies 
on young people / Damon Barrett, editor.
       p. cm.
  ISBN 978-1-61770-018-7
 1.  Drug control. 2.  Children--Drug use. 3.  Children--Social
conditions.  I. Barrett, Damon. 
  HV5801.C494 2011
  362.29’13--dc22
                                                            2011006930
Printed in the USAIDEBATE Press Books
IDEBATE Press Books
	 v
Contents
Foreword vii
Rebecca Schleifer
Introduction: Counting the Costs of the Children’s 
Drug War   1
Damon Barrett 
Part 1: Frontlines: Production and Trade 11
  1.  Real Life on the Frontlines of Colombia’s Drug War 
 by Jess Hunter-Bowman 16
  2.  Children: The Forgotten Victims in Mexico’s Drug War 
 by Aram Barra and Daniel Joloy 29
  3.  In the Shadows of the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Child 
 Bartering, Opium Debt, and the War on Drugs 
 by Atal Ahmadzai and Christopher Kuonqui 43
  4.  After the War on Drugs: How Legal Regulation of 
 Production and Trade Would Better Protect Children 
 by Steve Rolles  59
Part 2: Targets: Race, Class, and Law Enforcement 75
  5.  Getting the Message: Hip-Hop Reports on the Drug War 
 by Deborah Peterson Small   78
  6.  Under Cover of Privilege: College Drug Dealing in the 
 United States by A. Rafik Mohamed and Erik D. Fritsvold 91
  7.  Young Soldiers in Brazil’s Drug War by Michelle Gueraldi 104
Part 3: Home Front: Families and Drug Policy 117
  8.  Dancing with Despair: A Mother’s Perspective 
 by Gretchen Burns Bergman  121
  9. Mothers and Children of the Drug War: A View from a 
 Women’s Prison in Quito, Ecuador 
 by Jennifer Fleetwood and Andreina Torres  127
10. Between Diego and Mario: Children, Families, and the 
 Drug War in Indonesia 
 by Asmin Fransiska, Ajeng Larasati, and Ricky Gunawan  142
vi Children of the drug War
11. “Ants Facing an Elephant”: Mothers’ Grief, Loss, and Work 
 for Change Following the Placement of Children in the Care 
 of Child Protection Authorities 
 by Kathleen Kenny and Amy Druker 151
Part 4: Justification: Children, Drug Use, and 
 Dependence  171
12.  Youth Drug-Use Research and the Missing Pieces in the 
 Puzzle: How Can Researchers Support the Next 
 Generation of Harm Reduction Approaches? 
 by Catherine Cook and Adam Fletcher 175
13.  Taking Drugs Together: Early Adult Transitions and the 
 Limits of Harm Reduction in England and Wales 
 by Michael Shiner 186
14.  Drug Testing in Schools: A Case Study in Doing More 
 Harm Than Good by Adam Fletcher 196
15.  “I’ve Been Waiting for This My Whole Life”: Life 
 Transitions and Heroin Use 
 by Jovana Arsenijevic and Andjelka Nikolic 205
16. Why Should Children Suffer? Children’s Palliative Care 
 and Pain Management by Joan Marston 219
Contributors 239
Foreword 	 vii
Foreword
In 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon officially launched a “war 
on drugs,” declaring drug abuse to be “public enemy number one,” 
and requesting Congress to commit nearly $400,000,000 to national 
and international efforts to address “drug abuse control.” A key 
justification for this commitment? Protection of children. As Nixon 
stated in his Congressional address announcing the war on drugs, 
Narcotics addiction is a problem which afflicts both the body 
and the soul of America. . . .  It comes quietly into homes and 
destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the 
fiber of community which makes neighbors. . . . We must try to 
better understand the confusion and disillusion and despair that 
bring people, particularly young people, to the use of narcotics 
and dangerous drugs.1 
Forty years—and more than $1 trillion later—there is widespread 
consensus that the war on drugs has failed, not just in the United 
States but also worldwide.2 Notwithstanding, governments worldwide 
continue to support the same costly programs that do not work, and do 
so with policy support from UN drug control agencies. The justification, 
against all evidence of their effect to the contrary, continues to be child 
protection. As U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano recently stated, 
This is something that is worth fighting for because drug 
addiction is about fighting for somebody’s life, a young child’s 
life, a teenager’s life, their ability to be a successful and productive 
adult. . . . If you think about it in those terms, that they are 
fighting for lives—and in Mexico they are literally fighting for 
lives as well from the violence standpoint—you realize the stakes 
are too high to let go.3 
What Napolitano did not mention in her speech was that today, 
in the city of Juárez, Mexico, alone, there are 10,000 children who 
have been orphaned by the drug war violence.4 Napolitano’s comment 
highlights key flaws in drug war efforts to “protect” children. Not 
only has the war on drugs proved a costly failure in addressing drug 
addiction or use overall, including among young people, it has also 
caused significant harm to the health and lives of children and young 
people. Children are, indeed, “fighting for their lives”—but in many 
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cases, due to the very drug control efforts that are adopted in their 
name. 
As some of the essays in this book describe, and as Human Rights 
Watch’s work in Cambodia, the United States, Russia, and Thailand 
has shown, children often experience a wide range of human rights 
violations linked to drug control efforts. These include torture and 
ill treatment by police; extrajudicial killings; arbitrary detention; 
and denial of essential medicines and basic health services. Existing 
drug control policies, and accompanying enforcement practices, often 
entrench and exacerbate systematic discrimination against people 
who use drugs, and impede access to controlled essential medicines 
for those who need them for therapeutic purposes. 
In some countries, children are detained in compulsory drug 
detention centers together with adults, and denied appropriate health, 
education, and other social services. In 2008, nearly one-quarter of 
detainees in Cambodia’s compulsory drug detention centers were 
aged eighteen or below. They were detained alongside adults, forced 
to work, and physically abused.5 A sixteen-year-old detainee in one 
center reported “[A staff member] would use the cable to beat people. 
. . . On each whip the person’s skin would come off and stick on the 
cable.”6
Restrictive drug policies have not only had a pervasive effect on 
people who use drugs for recreational purposes or have a dependency 
on them, but also on those who need them for pain management. 
The World Health Organization estimates that 80 percent of the 
world’s population, including tens of millions of people worldwide 
who suffer from moderate to severe pain, do not have adequate 
access to pain treatment. Much of their suffering could be prevented 
if morphine, an inexpensive, effective, and safe medication that 
is generally not difficult to administer, was available. However, in 
more than 150 countries around the world, access to morphine is 
virtually nonexistent,7 in part due to excessively strict drug control 
regulations.8 Children are doubly victimized by government failure 
to ensure access to pain relief: on the one hand, those who suffer pain 
cannot access direct relief and, on the other hand, children of parents 
denied treatment are denied parental support.9
Severe drug laws resulting in mass incarceration deprive thousands 
of children of their parents, and, in some cases, their access to 
social benefits, including public housing;10 and in some countries, a 
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disproportionate share of those incarcerated are poor racial or ethnic 
minorities.11 
Scant attention has been paid to whether drug control efforts 
are consistent with human rights protections, or indeed, to what 
extent they affect children and young people. Children of the Drug 
War makes a critical contribution to addressing this gap. Its mix of 
academic, journalistic, and first-person essays, and the wide-ranging, 
often hidden, issues they cover illustrate the many ways in which the 
war on drugs affects the lives and health of children, from production 
and trade through use. By placing children and young people at 
the forefront of this inquiry, this book compels us to consider, in a 
comprehensive way, the diverse ways in which drug policies affect 
them. It should also foster critical thinking and debate about whether 
current policies are indeed protecting children as government officials 
claim, and if not, how this approach could prove important in shaping 
emerging policy and practices. Every policymaker and decision maker 
should read it before defending current drug policies in the name of 
children.
Rebecca Schleifer
Advocacy Director
Health and Human Rights Division
Human Rights Watch, New York
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Introduction: Counting the Costs of the 
Children’s Drug War
Damon Barrett
The drugs law will save our children and young generation . . .
Andi Mattalatta, 
Indonesian Law and Human Rights Minister1
We are all children of the drug war. While the term was coined by 
President Richard Nixon in the 1970s, the seeds of the “war on drugs” 
had been sown many decades earlier. International drug conventions 
began to be adopted at the turn of the twentieth century, and the 
bedrock of the international system of drug control, the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, is fifty years old in 2011.2 Certainly, 
for any of those born in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
whether they noticed it or not, they were growing up in the midst of 
the war on drugs.3 Whether they noticed depends on many things, in 
particular, where they grew up and under what conditions. For some 
it depends on who they are. This book is about the impact of the war 
on drugs on children, young people, and their families today, and the 
policy questions raised when children are placed at the forefront of 
the debate. 
Whether or not to reform drug laws is not the focal debate of this 
book. That is a debate that has been widely covered.4 Indeed, at the 
time of writing it is high on the agenda in various parts of Europe and 
Latin America, as well as the United States and Australia.5 In October 
2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand 
Grover, submitted a report to the UN General Assembly calling for an 
overhaul of the international drug control system.6 At present, more 
than 17,000 individuals and organizations, including ex-presidents 
and Nobel laureates, have signed the Vienna Declaration—a global 
call for a fundamental shift in drug policy in order to tackle HIV/
AIDS.7 And in November 2010, Californians went to the polls to vote 
on proposition 19 to legalize, tax, and regulate cannabis sales. It lost 
by a narrow margin, and is expected to be tabled again in 2012, along 
with similar propositions in multiple states.
It is accepted that change is needed, but how should laws and 
policies be reformulated if children and young people are, this time, to 
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be at the forefront? What must be avoided? What must be taken into 
account? What principles would underpin those policies? The chapters 
in this book deal with these questions in various ways—some directly, 
others indirectly by looking at specific issues and concerns. Though 
the book is divided into four thematic sections, three crosscutting 
questions may assist in guiding the reader through each section and 
chapter:
• What have been the costs to children of the “war on drugs”?
• Is the protection of children from drugs a solid justification 
for current policies? 
• What kinds of public fears and preconceptions exist in 
relation to drugs and the drug trade?
In each case, the policy implications of asking and answering these 
questions should be considered.
Counting	the	Costs
To begin with there is a basic need to take stock—to count the costs.8 
This necessitates a closer look at what really matters in terms of 
outcomes.9 Indeed, it is the way in which “success” has been measured 
in drug control that has led to some of the strongest criticism. The 
number of people who use drugs, the amount of kilos of drugs seized, 
prosecutions secured, and hectares of illicit crops eradicated are some 
of the key indicators in this regard.10 But while these indicators can 
be useful,11 they are, for the most part, indicators of means, not ends. 
This is not often recognized, and in the prominence given to such 
measurements, drug control has, over time, become self-referential 
and self-perpetuating; a positive feedback loop in which the fight 
against drugs is an end in itself.12 
Counting the costs to children is about breaking that loop as 
the process of investigating the harms of the war on drugs can 
help to delineate between means and ends and provide an insight 
into the question of meaningful outcomes. Children’s and families’ 
involvement in drug production and trade, for example, is a mix of 
coercive forces, often driven or even necessitated by poverty and social 
neglect.13 These drivers are all but ignored and even exacerbated by 
current drug policies that focus on eradication and interdiction, as 
some of the chapters in this book show.14 Success in dealing with 
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production and trade is for the most part measured in prosecutions, 
kilos, and hectares. But given such social and economic determinants 
of involvement in the trade, are these appropriate responses and 
metrics? 
A similar question arises in the context of drug dependence, given 
contemporary theories about structural and social determinants of 
dependence and drug-related harm.15 Are criminal laws an appropriate 
response? Is the number of people who use drugs an important 
indicator, or should we be more concerned about drug-related harms 
such as overdose, crime rates, and blood-borne viruses? These questions 
pose important challenges to current approaches to drug control, given 
the international framework and the national systems it has spawned, 
because they demand that we revisit priorities.16 In short, counting the 
costs of the children’s drug war both challenges current approaches 
and contributes to the debate around what goals drug policies should 
be striving toward. It is no easy task, and requires more qualitative 
analyses alongside a framework of indicators that relates more closely 
to quality of life and well-being. 
Looking beyond the limits of international drug laws, and refocusing 
the debate back to what drug control should be achieving, Steve 
Rolles, in “After the War on Drugs,” considers alternative models of 
control and how such models would better protect children from drugs. 
The rhetoric of “protecting children” from the “scourge” of drugs is, 
however, a strong barrier to even beginning these discussions.
The	Rhetoric	of	“Threat”
For many the “war on drugs” is a fitting analogy for the scale of 
the damage policies have caused, their transnational nature, and the 
financial and human costs. For some, however, the war is all too real, 
as some of the chapters in this book illustrate.17 For critics, the war 
on drugs is used in the pejorative to draw attention to a disastrous, 
international error, or to highlight a ruse adopted in the pursuit of 
hidden agendas.18 Children often provide a trump card against such 
criticisms, justification for whatever policies may be employed in the 
name of tackling addiction and fighting the drug trade. Children, 
after all, are our future, “our most precious asset.”19 Nothing less than 
our very way of life is at stake in combating this “evil.” This is not 
an overstatement of the political rhetoric. It is reflected in the core 
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international drug control treaties ratified by almost every state on 
the planet.20 
Of course, it is difficult to think of a better goal than the protection 
of children. But the rhetoric of protecting children from drugs can be 
unhelpful if it obscures reality. For policymakers and politicians the 
simple message is useful. It is more easily understood by the general 
public than some of the more counterintuitive yet evidence-based 
responses available, such as harm reduction.21  It makes for engaging 
press copy. It speaks to our fears (particularly as parents), to our 
prejudices, and to our ignorance. As such it is misleading. It does not 
speak to the complex realities of drug use (including culture, peer 
pressure, sex, pleasure, aspiration, experimentation, and fashion) or 
to the underlying determinants of dependence and drug-related harm 
such as social exclusion, mental health, inequality, and poverty. These 
concerns, while acknowledged in various international declarations, 
are often mere footnotes in actual responses, overshadowed by the law 
enforcement–based responses necessitated by the rhetoric of struggle 
against a perpetual threat. 
While the reasons for drug use among young people remain hotly 
debated,22 the assumption underpinning most countries’ responses to 
drug use is that it is in all cases aberrant or deviant behavior, and 
always harmful, always a threat. But while drug use among young 
people can be an indicator of later problems, experimenting with drugs 
is becoming increasingly common among young people, and most 
young people who experiment with drugs or use them recreationally 
do not develop serious drug problems.23 While universal prevention 
measures have little role in preventing drug use among those at 
most risk of dependence and drug-related harms,24 measures that 
focus on the worst-case scenario fail to speak to the lived experiences 
of recreational users.25 Accepting this reality and responding to it, 
however, may require a level of tolerance in policy that the current 
rhetorical posturing does not readily allow.26
Fears,	Preconceptions,	and	Policy
Public support for “get tough” policies is widespread. A 2010 poll, 
for example, showed that 80 percent of the Mexican public supports 
the government’s militarized confrontation of the drug cartels despite 
the violence that has ensued.27 In Thailand, in 2003, a government-
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sanctioned war on drugs left over 2,000 people dead—many with no 
connection to the drug trade.28 Again, this had widespread public 
support. In Mauritius, during the 2010 elections there was widespread 
support for reintroducing the death penalty for drug trafficking. The 
fears and ideas that underlie moral panics relating to drugs and 
result in instinctive support for crackdowns are understandable. 
But when unpacked and challenged, they provide important insights 
into current drug policies. Through the diverse chapters in this book, 
especially those in which personal perspectives are presented, it is 
hoped that some of these preconceptions and assumptions around 
drugs and those involved in the drug trade will be challenged, and 
discussion of the policy implications of challenging them encouraged. 
There is no doubt, for example, that problematic parental drug 
dependence places children at increased risk of neglect and abuse.29 
But for many it is difficult to accept that not all people who use 
drugs are bad parents, or that drug use and child neglect is not a 
straightforward equation. “Ants Facing an Elephant,” by Kathleen 
Kenny and Amy Druker, considers an aspect of this debate, focusing 
on women who have lost custody of their children to child protection 
services.
Many see the massive, violent, and destructive drug trade as simply 
organized crime run by evildoers. Far more troubling is the reality 
that it is a function of prohibition itself, though this is accepted as 
fact at high levels.30 In turn, people involved in the production of illicit 
crops are frequently equated with drug traffickers, seen as greedy, 
willful criminals. “In the Shadows of the Insurgency in Afghanistan” 
is a case study on the scale of poverty in which opium poppy farmers 
live, while “Real Life on the Frontlines of Colombia’s Drug War,” 
based on interviews with children and young people in Colombia, tells 
a similar story in relation to coca production.
The idea of drug users and dealers as some form of “other” is common.31 
It is easier to accept the shadowy “drug pusher” lurking on the school 
playground32 than the reality that most young people experience drug 
use for the first time via their siblings, sexual partners, or peers.33 But 
this is the reality for many and it questions who the “enemy” is in this 
“war.” On this issue, see “Under Cover of Privilege” on college drug 
dealing by A. Rafik Mohamed and Erik Fritsvold, set against “Getting 
the Message,” Deborah Peterson Small’s study of messages about the 
impacts of the drug war on black and Latino communities told through 
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hip-hop. Through these chapters we get an insight into those young 
people who experience the drug war, and those for whom it is of no 
concern. 
“Dancing with Despair,” “Mothers and Children of the Drug War,” 
and “Between Diego and Mario,” meanwhile, focus on the effects of 
law enforcement and incarceration on families in the United States, 
Ecuador, and Indonesia. In these personal stories, the users, dealers, 
mules and prisoners are by no means “other.” They are parents, 
siblings and children.
Structure	of	the	Book
With the exception of one chapter,34 Children of the Drug War 
consists entirely of original pieces. The chapters are diverse in many 
ways: geographic origin, discipline, and, of course, subject matter. 
Each author has his or her own writing style. Some pieces are 
academic, others are interview-based; still others are more narrative 
or journalistic. Most of the chapters were included following a call 
for papers in late 2009. Others were invited, and three are based on 
interviews specifically commissioned for the book.35 
There are four thematic sections: production and trade; race, class, 
and law enforcement; families and drug policy; and children, drug use, 
and dependence. Many chapters could sit comfortably in a different 
section; some could straddle three or even all four. They were, however, 
the best way to group an array of very different contributions in a 
manner that covered drug control from production to use, and that 
helped to highlight important policy considerations. The themes are 
interrelated and should be read as such, bearing in mind the three 
broad, crosscutting questions raised in this introduction. 
Part 1, Frontlines: Production and Trade, focuses on production and 
eradication, trade and interdiction, and the debate around alternative 
frameworks of legal regulation of drugs. These are well-worn topics, 
but the chapters presented here offer new insights, focusing entirely 
on children and young people and the specific risks and harms they 
face.
The chapters in Part 2, Targets: Race, Class, and Law Enforcement, 
consider the situation of children and young people who are the 
targets of drug law enforcement, and those who, by virtue of pedigree, 
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race, or economic status, are not. They paint a picture of soft-target 
law enforcement, disenfranchisement of new generations, and the 
privilege of race and class in escaping the drug war.
Part 3, Home Front: Families and Drug Policy, is central to the 
drug policy discussion relating to children. The family, after all, is 
crucial to the child’s development and well-being. The chapters in this 
section consider the effects of polices on families, rather than drug 
use or the drug trade per se. A main focus is incarceration, while 
policies relating to child custody, policing, and drug dependence are 
also touched upon.
The final section, Part 4, Justification: Children, Drug Use, and 
Dependence, contains a collection of essays asking what we know 
and what we do not know about drug use among young people, and 
what the answers to these questions mean for policy responses. The 
chapters tackle three broad areas: recreational use, which makes up 
the majority of drug use among young people but is largely neglected 
in policy responses; problematic drug use around which most demand 
reduction policies and harm reduction interventions are framed; 
and finally, access to opiates for palliative care, which has suffered 
due to a range of factors including overly strict narcotics laws and a 
disproportionate focus on addiction. 
Each part begins with a more detailed introduction to present its 
chapters and the issues raised. It is not intended, however, nor is it 
possible, to cover all aspects of this enormous debate. The book is 
clearly not comprehensive. Readers are encouraged to bear in mind 
not just the problems of the present, but what these questions mean 
for the policies of the future. As such, each part concludes with 
questions for further study and debate.
The diversity of the subject matter covered in this book is intentional. 
Very often issues relating to drugs are considered in isolation. While 
it is easy to see the connections between drug use, sale, transit and 
production as a supply chain, the harms associated with these various 
stages and the policies aimed at dealing with them are not so often 
connected. HIV related to injecting drug use, for example, is rarely 
connected to production issues, while drug related violence in Mexico 
or Brazil is not seen to be related to public health concerns such as 
the lack of access to controlled medicines for palliative care. But these 
harms are interconnected. And only when they are seen in this way 
is the scale of the drug war visible. These connections are not drawn 
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explicitly below, however. It is for the reader to identify them and 
draw his or her own conclusions.
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Part	1:
Frontlines:	Production	and	Trade
Historically, the main focus of international drug control efforts has 
been the reduction of supply, and therefore the availability, of drugs 
on the streets in consumer countries. Supply reduction, as it is known, 
has taken the form of counternarcotics law enforcement/interdiction 
as well as forced crop eradication programs, particularly in Latin 
America, the so-called Golden Triangle in East Asia, and the Golden 
Crescent in the Middle East. This has long been criticized as developed 
nations imposing their problems on poorer developing countries. It 
is difficult to argue with this reasoning given the disproportionate 
expenditure on supply reduction in producer nations over treatment 
and harm reduction in those where demand drives the drug trade.1 
Between all of the regions of production there is shared experience. 
First, forced crop eradication has not worked. While cultivation and 
production fluctuate for various reasons,2 cocaine and heroin are 
as available on the streets as ever before. The situation has been 
succinctly described by the high-level Latin American Commission on 
Drugs and Democracy in its 2009 official statement: “We are farther 
than ever from the announced goal of eradicating drugs.”3 
Second, forced crop eradication has had severe negative 
consequences, including for children, contributing to human 
displacement, violence, food insecurity, and further poverty.4 School 
enrollment and child health have also been affected.5 In Afghanistan, 
it is accepted at high levels that forced eradication has helped the 
Taliban to recruit. Richard Holbrook, who was the U.S. Special Envoy 
to the country, called it “the least effective program ever.”6
Third, programs to replace such crops with licit alternatives must 
be properly sequenced (i.e., alternatives in place before illicit crops are 
removed) to avoid plunging poor farming families further into poverty;7 
basic infrastructure must be developed to assist in production and sale 
(e.g., roads to transport crops to market, irrigation, and assistance to 
compete with bigger, better resources companies);8 “monocropping of 
plants such as rubber trees and African palm must be avoided; and, to 
date, such programs, overall, have had limited effect on drug markets. 
“Alternative development” as such programs are known, is not dealt 
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with in detail here, though chapters 1 and 3 are certainly relevant.9 
It is an important area, however, especially given the strictures of the 
international legal system for drug control, which do not permit the 
cultivation of coca, opium poppy, and marijuana outside of narrowly 
defined exceptions.10 There are various reports available for further 
reading.11
Transit routes, the avenues by which illicit substances reach the 
streets in consumer countries, are often areas of extreme violence 
and corruption, violence that surrounds and often directly involves 
children.12 As with forced eradication, however, interdiction measures 
have not worked. Instead, as transit routes are interrupted by law 
enforcement, they move, spreading violence, corruption, increased 
drug use, and drug-related harms, to new countries and territories.13 
West Africa is the most recent victim of this, with Guinea Bissau being 
one of the countries most affected.14 Meanwhile, law enforcement in 
many countries has become ever more draconian and violent, and in 
some cases militarized, with the army fighting the drug “war.”15
Part 1 deals with three countries that today represent the frontlines 
and public face of the war on drugs—Colombia and Afghanistan 
in relation to production, and Mexico as the most infamous transit 
country in the world.16
Colombia and Afghanistan are the primary sources of global 
cocaine and heroin supply, respectively, being by far the areas of the 
greatest production of coca and opium poppy. Both have been the 
subject of extensive forced eradication campaigns. They are also both 
mired in conflict, which, while not caused by the drug trade, in both 
countries is now intertwined with it. In Colombia the drug trade is a 
key source of funding for illegal armed groups, while in Afghanistan 
the Taliban benefits significantly from the opium trade.17 Meanwhile, 
growers of illicit crops in both countries have two main things in 
common—poverty and vulnerability to violence and extortion. It is 
this environment in which the children of these families grow up.
Jess Hunter-Bowman’s chapter, “Real Life on the Frontlines of 
Colombia’s Drug War,” was commissioned for this book. Along with 
colleagues from Witness for Peace, Hunter-Bowman interviewed 
three young people who have all been affected in different ways by 
the drug trade and drug-fueled conflict. Colombia is currently the 
only country in the world in which aerial fumigation with chemicals is 
used as a means to eradicate illicit crops. Javier’s interview explains 
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the consequences of fumigation for poor families and the desire of 
those families to leave the trade in coca, which has brought them 
only suffering. His outlook is bleak. “I don’t think they will ever stop 
fumigating,” he says. The remaining two interviews highlight the 
scale of drug-related violence in the country, and the involvement of 
traffickers, police, military, and, indeed, children in that violence. 
“Children: The Forgotten Victims in Mexico’s Drug War” focuses on 
the primary transit route for drugs coming from Latin America and 
destined for the U.S. market. Barely a day goes by without reports of 
horrific carnage in Mexico since President Felipe Calderón initiated 
the current war on drugs in the country, deploying tens of thousands 
of troops onto the streets. Aram Barra and Daniel Joloy work in 
Mexico focusing on drug policy and human rights and their chapter 
looks at killings of children and parents in the midst of the drug war; 
attacks on schools and rehabilitation centers, which have increased 
since the militarization of the campaign; and the psychological 
damage of conflict to children based on studies in other conflict zones. 
According to the authors, next to this collateral damage, the small 
gains in seizures and arrests are rendered “hollow and irrelevant.”
In the context of Afghanistan, Atal Ahmadzai and Christopher 
Kuonqui, in another piece commissioned for this book, have conducted 
interviews in Helmand, Kandahar, and Kabul on the practice of 
child bartering (selling) to pay opium debts when poppy crops fail 
through disease, natural shocks, or are eradicated in counternarcotics 
operations. It is an issue not just of drug control, of course, but of 
culture, tribalism, conflict, and poverty. The result, however, is 
a fundamental challenge to those who may equate farmers with 
traffickers, or see them as greedy opportunists, and the often simplistic 
views of crop eradication as a viable strategy. As noted by one social 
activist in the country “Opium farmers are the most vulnerable people 
in the opium cycle, and the uncoordinated war against opium further 
strengthens their social and economic vulnerabilities.” The chapter is 
an illustration of the depths of poverty in which farming communities 
live, and the cultural complexities involved in opium production in 
Afghanistan. “In the Shadows of the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Child 
Bartering, Opium Debt, and the War on Drugs” shows how children, 
and especially girls, bear the brunt of Afghanistan’s opium culture 
and counternarcotics strategies.
Finally, the section turns away from specific countries to the legal 
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and policy framework for production and trade itself. Steve Rolles’s 
chapter, “After the War on Drugs: How Legal Regulation of Production 
and Trade Would Better Protect Children,” asks whether a legally 
regulated model of production and trade, taken out of the hands of 
criminals and cartels, would better “protect” children from drugs—
children who use them, children involved in transporting them, and 
children who farm them. Set against the harms of the drug war, 
Rolles’s arguments are compelling in their lucidity and underlying 
morality.
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1. Real Life on the Frontlines of 
Colombia’s Drug War
by Jess Hunter-Bowman 
At least one fact about Colombia is well known; Colombia exports 
drugs. Most people know two things and two things only about this 
South American country; it produces coffee and cocaine. Colombia’s 
love affair with drugs began with marijuana production in the 1970s. 
In the early 1980s, the Medellin and Cali cartels expanded into cocaine 
production and trafficking. These two cartels, the Medellin cartel run 
by Pablo Escobar and the Cali cartel run by the Rodríguez Orejuela 
brothers, made their fortunes processing coca paste flown from the 
coca fields of Peru and Bolivia into cocaine, which was exported to 
markets in the United States and Europe.1
Due to multiple factors, coca production shifted from Peru into 
Colombia during the 1990s, making it the world’s leading coca as well 
as cocaine producer. While a minor player globally, Colombia is also 
a significant heroin producer. The country’s principal drug market is 
the United States, with a minority share making its way to Europe via 
West Africa. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), almost 90 percent of the cocaine and 60 percent of the heroin 
seized in the United States originates in Colombia.2
At the same time, Colombia is home to a raging civil war, including 
the oldest and largest guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The multifaceted 
war pits two leftist guerrilla groups3 against the Colombian Armed 
Forces who for more than two decades have worked with paramilitary 
groups to fight back the insurgency.4 Many assert that Colombia’s 
war is simply a drug war, suggesting guerrillas and paramilitaries 
are purely drug traffickers. While both groups are heavily involved 
in the drug trade, trafficking some drugs themselves and taxing all 
aspects of the trade, the single goal of the guerrillas is to overthrow 
the Colombian democracy to install a Marxist government. Solutions 
to Colombia’s stubborn drug production and trafficking problems and 
its deadly civil war are connected, but distinct.
For four decades, the United States has spent billions of dollars in a 
failed attempt to disrupt the Andean cocaine trade. At the beginning 
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of the twenty-first century, the United States inserted itself in a new 
way into fighting Colombia’s drug trade and propping up the country’s 
ragtag Armed Forces. Since 2000, the United States has spent $7.3 
billion5 on a fumigation program targeting coca production, spraying 
1.2 million hectares;6 on training and assistance to the Colombian 
military for counternarcotics and counterinsurgency activities; and 
on a secondary socioeconomic assistance program.
This assistance has brought with it modest security gains, reducing 
conflict-related attacks and deaths back to 1990s levels from their 
peaks in the early years of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, 
this drug-fueled conflict killed 32,436 people between 1998 and 
20087 and displaced an additional 3.4 million. The results are even 
worse on the counternarcotics front. Policymakers proclaimed that 
a full frontal assault on coca production through aerial fumigation 
would reduce production by 50 percent by 2005. Instead Colombian 
coca production, which appeared to be on the decline as production 
shifted back to Peru, actually increased by 17 percent over the ten-
year period beginning in 1998.8
But the human cost of the drug trade and the drug war cannot 
be accurately measured by statistics. What follows are the stories of 
three children of the drug war—Colombian children whose lives have 
been torn apart by drug trafficking, armed groups funded by the drug 
trade, and punitive counternarcotics policies. These stories, although 
dramatic, are not unusual in Colombia. They are the untold stories of 
millions of innocent victims of the drug wars.
Javier
Javier9 was born and raised in Guaviare province in Colombia’s 
Amazon basin. His was one of an estimated 59,000 households living 
off of small-scale coca production10 before his family was displaced and 
broken apart by the counterdrug aerial spray program. By and large, 
these families turned to coca production not to get rich, but rather to 
cross the line from extreme poverty into poverty. The United Nations 
estimates the annual gross income for a family farming coca in 2009 
was US$8,710.11 As eleven-year-old Javier eloquently explains, coca 
production is a last resort rather than a dream for Colombian farmers. 
They know coca production is a magnet for violence associated with 
Colombia’s war as armed groups fight to tax drug production, as well 
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as indiscriminate aerial fumigation, which is purported to target coca 
fields but in practice destroys any and all crops in the area. Javier offers 
insights that have escaped many a counternarcotics policymaker; the 
vast majority of Colombia’s coca farmers would jump at a way out, 
they are just looking for a sustainable alternative.
My name is Javier. I am eleven years old and from a small 
farming community in Guaviare province. My family farmed 
coca and food crops. We had a small farm and didn’t make much 
money off of the coca, but the money we made, we used to buy food 
for the house, seeds for food crops, and more land to raise a cow. 
The farmers around us did the same. If they had any money, it 
was because they had some coca. Nothing else makes money. 
Most people don’t want to grow coca, but they feel like they have 
no other option. If they were given another option, most would 
leave coca behind. Where we’re from, the people don’t get any help. 
There are no [assistance] programs to support them. People even 
die of starvation out there. And that’s why they grow coca. It’s the 
only way to earn a living. People get scared about the violence and 
the fumigation that comes with the coca, but they do it because it’s 
the only way to make money.
The planes often sprayed our community. People would get very 
sad when they saw the fumigation planes. You see the planes 
coming—four or five of them—from far away with a black cloud 
of spray behind them. They say they are trying to kill the coca, 
but they kill everything. I wish the people flying those fumigation 
planes would realize all the damage they do. I wish they’d at least 
look at where they’re going to spray, rather than just spraying 
anywhere and everywhere. The fumigation planes sprayed our 
coca and food crops. All of our crops died. Sometimes even farm 
animals died as well. After the fumigation, we’d go days without 
eating. Once the fumigation spray hit my little brother and me. 
We were outside and didn’t make it into the house before the 
planes flew by. I got sick and had to be taken to the hospital. I got 
a terrible rash that itched a lot and burned in the sun. The doctor 
told us the chemical spray was toxic and was very dangerous. I 
was sick for a long time and my brother was sick even longer. 
We were fumigated five times. I don’t think they will ever stop 
fumigating. They’ll keep fumigating because there’s still coca. 
They say they won’t stop fumigating until all the coca is dead. 
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Two years ago, after the last round of fumigation, we couldn’t take 
it anymore and we were forced to flee. The farm was abandoned. 
My parents separated and they put me into an orphanage run by 
a Catholic priest. I miss my family terribly. When I said goodbye 
to my mom and dad, I couldn’t stop crying. 
I really want to go back to our farm, but I am scared because of 
all of the terrible things that happen there; the fumigation and 
the armed groups . . . so much violence. The coca brought not 
only the fumigation planes, but also the war. The guerrillas were 
around a lot and sometimes even killed people, saying, “They’re 
working with the army.” People were also killed by the military. 
Sometimes people are killed in the fighting between the armed 
groups.
At first I wasn’t so scared by all of this, but now I am terrified 
by what happens out there. I know if I go back there, I’ll see lots 
of people get killed. I saw two people killed right in front of me; 
Rebecca and her brother. They lived close by us. The guerrillas 
had been looking for Rebecca and caught her while she was with 
her brother. I was standing close by and saw the whole thing. They 
made them get down on their knees. They shot them many times 
in the head with machine guns, picked up their dead bodies, put 
them in chairs, put bags over their heads, and left.
The guerrillas also recruited child soldiers. They would try to 
seduce us by showing us their machine guns, teaching us how to 
fire them and to use grenades. My mom told me not to listen to 
them, that they just wanted to take me. One day I was down by 
the river with a group of kids and the guerrillas came by, grabbed 
one kid, and took him off to join them. He screamed, “I don’t want 
to go. I don’t want to go.” I felt terrible watching him being taken 
to join the guerrillas by force. I was scared; scared that one day 
they may come for me, come and kill my mom or take my brother, 
take me and make me kill someone.
When I was five, my uncle was killed by the paramilitaries. My 
mom told me that he helped our family and helped pay for me 
to go to school when I was little. But one day he went to town 
to buy some chemicals for coca production and paramilitaries 
pulled up on a motorcycle. They stopped him, tied him up, and 
tortured him. They asked him questions and if he didn’t know 
the answer, they cut off one of his fingers. They cut off finger after 
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finger until there were none left. While he was still alive, they cut 
him into pieces with a chainsaw. I remember his funeral. People 
were crying so much, screaming. I still don’t know why they killed 
him. I wish this violence would end, that the hatred would end.
When I grow up, I want to be a lawyer. But if I end up farming, I 
think I’ll have to farm coca. I know that if I was offered support, 
a government program that allowed me to farm and survive, I 
wouldn’t go back to coca. There would be no reason to take the risk. 
But if things remain the same and there is no support, I think I’d 
have to grow coca. Of course, I’d be scared of the fumigations and 
all the violence coca production brings with it. I wish we could 
stop growing coca because it has brought the war to us. I know we 
can make it, but we’ll never make it with coca. I’d like to speak to 
the president of Colombia; to tell him that he should help farmers 
like us. If he’d help us, send programs here, people would stop 
growing coca. And if there was less coca, there’d be less violence. 
I’d like to ask people in other parts of the world to help us. People 
are suffering. People are being killed. People are starving. Please 
help the people of my community and the other communities all 
over Colombia. 
Alfredo
Alfredo’s12 family knew their uncle’s involvement in the drug 
trade would come back to haunt them, but they never could have 
imagined the extent to which that would be true. Shady deals put 
paramilitaries after him and by the time Alfredo was seventeen, 
paramilitaries had killed his two uncles and his father. A significant 
and illustrative aspect of Alfredo’s story is the role of the Colombian 
security forces, recipients of billions of dollars in counternarcotics 
security assistance from the international community, principally 
the United States. The Colombian security forces have the worst 
human rights record in the Western Hemisphere and long-standing 
ties to paramilitary groups (both the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia and post-demobilization, “next-generation” groups).13 
Alfredo recounts multiple instances in which the Colombian National 
Police, the principal entity responsible for counternarcotics activities 
in Colombia, facilitated or turned a blind eye to paramilitary 
activities.
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My family’s tragedy started in 2002, when I was seventeen. My 
uncle was involved in the drug trade. The rest of my family didn’t 
have anything to do with my uncle’s business and we told him 
that he was going to get us into trouble. When he was about 
twenty years old, barely starting in the trade, he got into trouble. 
Paramilitaries were after him and he went into hiding. They 
went to his house looking for him and tied up my grandmother 
and interrogated her. I don’t know what he did, but they looked 
for him for a long time, many years. 
One night at 2 a.m., paramilitaries opened the door and they 
killed him. They shot him three times and killed him. They also 
killed the man he worked for, on Christmas Eve. The coroner’s 
report showed that they pulled forty bullets out of his body. That’s 
how the story started, when my uncle, who was the youngest of his 
three brothers, was killed.
And so my dad and his brother inherited these problems. The 
paramilitaries who killed my uncle thought his brothers might 
go to the police or seek revenge. Paramilitaries sometimes showed 
up at my dad’s office to tell him they needed to “fix the problem.” 
They threatened to kill him and his family. He worried about his 
kids. At times he would cry just thinking about these threats. He 
told us that if he was ever murdered, we’d know paramilitaries 
were responsible.
One day my brother and I were coming home from school and 
there were two men with guns at the house looking for my dad. I 
asked them why they were looking for him and they said, “So we 
can take a look at some papers that he’s working on.” My older 
brother told my dad that there were some strange guys at the 
house looking for him. My dad went to the door and they shot him 
fifteen times right in front of me. The only thing I could do was 
watch and wait as they pumped bullets into him. I was powerless.  
The police came and asked what happened.  Neighbors pointed 
out the guys that murdered my dad and said, “Run! You can 
still catch them! There they go!” But the police just stood around; 
they themselves were mixed up in this. I grabbed my dad and 
tried to pick him up, but the police stopped me. They said that he 
was dead and we had to wait for the coroner’s office to deal with 
the body. But it was so horrible; people were looking at him so I 
carried him into the house.
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And then they killed my last uncle. He was a mechanic and 
hardly left the house because he knew the paramilitaries were 
going to kill him. We begged him to leave the city, but he said he 
didn’t want to. One way or the other, he said, they were going to 
kill him. One morning, as he was feeding breakfast to my eighty-
year-old grandfather, they came and they killed him. They left us 
a message: if any of us talked about these killings, reported them 
to the police, or sought revenge, we would be killed, just as my 
dad and uncles were killed.
This has devastated our family. My youngest brother hardly talks 
anymore. He was about fourteen when my dad was killed. He 
dropped out of school and locks himself in his room all day. And 
now my mom works as a street vendor to bring food home for the 
family. It all makes me sad because you want the best for your 
family and with this situation, everything is different. Christmas, 
for example, isn’t like it used to be. We now remember Christmas 
Eve at 5 p.m. as the time they killed my uncle’s drug-trafficking 
partner.
When my mom went to file a report about my father’s murder, 
the lawyer from the Prosecutor General’s Office said, “Ma’am, I 
don’t know you but you seem like a nice person. You shouldn’t file 
this report. If you do, they’ll kill you and your sons. Let sleeping 
dogs lie.” He was right because the paramilitary leader behind 
my father’s murder later killed a young man and the boy’s father 
filed a police report. The police immediately handed the file over 
to the paramilitaries with the father’s name, address, and what 
he had reported. The paramilitaries killed him that day. Here 
we cannot trust the justice system or the security forces. You 
see paramilitaries driving around on police motorcycles. You 
see paramilitaries and police playing pool and dominos while 
drinking beer on street corners. This is normal.
People often ask me, “How do you keep going with everything that 
has happened to your family? I would have picked up a gun and 
gone after the people that killed your dad if I were you.” And I hope 
you don’t think I am a bad person, but if the guerrillas hadn’t lost 
their ideals, I probably would have joined them. I just want justice 
so badly and I know that it is never going to come through the justice 
system. I saw the people kill my dad. I know who they are. Sometimes 
I pass them on the street. I have this terrible feeling of powerlessness. 
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But what can I do? There is nothing to do. I have to focus on the rest 
of my family that is still alive and try to move on. 
Yina	Paola
Yina Paola14 was the epitome of a child of the drug war. Now twenty-
three, she is also a sign of hope. Yina was born into an opium poppy 
farming family that treated her more as an employee than a child. 
At eleven she joined the FARC to escape her family and spent the 
next three years on the frontlines of Colombia’s war. Years later she 
demobilized and managed to turn her life around. She began working 
on children’s rights with a nonprofit organization and soon founded a 
new organization to do the same. Thanks to her efforts, she was sent 
to New York to speak with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon about 
the plight of child soldiers across the globe. Closer to home, she is 
breaking the cycle of violence. She took in her fourteen-year-old sister 
who was recruited to join the FARC and will soon do the same for her 
young brother.
I lived with my grandparents and started working on the farm 
as early as I can remember. I had to get up at 4 a.m. most days 
to start working. My grandparents had a seven-acre opium poppy 
farm back then. I worked in the fields, weeding and harvesting 
the sap. On our farm, the sap was processed into morphine bricks 
and bought by local drug traffickers. The farm was fumigated a 
couple of times. The planes would fly by, spraying the poison on 
the crops. We’d run out and try to harvest before the poppies died. 
The poison was strong and would kill everything. The work was 
hard; I was treated poorly, especially because I was a girl. The 
family was sexist and the boys were seen as more important. That 
is why my aunt and I decided to escape. The only escape we could 
imagine was the FARC. I was eleven when I joined the FARC.
The FARC was very active in the area. Guerrillas marched by 
our farm regularly. I was intrigued by the guerrillas. They were 
the group in charge and having a gun was a quick way to gain 
respect. One day, when a group of FARC guerrillas passed by the 
farm, my aunt and I ran up to them and said we wanted to join 
them. My grandmother came running after us. She yelled at the 
guerrillas, told them to let us go because we were children. To join 
the FARC, you had to be fifteen. So, when the FARC commander 
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asked us how old we were, we lied and said fifteen so they would 
accept us.
My grandfather showed up at the guerrilla camp many times, 
demanding we be released. Once he came with our birth 
certificates. He said, “Look, you’ve taken these girls by mistake. 
They are under fifteen.” The commander asked us about this. We 
admitted the lie. He yelled at us for lying, but sent us back to 
work.
The first couple of months we were in training, but the very first 
day they gave me a revolver. I was very excited. I was soon put 
on guard duty for an FARC member, a relative of mine who was 
being punished. He had been tied up for a week awaiting trial. I 
had to bring him his breakfast and keep him tied up. He had been 
a member of the paramilitaries and then joined the FARC. One 
night he got drunk and hit a civilian. That was a big mistake in 
the eyes of the FARC back then. You were not allowed to mistreat 
a civilian. He was soon taken before a guerrilla tribunal and 
tried. The judge asked all the guerrillas in the company to vote on 
his sentence. He said, “Raise your hand if you think he should be 
executed by firing squad.” Everyone raised their hands. Without 
understanding what was going on, I raised mine too. Then the 
judge said, “Raise your hand if you think he shouldn’t be killed.” 
No one raised their hand. After everything was done, I asked a 
guerrilla fighter, “So, is he going to be tied up for another week?” 
And he said, “No. He’s going to be executed by a firing squad.” 
I couldn’t believe it. He explained the guerrilla tribunal process 
to me and said that votes are counted and in this case everyone 
voted for him to be executed, even me. And in fact he was executed. 
That is my worst memory from my time in the FARC; naively 
voting for this person—this relative of mine—to be executed by a 
firing squad.
When we finished training, my aunt and I were split up. She was 
sent to a company of guerrillas up north and I was sent south. I 
soon got word that she was killed fighting the Colombian Army. 
That set me off. Rage filled me. I hated the Colombian Army and 
wanted to kill as many of them as I could. That hatred stayed 
with me for a long time, even after I left the FARC. I was so angry, 
I always asked my commander to send me to the frontlines to 
fight. That was my favorite thing, it was like a passion; being on 
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the frontlines, fighting the army and paramilitaries. There was a 
lot of fighting as it was a dangerous area, but I was never afraid. 
My heart had died and I only thought of getting revenge for my 
aunt’s death. Of course, when they killed one of ours, a friend, 
that hurt.
I was twelve when I got married to a platoon commander. He 
was forty-six years old. There are a lot of rules in the FARC about 
relationships. If you want to date someone, you go to the company 
commander and tell him or her that you want to be a couple 
and you are given permission. But you are not allowed to sleep 
together. If you decide to get married, the commander marries 
you and then you can sleep together. So, I got married. If you 
want to get divorced, the commander will divorce you. The FARC 
is also very careful to make sure no women get pregnant. They put 
women on birth control and if a woman gets pregnant, she has to 
get rid of the child.
As I moved up the FARC ranks, I was sent to work with the FARC’s 
financial manager. There we collected FARC taxes. Everyone paid 
taxes to the FARC—local farmers, drug traffickers, ranchers, 
businesses, everyone. All opium poppy farmers paid the FARC a 
share of the money they made selling their products. Coca farmers 
would also pay a share. The drug traffickers that purchased the 
morphine brick or the coca paste also paid the FARC. 
The FARC also raised funds through kidnapping for ransom. 
The first time I ever visited the provincial capital of the province 
where I grew up was to kidnap a wealthy man from the city. We 
set up a roadblock and stole a couple of SUVs.  A small group 
of us dressed up as civilians, got in the SUVs with our guns 
and made our way down into the city at night. We broke into 
the apartment while our victim was watching TV with his kids. 
We grabbed him and took him away as his family screamed and 
cried. We spent the whole night marching up into the mountains 
with him tied up the whole time. At 9 a.m. we arrived at our 
destination, 10,000 feet above sea level. It may sound strange, 
but there was no emotion in this, in stealing someone’s life. It was 
just normal. Kidnapping someone was just that: normal. I didn’t 
feel any pain. 
I demobilized from the FARC when I was fifteen. I was on an 
intelligence mission dressed as a civilian and had to go into a 
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small town to get food. That day a woman saw me walking into 
town and yelled to me from her house, “What are you doing? Who 
are you?” I said that I was looking for a store. She said she could 
tell I wasn’t from the town and asked again what I was doing. The 
FARC told us that if we ever ran into any trouble, we should say we 
were runaways. So I said that I had run away because my parents 
beat me. She invited me in and offered me a drink and something 
to eat. While I was there and without me knowing, she called the 
police, who picked me up and took me to Child Protective Services 
because I was a minor. 
I wanted to escape, get back to the FARC, but they put me under 
special watch as they thought I was in danger. My family picked 
me up and took me home. I thought I’d sneak out of the house 
when the FARC marched by and rejoin. My family pleaded with 
me not to go back, but I knew what I wanted. So they kept me 
holed up in a room and when the FARC was in the area, they’d 
put someone in the room with me so I couldn’t yell to them.
My family finally convinced me to go to Bogota, where I entered 
the Child Protective Services demobilization program. I was in 
the program until I was eighteen. Like most of the women in the 
program, we believed we had two options: rejoin an armed group 
or move in with a man. I moved in with an ex-FARC combatant 
I met in the program and was soon pregnant. Our relationship 
didn’t last and I ended up on my own with a young son. Then the 
FARC started recruiting my fourteen-year-old sister, so I brought 
her to live with us in Bogota. I was twenty, raising a year-old 
son and my sister without any support and no real income. It 
was tough. I made US$290 a month and my monthly rent alone 
cost US$190. There simply wasn’t enough money for food and I 
hardly ate anything. My son would go a whole day eating only an 
egg. And I’d get a lunch at work and would bring whatever they 
gave me home to feed my sister. I didn’t even have plates to eat off 
of. That was the most difficult thing I’ve ever faced. I will never 
forget it. And if not for my son, I probably wouldn’t have overcome 
that. I would have probably gone back to the FARC.
But, instead, I started a new life. I joined an organization called 
Taller de Vida that works on children’s rights issues with ex-
combatants and in local schools. I realized I wanted to dedicate 
my life to working on human rights and children’s rights, and 
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I dove right in. We worked with children through art and rap, 
helping them express their feelings about abuse they’d faced and 
work through it. And last year, two other ex-combatants and I 
founded a human rights organization called Red Ali Arte. This 
organization works with ex-combatants on children’s rights and 
women’s issues, displaced people, and local community members. 
Currently, we are working on a play—written by one of our 
members, an ex-combatant—that will be performed at a theater 
festival later this year. Because of my work, I was selected by 
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers to travel to New 
York in 2009 to speak with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
about the Red Hand Campaign and the use of child soldiers in 
Colombia and across the world.
For years after leaving the FARC, I had dreams every night about 
being back with the guerrillas. Sometimes they were nightmares 
about a commander taking my son away from me. Sometimes they 
were just dreams about being a guerrilla again. But I had them 
every single night. Three years ago, when my son was one year old 
and I started working with Taller de Vida and then Red Ali Arte, 
the dreams stopped. That life is behind me now and a new one has 
begun. Today, I am the only person in my family who has a high 
school diploma. Today I am twenty-three years old, working on 
children’s rights with Red Ali Arte and continuing my studies. 
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2. Children: The Forgotten Victims in 
Mexico’s Drug War
by Aram Barra and Daniel Joloy
Introduction
My government is absolutely determined to continue fighting 
against criminality without quarter until we put a stop to this 
common enemy and obtain the Mexico we want.
President Felipe Calderón1
We live in a state of war and children are left to drift.
Aurelio Paez, 
Orphanage director, Ciudad Juárez2
The “war on drugs,” in most places, is metaphorical. The term is rarely 
used by governments and was recently abandoned as a rhetorical 
device by the United States.3 In Mexico, however, the war on drugs 
has a very real dimension. It is “declared” government policy, it is 
militarized, and it is extremely bloody. Shortly after taking power, 
President Felipe Calderón ordered a military offensive against the 
country’s drug cartels that eventually involved tens of thousands of 
troops. Keeping drugs away from Mexico’s children has been a central 
justification.4 
While the consequent violence in Mexico has been well documented, 
the specific consequences for children are not so often brought to the 
fore. Despite President Calderón’s justification based on the welfare 
of children, his decision, combined with a zero-tolerance approach to 
drug use, has contributed to conditions in which children have been 
killed, orphaned, and neglected.  Since the war on drugs began, there 
have been increased killings of children and parents with thousands 
dead and tens of thousands orphaned; increased attacks on drug 
rehabilitation centers, including massacres of young drug users; and 
increased attacks on schools resulting in a significant drop in school 
attendance for fear of violence. We consider these effects of the drug 
war and the long-term psychological damage experienced by children 
who are surrounded by conflict and violence. Due to space constraints, 
we cannot analyze all aspects of Mexico’s drug problems and policies. 
The involvement of children in drug trafficking, for example, is not 
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covered, nor is the incarceration of parents. We focus instead on the 
military intervention against the drug cartels, the related escalation 
in violence, and the connected zero-tolerance approach to drug use 
and dependence.
With this focus, it becomes clear that the harms of the drug war 
not only exist in the present but also will reverberate through many 
generations due to the specific harms inflicted on children. Next to 
them, the small gains against the cartels are rendered meaningless. 
After four years of poor results in frontally combating drug cartels and 
adopting zero-tolerance approaches to drugs, rethinking government 
strategies is now unavoidable. 
Military	Intervention	Against	the	Drug	Cartels
Soon after taking power in 2006, President Felipe Calderón directed 
the Mexican army to wage a battle against drug cartels that, as he 
himself said, could not be put off any longer. Military operatives soon 
extended to several Mexican states such as Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and 
Baja California, and highways and streets were soon filled with armed 
men. In a matter of days, more than 30,000 soldiers were deployed in 
different cities in the country in order to avoid, as Calderón explained 
(somewhat ironically in hindsight) the risk of “being dominated by 
crime, insecurity and violence resulting from the activities of criminal 
groups.”5
Combined with a program to address corruption within the police 
force, the strategy was intended to shatter the cartels by carrying 
out arrests of gang leaders, extraditing them to the United States 
when possible, and seizing drug shipments. According to a report 
by the Security Cabinet to reflect the achievements made in three 
years of the drug war, from December 1, 2006, to April 30, 2009, 
66,621 criminal suspects were captured.6 High-profile criminals were 
extradited for trial in the United States in far greater numbers than 
in previous administrations,7 thousands of metric tons of illicit drugs 
(mainly cannabis) were seized, and hundreds of millions of dollars 
were frozen.8 
Initially, this strategy managed to reduce somewhat the presence 
and visibility of gangs and cartels in the states where they used 
to operate, such as Sinaloa, Baja California, and Chihuahua. 
Nevertheless, the so-called cockroach effect soon became evident and 
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cartels moved to new places.9 In 2007, the presence of cartels was 
registered in twenty-one of the thirty-two Mexican states. Today they 
are in all but one.10
As a result, violence also spread to an alarming number of states, 
cities, and municipalities, and the number of casualties of the war has 
increased with every day that has passed. Although official figures are 
uncertain, the National Security Center CISEN estimates that there 
have been more than 28,000 deaths since the war began in 2006.11 
It is a figure that has alarmed many nationally and internationally. 
Regrettably, all these deaths have been considered simply as 
“collateral damage.”
Cases where civilians have died because of military operations are 
becoming more and more frequent as the increase in complaints to 
the National Commission on Human Rights shows. Queries directed 
against the military rose more than 900 percent in the first three 
years of the drug war, increasing from 182 cases in 2006 to 1,791 in 
2009 at just the federal level. This does not include queries registered 
at local commissions of human rights.12 However, in a recent report 
of the Defense Ministry in response to a request from Congress, it 
was claimed that only 565 civilian deaths may be linked to military 
action, a number that includes those suspected of being linked with 
drug cartels.13 
Killings	of	Children	and	Parents
The death toll among those under the age of seventeen since the war 
began amounts to over 900, according to the Network for the Rights 
of Infancy in Mexico. In the first half of 2010, it is estimated that 
ninety children have lost their lives to drug-related violence.14 The 
same nongovernmental organization reported that homicide rates for 
children under seventeen years of age have increased, especially in the 
states of Durango, Baja California, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa. During 
the past three years, child homicide rates have tripled, increasing 
from 83 per year to 274 per year. Durango itself saw an increase of 
more than 450 percent in homicide rates for young people in 2006–8.15 
Those most affected have been young people between the ages of 
fifteen and seventeen. For example, in Baja California the homicide 
rate for this age group increased from 8.33 per 100,000 in 2007 to 
24.3 per 100,000 in 2008—an increase of almost 300 percent. In 
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Chihuahua the rate rose from 12.6 to 45.9 per 100,000, an increase 
of 364 percent.16 In Ciudad Juárez—now considered the most violent 
city in the world—from September 2009 to February 2010, three 
different massacres took place with at least forty-five young people 
aged between fifteen and nineteen being killed. It is estimated that 30 
percent of the 4,500 homicides committed in Juárez from 2007 to 2008 
involved young people under the age of nineteen. 
But Ciudad Juárez is not the only city where massacres of young 
people have occurred. In Durango, an armed group in the municipality 
of Pueblo Nuevo gunned down ten children and young people between 
the ages of eight and twenty-one after they had received scholarship 
awards at an official ceremony.17 In Tijuana, three students (two boys 
and a girl) all aged sixteen, died on their way back from school when 
unknown gunmen attacked them with high-powered weapons.18 In 
Torreon, five young people between seventeen and nineteen were 
found stacked in the back of a pickup truck with the engine running. 
All of them were gagged, had bullet wounds, and signs of torture. 
According to some neighbors, shots were heard at around five in the 
morning, though police and military forces did not arrive until almost 
two hours later.19    
The killings have included cases where children have died at 
military checkpoints, such as that of the Almanza boys, killed by 
army forces on April 3, 2010, on a highway in the state of Tamaulipas. 
According to statements made by Cynthia Salazar, mother of the 
two brothers, the family was on their way to the beach to spend 
the holidays when they passed through a military checkpoint. They 
reduced their speed and soldiers allowed them through to continue 
their journey. However, a few meters down the road, soldiers opened 
fire, killing Bryan and Martin Almanza, aged five and nine.20
This case resulted in a recommendation from the National 
Commission on Human Rights to the military forces. While the official 
version given by the military and even by the Ministry of Interior 
argued that the family was caught in crossfire between the military 
and drug cartels, the National Commission on Human Rights rejected 
this and concluded that the van in which the two children and eleven 
other people were traveling was in fact under direct attack from the 
military.21 A couple of months later, authorities accepted this version, 
but no one has yet been charged or indicted for the alleged crimes nor 
has a full and credible investigation been conducted.
Part 1: Frontlines 	 33
This was not an isolated case. Since 2006, military checkpoints 
have been widely used in the drug war. In June 2007, two women 
and three children, aged two, four, and seven, were shot and killed 
when they failed to stop at a military checkpoint involved in “the 
permanent campaign against drug trafficking.”22 More recently, 
a child of fifteen and his father died after being shot by soldiers in 
the city of Monterrey. The military argued that the vehicle missed 
a checkpoint, while other relatives who survived the attack declared 
they were shot at without having been given any indication to stop.23
Violence in Mexico has had myriad implications for society and 
specifically for child development and well-being.24 It has, for example, 
eroded adults’ capacities to care for, nurture, and protect children. It 
is important to note that many of the 28,000 who have been killed 
since the war on drugs began were parents. While neither Mexico’s 
government nor the various nongovernmental organizations working 
in this area keep track of the number of children who have lost one 
or both parents in the war, it is estimated that tens of thousands of 
children are orphaned directly because of the drug war.25
Human rights lawyer and investigator for the Chihuaha local 
commission for human rights, Gustavo de la Rosa Hickerson, has 
analyzed these numbers and concluded that, based on data that 
Mexican men aged eighteen to thirty-five have on average 1.7 children, 
in Ciudad Juárez alone, the war has left more than 8,500 orphans.26 
Extending this figure to the national level, a total of 50,000 drug war 
orphans is possible.
The growing toll of children left orphaned because of the war is 
damaging not only to them but also to the country’s social network. 
Government officials at all the different levels have ignored the 
problem, and failed to take into account the future ramifications. 
Education and entry into the labor market, for example, may be 
more difficult for these children. For some this may be an additional 
factor pushing them toward the drug trade where employment is all 
but assured. “There is an opportunity cost from these hundreds of 
thousands of youths in Mexico who are either orphaned or part of 
criminal gangs,” said Eduardo Buscaglia, an expert on armed conflict 
and Mexico’s drug trade. “These are people who are growing up with 
high levels of deprivation, in dysfunctional families, with sexual 
abuse, and these risk factors should be addressed.”27 
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Young	Drug	Users:	Zero-Tolerance,	Stigma,	and	Violence
Another goal of the Calderón administration’s drug war was 
to prevent the use of drugs, which the government argued had 
alarmingly increased in recent years.28 While this argument was on 
the right track, the government’s zero-tolerance response, involving 
the criminalization of drug users and limited treatment options, has 
been deeply flawed. Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution provides for 
universal access to health services, but this is far from the case for 
people who use drugs. While this should include universal access to 
treatment options, including access to methadone and buprenorphine 
as substitution therapy, public funding of syringe exchange programs, 
and the availability of naloxone for the treatment of opiate overdose, 
such services are scarce and hampered by a lack of security, criminal 
laws, and drug-related stigma. 
Some years ago, there was only one publicly funded methadone 
program clinic in the country, located in Ciudad Juárez, and today 
only two methadone clinics are functioning in all of Mexico—both 
located in the northern cities of Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, where 
use of injectable drugs is more common and heroin dependence has 
increased in recent years. According to statistics provided by the 
Health Ministry in 2008 (National Drug Addiction Survey), there 
were more than 5,000 heroin users in Juárez—where most drug users 
are between the ages of twelve and seventeen.29 Despite this, few 
efforts are being implemented either by the government or by civil 
society to help fill the gaps in services.
In addition, the criminalization of drug users by the federal 
government has acted as a significant barrier to health policies, 
contributing to public stigmatization, and driving them away from 
services. The National Drug Addiction Survey also states that only 
16 percent of problematic drug users seek treatment.30 Meanwhile, 
although drug use among young people is a consistent justification 
for the offensive against the cartels, addiction rates continue to rise, 
including among elementary and high school students.31 
Mexican society, however, sees little need to protect the human 
rights of drug users and people affected by drug use. Recently, 
widespread stigma and negative public attitudes toward drug users 
combined with the drug war have made violence against this particular 
community a valid political statement. Killings of young drug addicts 
as direct targets started in Ciudad Juárez, but disappearances, 
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levantones,32 kidnappings and killings quickly expanded to the whole 
country. This is a little-known phenomenon but it is increasingly seen 
as cartels engaging in a form of “social cleansing.”33 The alarm was 
raised only recently when nineteen young drug users were gunned 
down by an armed commando who entered a rehabilitation center in 
Juárez. Many of the victims were younger than sixteen.34 
This massacre, however, was in fact the fifth reported attack on 
rehabilitation centers close to the northern Mexican border since 
August 2008, when two Alcohol and Drug Addiction Integration 
Centers were attacked, and ten young drug users were killed. In 
2009, two other attacks were reported, one on June 6 at the Doceava 
Tradición center, where an intern was injured by gunfire and then 
died at the local hospital; the other one was on May 31, when five men 
were murdered in the rehabilitation center La vida sin Adicciones.35 
In Ciudad Juárez, there were at least forty-six killings of young people 
at different treatment centers during 2009.36
The government’s neglect of drug dependence and treatment is 
evident in the fact that there is no regulation of rehabilitation clinics. 
Many now function as “fronts” for criminal gangs, and operate as 
centers for recruitment or distribution.37 As explained by Chihuahua’s 
public security minister, “rehab centers have become a nest for 
criminal groups to recruit young people aged seventeen to twenty-
three years, considered ‘disposable’ because if they are detained or die 
they can be quickly replaced.”38 
Despite the cruelty of the killings at the centers, the government 
reaction is to immediately argue that the victims were directly linked 
to organized crime, overshadowing any due diligence required to 
protect vulnerable young people from harm. For example, on the same 
day that ten young people were massacred at a rehab center in Juarez 
on September 17, 2009, Chihuahua’s Governor José Reyes Baeza 
argued “it is no coincidence, there is a clear motivation: everything 
is happening in the context of a war between different criminals. 
Dependent drug users at the clinic belong to one group or another.”39 
Just a few days earlier, at the rehab center El Aliviane, also in 
Ciudad Juárez, hit men forced twenty-two young drug users to form a 
row against the wall before shooting with AK-47 rifles, killing eighteen 
of them, many under age sixteen who had arrived just weeks earlier. 
After the shooting, the state attorney declared, “the motive for these 
crimes is extermination between criminal groups.”40
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Human rights defenders have questioned the authorities’ responses 
to these cruel acts. Gustavo de la Rosa, an investigator at the local 
Commission on Human Rights, criticized the government response for 
putting the blame on children. He added that “the role of authorities 
is not to discriminate between good and bad people who die; this 
only reveals the utter contempt for those who have fallen into drug 
addiction.”41
Conflict	and	Psychological	Damage
It is important to take into account the long-term psychological 
damage to children associated with high levels of violence and the 
resultant breakdown in family, community, and social structures. 
That damage is well known and documented from other conflict 
zones in the world, and some of those countries are still struggling 
with the harmful effects on children many years after the conflict 
ended.
Conflict and violence have direct consequences for the individual 
child, immediate family, and community that can be devastating, 
but while the long-term corrosive effects of the breakdown of social 
and political structures may take the severest toll, they are barely 
spoken of. In addition to understanding the damage to children’s 
developmental processes caused by exposure to ongoing armed 
violence, it is essential to understand how the maintenance of family 
and community norms in addition to functioning state structures—
such as education and health services—can mitigate the dire situation 
in which children find themselves when they live in communities 
exposed to violence.42
There is no doubt that exposure to violence, deprivation, fear, and 
stress affects children’s development even before birth.43 It is well 
documented that individual development is characterized by the 
interplay of environmental and biological factors from the outset. For 
example, evidence from neurological research reveals that, in utero, 
the wiring of the brain is affected by external factors such as adequate 
nutrition and levels of maternal stress, which, in pregnancy, may affect 
the unborn infant’s brain development. In essence, exposure to stress 
hormones before birth can potentially lead to longer term behavioral 
disorders such as hyperactivity and attention deficit disorder in the 
young child, which in turn can be precursors of aggressive behavior, 
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making it more likely that cycles of violence are reproduced from one 
generation to another.
Each child is different, and many variables such as age, cultural 
norms, gender, and individual temperament will mediate how children 
experience the threat or reality of violence. Nonetheless, research 
draws out clusters of typical reactions of children experiencing loss 
and trauma. When faced with the death or maiming of a family or 
community member, children’s reactions will vary tremendously, and 
will depend on the ability of the family and community to provide 
reassurance and explanation. However, reactions to ongoing violence 
may include increased anxiety, which manifests through emotional 
and physical withdrawal (e.g., elective mutism or inability to engage 
in everyday tasks such as washing) or demonstrations of aggression. 
Children may also find it difficult to separate from family members 
for fear of what will happen during separation, thereby making 
attendance at early childhood services or school very difficult. Some 
children regress to earlier stages and may, for instance, talk or behave 
like a much younger child. Bed wetting is another common example 
of regressive behavior. Other children become hypervigilant, feeling 
it is their responsibility to keep the family safe. Trust in adults and 
the future can also be eroded, leaving children without hope. This 
is particularly the case when children witness the helplessness of 
parents and caregivers to stop violence. 
It does not matter to children whether violence is caused by states, 
militias, rebels, or criminal groups; whatever the cause and whoever 
is to blame, children experience violation and distress that can have 
long-term consequences. In the current situation in Mexico, the 
government must be held accountable for upholding the rights of 
children and for putting into place measures to reduce the violence 
children are experiencing, particularly if it emanates from agents of 
the state, in addition to providing services aimed at mitigating the 
effects of violence on children.
Attacks	on	Schools
The constant battles between drug cartels and the military have 
made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for children in some 
places to reach school. In its 2010 report Education Under Attack, 
UNESCO documented a significant number of cases in which schools, 
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teachers, and students were attacked and threatened, both by cartels 
and by police or military forces. 
The report found as reasons for these attacks, among others, the 
desire of irregular groups to undermine confidence in government 
control of an area or even the functioning of the education system.44 
In November 2008, armed drug gangs threatened teachers in six 
different schools, stating that they would kidnap students if they were 
not paid Christmas bonuses. Most of these schools had to evacuate all 
of their students and close their doors for more than three weeks due 
to a lack of security that should have been provided by the state.45 
On March 17, 2009, more than twenty high-caliber cartridges were 
found on the campus of the 83rd Baccalaureate Studies Institute, in 
the Triqui region of San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, following a raid by 
armed gangs on a community along its perimeter. Those were days 
of continued armed attacks attributed to the Union of Social Welfare 
of the Triqui Region, a paramilitary group that forced primary and 
secondary high schools to suspend classes during April 2009.46 
Police and military forces have also been directly involved in cases 
where accessibility to schools, and even the very security of students, 
has been compromised. In March 2010, local police burst into a 
high school in Ciudad Juárez looking for drugs and arms without 
any previous notification to school authorities. They evicted 2,600 
students and took them out for inspection. After a few hours, the police 
retreated and concluded that the students were not in possession of 
drugs.47 
Schools have been a specific target in the government’s strategy 
to reduce the demand for drugs by criminalizing drug use. Thus the 
program Mochila segura (Safe schoolbag) was implemented. It consisted 
of a series of police-led random search efforts inspecting students’ 
schoolbags to make sure they are not carrying weapons or drugs with 
them. Different human rights authorities have spoken against this 
program because it not only pushes students away from schools and 
damages confidence between pupils and teachers, but also is an invasive 
measure that violates the right to privacy of children and youth.48
In states such as Tamaulipas, Morelos, or Chiapas, students 
have missed classes because of rumors that heavy shootings will 
occur around the city. In Reynosa, for example, absence from school 
extended to 90 percent of all students. Tamaulipas’s Education 
Ministry explained that: “the reason for the large number of absences 
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was primarily email chains that contained phrases such as ‘care for 
your children’ and ‘don’t leave home because it will get worse than 
Iraq.’”49
Experience from other conflict zones has shown the value of reducing 
the harmful effects of violence on children by ensuring that they have 
access to safe spaces such as early childhood and community services 
and schools.50 If schools are threatened with disruption or targeted as 
described above, the state must take every action to ensure that they 
still function. Education has proved its essential role in providing 
structure, routine, and a focus on the future that is highly beneficial 
to children and communities affected by violence and conflict. 
Equally, programs that enable children to explore and come to terms 
with their experiences in a safe environment through play, music, 
art, and drama are often sufficient to help most children deal with 
the extreme effects of exposure to violence. Initiatives such as those 
in Ciudad Juárez to establish safe spaces for play, supported by the 
community and World Vision, an international evangelical relief and 
development agency, will go a long way to lessening the effects of the 
violence that these children are still experiencing.51
Conclusion
Árbol que crece torcido jamás su tronco endereza
Mexican proverb52
After four years of poor results in attempts to directly combat drug 
cartels and to adopt zero-tolerance approaches to drugs, rethinking 
government strategies is now unavoidable in the face of grotesque 
violence and rising rates of addiction (both affecting children); 
increased school absences and the breakdown of educational 
structures; and the prospect of almost certain long-term psychological 
damage to children exposed to the drug war.
A radical change in direction is required, for as more and more 
children fall victim to violence directed at them, their parents, and 
their schools, and as more and more young people who use drugs 
are abandoned by the state, the long-term impact of Mexico’s violent 
experiment will become clear. Next to this prognosis, the earlier gains 
in terms of dollars frozen, criminals extradited, and metric tons of 
drugs seized, seem all the more hollow and irrelevant.
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Former president Vicente Fox has now stated that he is in favor 
of considering models of legal regulation of currently illicit drugs. 
President Calderón, while against this proposal, says that the debate 
is important.53 Whatever the outcome of such debates, Mexican 
authorities must refocus and increase actions aimed at promoting 
young people’s comprehensive development, particularly in the 
areas of education, employment, and leisure. This is possible if it 
is proactively decided that drugs should be addressed as a public 
health and development issue, rather than a security issue, and only 
if children are truly placed at the forefront of more effective drug 
policies rather than being left to drift in a sea of violence. 
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3. In the Shadows of the Insurgency in 
Afghanistan: Child Bartering, Opium 
Debt, and the War on Drugs
by Atal Ahmadzai and Christopher Kuonqui
[T]his is a real crisis for the young sisters and daughters of the 
opium farmers’ families in this region.
Khamosh Hezb-u-allah
Freelance Afghan reporter1
Introduction
In 2010, Afghanistan produced over 3,600 metric tons of opium. While 
marking a continual decline over recent years (a 48 percent fall from 
2009), this figure represents a tremendous illicit economy, the value of 
which is on the rise. Farm-gate incomes in 2010 reached an aggregate 
US$604 million, up from US$438 million in 2009.2 Many argue that 
this trade bolsters the Taliban and related networks. Others dispute 
this. Whatever the security reality, the Afghan opium trade produces 
an often-ignored face of the global war on drugs: that of the children 
and families who often pay the steepest human costs of the direct and 
indirect consequences of national and international policies.
History shows that drug wars and violent wars often travel 
together. Today’s Afghanistan may represent the strongest expression 
of this pattern. Opium production in the country takes place precisely 
in those areas where the rule of the gun supersedes the rule of law. 
As the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Afghan 
Opium Survey 2010 finds, 98 percent of total cultivation takes place 
in nine provinces in the southern and western regions, including the 
least secure areas of the country. The link between opium cultivation 
and lack of security remains salient despite twists and turns in 
counterinsurgency and poppy-field eradication strategies, military 
leadership changes, and national elections, disputed and otherwise.
The war on drugs in Afghanistan pivots on an understanding of the 
opium trade as a major source of financing terrorism. The UNODC 
estimated the value of trafficking, lab processing, and the precursor 
chemical industry in Afghanistan at US$3 billion in 2009, including 
farmers’ and traffickers’ incomes.3 This mirrors roughly one-third of 
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total Afghan gross domestic product in that year.4 Based on these 
figures, many argue that the opium trade helps to finance recruitment 
to the Taliban and other quasi-terrorist groups operating in the largely 
unregulated Afghan countryside. NATO officials say that insurgents 
receive 40–60 percent of the income from drugs (though some of this 
may come from Pakistan’s opium fields).5 Former UNODC head 
Antonio Maria Costa in turn estimated that the Taliban annually 
reaps $400 million from the trade.6 The magnitude of these estimates 
makes the opium trade a significant concern on many fronts. 
But the drug–security dynamic does not exist in a vacuum. Deep, 
changing cultural practices also provide a backdrop that shapes the 
war on drugs and its implications in Afghanistan. Driven by shifts 
in cultivation, market forces put the price advantage of opium over 
wheat—the main competitor—at three to one in 2009.7 In 2010, the 
ratio was more than six to one.8 Afghan farmers can make far more 
money growing poppies than pursuing any other alternative. The 
economic role poppy plays in one of the world’s poorest economies 
influences social perceptions and attitudes, in turn leading to stark 
practices that include trading in children to resolve opium debts. 
This double setting of insecurity and profoundly rooted socioeconomic 
practices informs how the opium trade and the war on drugs affects 
the children of Afghanistan, a crisis that is otherwise all but invisible 
in the flight path of the war on terror and global security policies. This 
chapter sets out some of these more obscure processes.
The war on drugs framework placing poppy-field eradication at the 
heart of counternarcotics policy9 in Afghanistan cannot claim victory 
for the production decline, despite ongoing eradication campaigns. 
Disease and pests caused the large cultivation drop in 2010. 
Regardless of cause, however, decreases in opium supply produce two 
major effects in Afghanistan: as observed in 2010, they sharply edge 
the price of opium upward; and this is worrisome from the perspective 
of poverty and livelihoods because it severely stresses farmers who 
rely on opium for income. Most opium farmers buy their seeds and 
food for the year on credit from drug lords—a transaction filtered 
through a debt system called salaam. This has potentially significant 
consequences. When in 2000 the Taliban’s Mullah Omar decreed 
that opium planting was against religious practice, the economic 
implications were so great that more than 30,000 Afghans fled to 
Pakistan from Helmand alone to avoid defaulting on salaam loans. 
Some argue that the motivation for the opium ban was to induce a 
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price rise, rather than to prevent use.10 Since the 2001 invasion, due 
in part to the onset of eradication practices and, more important for 
overall reductions in production, disease, and pests, sudden opium 
income losses can have the result that farmers sell off their children 
to avoid violent reprisals from drug lords who are unwilling to accept 
a default.
The crux of the problem is that a drop in opium production leaves 
farmers with few options to repay salaam loans. While abrupt and 
catastrophic losses of opium crops can be cause for celebration in some 
circles, the direct consequences for small-scale and poorer farmers’ 
families and livelihoods require deeper caution. Drops in opium can 
unintentionally harm already vulnerable farmers while not affecting 
the intended targets—smugglers and terrorists. This suggests that 
perhaps the most viable means of weaning Afghanistan off opium 
may be to do so gradually, giving the rural farmer a chance to adapt. 
Expanding microcredit systems in Afghanistan represents a positive 
initial step. Another is to implement alternative crop programs that 
effectively secure livelihoods for farmers, although the record so far is 
weak.11 As long as poor decisions remain subsidized, little ground for 
developing nonopium-based self-sufficiency can form. Either way, the 
social and economic tragedies wrought by opium production declines 
complicate this otherwise desirable outcome.
This chapter studies the socioeconomic practices and implications of 
the salaam system, opium cultivation declines, and the consequences 
for children of the drug wars in Afghanistan. Based on a series of 
interviews conducted with farmers, villagers, journalists, activists, 
and policymakers in Helmand, Kandahar, and Kabul, it sets out 
new evidence that substantiates the links and results. While the 
scale of the research can only reveal the tip of a large iceberg of 
consequences, what emerges is how bartered girls, child addicts, and 
their families suffer the unintended consequences of counternarcotics, 
counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency stratagems in a society 
already marred by decades of poverty and violence.
Entrapping	Opium	Farmers:	The	Practices	of	Salaam	and	“Opium	
Culture”
The bartering of girls happens more but not exclusively in areas 
well-known for opium trade such as Naad Ali, Gareshk, Musa 
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Qala, and Sangeen districts. Recently we got information that in 
Baba Jee area—walking distance from the provincial capital—a 
farmer who owed a debt to a drug smuggler gave his daughter 
to him. One other case that I can remember happened in Musa 
Qala district. We eradicated a farmer’s opium field. The farmer 
actually took salaam from a drug lord. Eventually, we got to 
know that the farmer married either his daughter or sister to the 
salaam provider.12
Shafi-u-allah, Head, Department of Counter Narcotics in 
Helmand
Farmers form the foundation of the opium economy and culture, 
planting poppy seeds and setting the stage for one of the most profitable 
markets in Afghanistan. But despite their role, farmers largely fail 
to reap the rewards of partaking in the opium industry—earning the 
least, remaining the most vulnerable, and often suffering the worst 
consequences affecting their income and family lifestyle when crop or 
financial shocks take place. Reports in fact suggest that large-scale 
landowners rarely cultivate opium, leaving the crop to be managed 
by farmers who lease or mortgage their lands, or else by small-scale 
landowners. This trend provides wealthier landowners a social and 
economic buffer from losses due to field eradication or natural disasters, 
expected or unexpected. As a prominent social activist in Kandahar 
describes this state of power inequities: 
Opium farmers are the most vulnerable people in the opium cycle, 
and the uncoordinated war against opium further strengthens 
their social and economic vulnerabilities.13
In many if not most cases, farmers cannot afford the upfront capital 
investment of opium production, from overhead expenses to seeds, 
fertilizer, and irrigation costs. In these instances a “drug dealer,” 
yet another actor in the opium system, intervenes to offer farmers 
financial assistance in the form of credit. This special financing 
mechanism is a conditioned debt called salaam—cash money loaned 
to the borrower. But returns are not paid in cash or with interest 
(Rheba), the latter being strictly prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence. 
This leaves the salaam to be repaid in kind or in goods and products, 
leaving the distinction between Rheba and salaam to effectively cloak 
opium production in a veil of religious legality.
Salaam is generally offered to farmers in cash money equivalents 
to a specified quantity of processed opium, at market prices at the 
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time of issuing the debt. But the repayment terms obligate the farmer 
to return the same amount of opium, not cash, to the lender at the 
time of harvest, usually when opium prices are at their highest. A 
cycle of financial risk subjects farmers to the full brunt of crop failure 
or market changes, from expected and unexpected yield losses due 
to disease, flood, low productivity, or the increasing prevalence of 
opium-field eradication by the state and war on drugs policies. If any 
of these crises affect farmers, then they are left with steep debts to 
salaam providers. 
Often, farmers do not have alternative means to compensate 
and release the debt other than to offer their daughters or sisters 
as repayment, either with bride money14 or directly to the lender. A 
civil society activist in southern Afghanistan succinctly captures this 
tragedy: 
Drug lords and sometimes landlords give loans to farmers with 
cash money and ultimately the farmer is entrapped. For example, 
at the start of the opium cultivating season, the drug lord gives 
a specific amount of money and demands a particular amount of 
opium at harvesting time. Thus, the farmer is under debt from 
the beginning of the year. The bad times for farmers are when 
crops fail or are eradicated by police. Subsequently, the farmer 
does not have any other option except to satisfy the debt using his 
daughter’s bride money or by marrying his daughter directly to 
the loan provider.15 
Alongside the promise of higher income rewards of dealing in poppy 
production, salaam is used as an additional tool to encourage farmers 
to enter opium cultivation rather than other yields such as wheat, 
maize, and corn.
To be sure, however, the prepaid salaam debt does not always prove 
to be financially damaging to farmers. On the contrary, if opium yields 
remain immune to natural disasters or field eradication, farmers can 
stand to benefit. Often, the price of opium at the beginning of the 
cultivation seasons, when farmers receive salaam, is much higher in 
comparison with the price during the harvesting season. This range 
of price changes can financially benefit farmers when repaying opium 
debts at lower prices. Yet, twenty-first-century opium trends have so 
far provided little consolation with these rewards, more often leaving 
farmers steeped in financial burdens.
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A	Culture	of	Opium
Farmers are the most vulnerable; however, the opium brides 
directly suffer from both opium culture and field eradication. 
Opium culture instigated the practice of polygamy, and field 
eradication mostly and exclusively affects the farmer.
Child Rights Officer, Kandahar16
The salaam system sets part of the scene for the drug war’s 
affect on Afghanistan’s children. The sociocultural milieu across 
Afghanistan sets much of the rest. An “opium culture” practiced by 
those high in the narcotics apparatus hierarchy—including dealers, 
traffickers, and large-scale landowners—breeds and gives momentum 
to polygamy practices. Transformed over generations into a marker of 
social status, polygamy is widely practiced among those of this social 
faction—with underage girls from poorer rural families having the 
least voice in decisions.
The case of Ruzi Mohammad underscores this reality. Ruzi 
Mohammad is a farmer living in Alakozo village in the Marja District, 
Helmand Province (site of the spring 2010 NATO offensive). Earlier, 
in 2008, enjoying relatively good economic standing, Mohammad 
mortgaged several geribs17 of farm land from local owners, with 
the aim of cultivating opium. That year, however, saw the onset of 
a severe drought that dried up traditional irrigation systems such 
as springs and karizes (underground canals). A local drug dealer 
offered help by way of a salaam loan, which Mohammad used to 
install fuel-run water pumps on a bore well. But then disease hit 
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the crops. With his investment threatened, the farmer in time 
found himself under huge financial stress, with a mortgage and 
salaam debt to repay and hardly any means to compensate for his 
losses. To reconcile his debts, Mohammad married off his sister 
as a second wife to another villager, an opium dealer. Instead 
of paying the customary bride money to Mohammad, the dealer 
secured release of the mortgage and salaam debts. At the time 
of his interview in 2010, Mohammad’s family remained in deep 
poverty and had not heard of his sister since the debt repayment.
The opium culture and the war against drugs levy dual negative 
effects on farmers and their children in contemporary southern 
Afghanistan, particularly in the high-producing areas of Helmand. 
First, children directly participate in opium cultivation through 
irrigation, harvesting, trade, and, to some extent, addiction. Their 
involvement in both production and consumption clearly exposes 
children to high-risk activities and behavior. Second, children, 
mainly the daughters of poor farmers, are often bartered or “sold” 
as compensation for their families’ financial losses. Instances where 
drug lords intentionally aim to entrap farmers in order to pave the 
road to matrimony deals have also been reported from the field. These 
girls are called “opium brides” in the brief social literature on the 
practice.
Drug	War	Impacts
Eradication of opium fields means taking bread away from the 
farmer’s mouth. The farmer who is poor after suffering field 
eradication does not have any other means to return the debt 
he owes, mainly to drug dealers. He is disgraced and on the 
breadline. To save face in society he has to barter his daughter 
or sister to satisfy the debt.
Abdullah Khan, 
Helmand Representative, Independent Human Rights 
Commission of Afghanistan18
I am not hesitant to state that both opium cultivation and trade 
and opium eradication are equally endangering the children 
of farmers’ families. You can easily see school-age children 
who, instead of going to schools, are involved in cultivating, 
irrigating, and harvesting opium. On the other hand, when 
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we eradicate opium fields, we indeed make the farmer and 
his family poor and impoverished. In such circumstances the 
children of poor families cannot afford to go to school, so they 
become means of income for their families.
Shukran G. Mohammad, 
Head, Department of Counternarcotics in Kandahar19
Counternarcotics strategies aim to foster alternative livelihoods 
and means of diversifying income that encourage farmers to leave the 
opium economy. For the most part, these “carrots” include providing 
farmers with fertilizer, crop seeds, water pumps, and tractors, 
largely after the “stick” of field eradication has occurred. The scope of 
assistance is rarely (if ever) sufficient to alleviate the financial losses 
of the total destruction of a farmer’s crops. 
The war against drugs initiated by the government of Afghanistan 
and the international community appears as a comprehensive 
strategy to target cultivation and trafficking, and to support a legal 
agriculture-based economy. The practice of antidrug policy presents 
a different picture, where farmers and small-scale landowners are 
most affected. Opium smugglers and dealers, who have a strong 
influence over farmers and small landowners, remain immune. 
Moreover, Shafiullah, head of the Department of Counternarcotics 
of Helmand Province, notes that, in 2009, existing counternarcotics 
practices led to a 33.7 percent drop in opium production. He hastens 
to acknowledge that increased child bartering may be a likely 
consequence of these practices.20
The underlying sociocultural current means that the bartering 
of girls is not, of course, exclusively the outcome of field eradication 
under drug control policy. Factors such as natural disasters and crop 
disease can also devastate yields and leave farmers with high debts. 
The perception, however, among those interviewed for this study is 
that field eradication plays a dynamic role in financially entrapping 
farmers and that the bartering of girls is a means to resolve opium 
debt. Yet the generally obscure nature of opium-related culture 
similarly prevents gaining access to knowledge of bartering practices, 
which remain undiscovered and unreported by civil society and 
human rights bodies. 
The drug trade also facilitates drug use among Afghan children. 
While policies aim to curb Afghanistan’s opium exports, the plight 
of domestic use goes scarcely noticed, with as many as 1.5 million 
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Afghans estimated to be dependent on drugs—a substantial share of 
the 24 million population estimated by national demographic data.21 
According to a recent report by the UNODC, up to half of the drug 
users surveyed gave their children opium.22 More than 2,000 drug-
dependent children are estimated to live in the western city of Herat 
alone.23 These figures point to the need for refined policies able to 
recognize and better account for child and adult drug dependence.
Obscured	Reality
Although the term “opium bride” has emerged to capture 
the phenomenon of bartering girls to satisfy opium debts,24 the 
international and local literatures remain nearly blank on the subject. 
The fieldwork conducted for this chapter finds that the incidence and 
practice of bartering girls is more prevalent than this scant coverage 
suggests. What explains this difference?
The decades-long media focus on war, insurgency, and corruption 
can serve as a wedge between the actual phenomenon and its media 
representation. Scarce opportunities for reporters to visit villages and 
capture local grievances means that the melancholic social character 
expressed daily by ordinary people is all but ignored. Indeed, as one 
respondent affirmed: 
The reality and concept wrapped in the term “opium bride” exists 
to a large extent in our society. We accept that “opium brides” 
exist in the villages.25
The Afghan media and civil arenas have altogether failed to 
report on “opium brides.” Several respondents link this paucity of 
recognition to the social and cultural sensitivities surrounding child-
bartering practices, as well as the devastating security situation in 
areas packed with the opium trade. One journalist describes this 
situation as follows:
Cases of bartering of girls are not breaking into media to the 
extent that they actually occur. The reasons are multidimensional, 
including cultural and social sensitivities and the strong de facto 
hold on society of drug lords, who obstruct the flow of opium-
related information. We receive reports about the bartering of 
girls but it is difficult to give proper coverage to this phenomenon 
through firsthand information. The reason is that most of the 
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time drug-related trades including girls are prevalent mainly in 
unsecured districts and it is not feasible for the media to easily 
break through.26 
Strongly acknowledged by nearly all respondents to this study, 
incidences of “opium brides” are undoubtedly much more numerous 
than what surfaces in media, human rights, and civil society circles. It 
represents a social cost whose full magnitude remains unknown. Despite 
the inadequate literature and discourse, the child-bartering phenomenon 
is widely acknowledged among average individuals at local levels, from 
government officials to members of the media and civil society as well as 
land- and business owners. 
In Afghanistan, the quality of life for many children and women is 
highly compromised in terms of their rights and roles in society. In the 
southern region, hit hard by active insurgency and counterinsurgency, 
conditions for women and children exist in even more acute states 
of crisis. The opium culture and active insurgency pose a double 
disadvantage to women and children. First, social and political upheaval 
leaves children and women particularly vulnerable to violation of 
their rights, such as child bartering. Second, the large focus on these 
upheavals often leaves children and women neglected, overlooked, and 
overshadowed by contemporary so-called strategic issues. 
Journalists working in southern Afghanistan note the enduring 
frequency of child and gender discrimination in the shadows of the 
insurgency: 
As a reporter working in Helmand, I know many families have 
bartered and married their girls to the drug smugglers who gave 
the farmer money to cultivate opium. Eventually, when there is 
no yield then they have to get engage in bartering.27
Married	Lives	of	Bartered	Girls
In our village two families brought brides from farmers’ families, 
yeah I mean opium brides. Now the stories of mistreating and 
miseries of those brides are spread all around the village. The 
stories of their suffering are the topic of women in all social 
gatherings such as weddings, death prayers, and everywhere.28
Local shopkeeper
Lashkarga, Helmand
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Child bartering as a means of paying opium debt is largely weighted 
against girls. This fact gives way to two clusters of responses—one 
driven by values, and the other by consequences—but both are 
united in their opposition to the practice. The value-driven response 
consists largely of human and women’s rights objections, where the 
very suggestion of using girls as a legitimate “unit of transaction” to 
resolve financial debt or to prevent social enmity is a nonstarter. By 
contrast, the basic thrust of local and village concerns about bartering 
practices is seen in their actual consequences. Where paying bride 
money is an embedded cultural value that offers brides some measure 
of security in married life, the procedure and involvement of money 
does not figure as a concern. For these, opposition is rooted in what 
is painted by respondents as a devastatingly bleak post-marriage 
portrait of bartered girls. 
Practical social, cultural, and security constraints to the fieldwork 
undertaken for this chapter limited firsthand conversation with 
girls bartered into marriage to resolve opium debts.29 In addition 
to other sources, the paternal families of some bartered girls, 
however, managed to provide some insight into their experience. All 
respondents reported the suffering of opium brides in their married 
life. In the local context, a legitimate and plausible reason for suffering 
was not apparent. But the closer examination made possible by this 
study highlights the underlying causes of the poor matrimonial living 
standards and status of the opium brides. 
Three structural themes surfaced throughout the interviews. The 
first involves the implications of a marriage where the bride’s family 
holds a disproportionately inferior social status to the matrimonial 
husband—and no options are apparent in the matrimonial terms. This 
widely contradicts the cultural expectations of “normal marriages,” 
where the upper hand usually lies with the would-be bride’s father, 
who has the final choice in weighing suitor options and selecting a 
husband for his daughter. In opium-debt–induced marriages, the 
bride’s family lacks these freedoms, subsequently severely harming 
the bride’s social status among her in-laws, in turn, initiating a 
vicious circle that holds the potential to make the bride’s married life 
increasingly difficult.
A second described feature is rooted in the very nature of marriages 
facilitated by debt. Normally, the paternal family provides the bride 
with staff to establish the new home; the family in some cases even 
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delivers the bride money directly to the bride to satisfy her household 
needs. This code of conduct provides the newlywed bride with the 
desired social status as well as a safety social net. On the contrary, 
due to the impoverished socioeconomic status of the farmer, the opium 
bride goes empty-handed to her in-laws’ home. This trend deprives 
opium brides of conventional social status and social security nets. 
The scenario gets worse when the bride money is already spent by the 
farmer on expenses required for cultivating opium. A children’s rights 
officer in Kandahar summarizes the result: 
These girls have horrible marriage lives. They do not have the 
same social status and respect as other women do. Mostly they 
get married to those who already have one or more wives. Second, 
these girls go empty-handed to their in-laws, which gives them a 
compromising and disregarded social status among the family.30 
The third theme recognized in the interviews describing the 
married life of opium brides involves age gaps and polygamy. In 
most cases, these brides are underage, not of marriageable age. The 
rapid and unexpected social change from adolescence and even late 
childhood into womanhood is an unnatural transformation that is 
noted to cause immense challenges for the girl. Polygamy, as revealed 
by all respondents, is one of the principle practices of the opium 
culture, functioning as what seems a de facto marker of social status 
among those engaged in opium circles. On the one hand, vulnerable 
farmers who are deliberately trapped into debt is a means for drug 
lords to practice polygamy, and on the other hand, the practice serves 
as a vehicle for the suffering and misery of opium brides. As one 
respondent notes: 
The hallmark of opium marriages is the huge gap in ages. 
Normally, the girls are much younger and even underage for 
marriage, while the man is married and overage. The reason 
for the age gap is the “no option” reality. The farmer does not 
have another option; in order to overcome the financial and social 
ordeal originating in opium debt, he must marry the girl to 
someone who has the upper hand over the farmer.31 
Mohammad Khan, a farmer in Helmand who married his daughter 
to an opium trader when she was younger than fifteen years old in 
return for the debt he owed the trader, describes how he still remains 
a caretaker of his daughter:
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My daughter has two sons and a daughter. Most of the time, I 
purchase medicine for her because her husband does not treat her 
like his wife. I take sugar and sweets, and tea to her. My son-in-
law has another wife and he married her with bride money. This 
is the difference between my daughter and his other wife.32 
The farmer’s inferior status, that of his daughter in her marriage 
home, and the age gap and polygamous household she is subjected to 
each play a role in what Khan describes as the suffering his daughter 
experiences as a result of his opium debt.
“Opium	Flower”
A web of complexity entangles social attitudes to opium-debt–
induced child bartering. Part of the complexity is due to the significant 
social transformations wrought over much of Afghanistan in the past 
three decades, rooted in sociopolitical turmoil. These shifts have 
led to increasingly incoherent matrimonial practices, such as the 
engagement of girls and boys in childhood or even during infancy, 
and have served to entrench a patriarchal order in social life across 
many villages. 
A powerful repercussion of these changes has been weakened social 
and cultural practices and the waning importance of traditional 
elites, from elders to Maliks (tribal leaders), Khans (landowners), and 
traditional religious figures. These actors have usually functioned as 
the mediators of social interactions in conflict, business, and trade, 
and played a strong role in marriage negotiations. Today, these elites 
are increasingly marginalized, subsequently leaving a social vacuum 
to be filled by those with the means to control power—warlords and 
drug traffickers often take advantage of these circumstances. The 
approaches of the latter to social affairs are undoubtedly different. 
While most families still engage in relatively traditional matrimony 
practices, early-age marriages, polygamy, age gaps, and exchange 
marriages or Badal33 figure more commonly in many villages. What 
results is that instances of child bartering are met with silence. The 
former gatekeepers of social life largely ignore these cases, as the 
traditional elites fail to voice opposition through their respective 
platforms in mosques, Jirgas (tribal councils), or local community 
meetings. Whether the disregard is due to their suppressed social 
roles, shifts in their perceived responsibilities, or other factors is 
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unclear. That drugs and warlords wield their newly evolved influence 
to their own benefit is less subject to doubt.
Despite these transformations, however, child bartering remains 
largely an implicitly ill-considered practice. As Khamosh Hezb-u-
allah puts it, 
Culturally, the practice of bartering girls to satisfy opium debts 
is considered a reprehensible and socially ill practice, and such 
conduct does not exist in any ethnic or tribal cultural setups. Those 
involved in practicing “child bartering” are socially stigmatized.34 
This strong stigma exists against those involved in bartering 
girls—on both sides. Farmers who barter their children to fulfill debt 
suffer subsequent social discrimination and stigma from having done 
so. Mohammad Khan notes: 
I am disgraced at home, in the village, and at the mosque. I 
lost face with my family and my people. I know that I am badly 
dishonored in the village, though they do not express it verbally.35 
He goes on to wish protection for his daughter.
May Allah protect even the daughter of Kafir36 from the suffering 
that my daughter is having. She has been teased by other women 
of her in-laws and she is called “the opium flower.” They tell her 
that wherever the opium flower grows it destroys everything, and 
eventually you will destroy our home.37
While the practice of bartering girls to resolve opium-induced 
debt remains obscure and in the shadows of better-known crises in 
Afghanistan, there may exist no clearer representation of suffering 
among the children of Afghanistan’s terror and drug wars.
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4. After the War on Drugs: How Legal 
Regulation of Production and Trade 
Would Better Protect Children
by Steve Rolles
Children	in	the	Political	Narrative	of	the	Drug	War
The emergence of the “war on drugs”—shorthand for a broader punitive 
and prohibitionist paradigm—has been predicated on the concept of 
drugs as an existential “threat” rather than a more conventionally 
conceived health or social policy issue.1 Prohibitionist rhetoric frames 
drugs as menacing not only to health but also to national security (our 
borders), and not infrequently, to the moral fabric of society itself, 
using the “drug threat” to children as the specific rhetorical vehicle. 
Emotive plays on the threat to our children have a long history 
in political propaganda (particularly in times of war), exploiting the 
potency of the parents’ greatest fear. Drug-war rhetoric presents the 
threat to youth both as the drugs themselves (although significantly 
only the illegal ones) and the sinister drug dealers who prey on the 
young and vulnerable (lurking at the school gates, etc.). While there 
are, of course, very real risks for children and young people associated 
with both drug use and illegal drug markets, perception of these risks 
has been dramatically distorted by the populist fearmongering of 
politicians (who can then position themselves as “tough” on the drug 
threat), aided and abetted by a sensation-hungry mainstream media.
The prohibition paradigm is very much framed as a response to 
such threats, and its popular narrative has cast itself as a moral 
crusade against an “evil” that threatens mankind itself. The preamble 
to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, for example, 
establishes the context of the legal framework it has enshrined in 
these terms:
• Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind. 
• Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a 
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and 
economic danger to mankind.
• Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil.
Given this rhetorical context, it is easy to see how supporters of 
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prohibition understand any kind of moves toward legal regulation of 
drug production and supply as being immoral, a form of surrender, or 
a descent into anarchy in which our children will be the first and most 
obvious victims.
Criticisms of less punitive drug policies are, in fact, often framed 
in these terms. Critics define one or more worst-case scenarios, often 
extrapolated from “what if?” thinking built on an immediate and total 
absence of all drug control legislation, and then argue from the basis 
that such scenarios will be the norm. The popular public discourse 
on alternatives to prohibition is thus frequently characterized by 
the “imperiled child” narrative, with apocalyptic visions of stoned 
school bus drivers, heroin in candy stores, and armies of child drug-
zombies. As advocates of legal regulation of drug markets have made 
abundantly clear (see below), this is a grotesque misrepresentation of 
what is actually being proposed.
Supporters of prohibition also frequently present any steps toward 
legal regulation of drug markets as “radical,” and therefore innately 
confrontational and dangerous. However, the historical evidence 
demonstrates that, in fact, it is prohibition that is the radical policy. 
Legal regulation of drug production, supply and use is far more in 
line with currently accepted ways of managing health and social 
risks in almost all other spheres of life. Yet prohibition has become so 
entrenched and institutionalized that many in the drugs field, even 
those from the more critical progressive end of the spectrum, view it 
as immutable, an assumed reality of the legal and policy landscape to 
be worked within or around, rather than as a policy choice.
Given that the war on drugs is predicated on “eradication” of the 
“evil” drug threat as a way of achieving an (entirely fantastical) 
“drug-free world,” it has effectively established a permanent state 
of war. A curiously self-justifying logic now prevails in which harms 
that are a direct result of drug prohibition—such as children killed 
in drug gang drive-by shootings, drug-fueled conflict, environmental 
damage, corruption or deaths from contaminated street drugs—are 
confused and conflated with harms related to drug use. These policy-
related harms then bolster the “drug menace” rhetoric and justify the 
continuation, or intensification of prohibition. 
This has contributed to a high level policy environment that 
routinely ignores critical scientific thinking, and health and social 
policy norms. Fighting the threat—defending the vulnerable from 
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the evil of drugs—becomes an end in itself, one that is seen as 
intrinsically righteous, and as such it creates a largely self-referential 
and self-justifying rhetoric that makes meaningful evaluation, 
review, and debate difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, while the drug-
related victimhood of the child is a key part of prohibition narrative, 
furnished with emotive anecdotes of wasted youth and bereaved 
parents, prohibition’s effect generally, and its influence on children 
specifically, remains largely immunized from meaningful scrutiny 
and evaluation.
Practical	and	Intellectual	Challenges	to	the	Prohibitionist	Status	
Quo
Despite this hostile ideological environment, two distinct policy 
trends have emerged in recent decades—harm reduction and 
decriminalization of personal possession and use. While both nominally 
permitted within existing international legal frameworks, they pose 
serious practical and intellectual challenges to the overarching status 
quo. Both have been driven by pragmatic necessity; harm reduction 
emerging in the mid-1980s in response to the epidemic of HIV among 
injecting drug users, and decriminalization in response to resource 
pressures on overburdened criminal justice systems (and to a lesser 
extent, concerns over the rights of users). 
Both policies have succeeded in demonstrating effectiveness to the 
extent that harm reduction is now used in policy or practice in ninety-
three countries,2 while decriminalization (in various forms) has spread 
across mainland Europe, Central America, and Latin America, with 
cannabis-only decriminalization more widespread still—including 
states in Australia and the United States. 
Decriminalization has demonstrated that less punitive approaches 
do not necessarily lead to increased use, most notably in Portugal, 
where even though drug use more generally has risen in line with 
its European neighbors, use among young people has actually fallen 
since the 2001 decriminalization of personal possession of all drugs 
(now dealt with via civil/administrative interventions).3 While we 
should not assume a causal link between this positive development 
and the decriminalization itself—there being many other policy and 
wider environmental variables at play (not least the substantive 
investment in public health programs)—the fact that the apocalypse 
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predicted by many doomsayers has failed to materialize remains 
significant.
More broadly an extensive World Health Organization study 
concluded:
Globally, drug use is not distributed evenly and is not simply 
related to drug policy, since countries with stringent user-level 
illegal drug policies did not have lower levels of use than countries 
with liberal ones.4
Similarly, cannabis decriminalization states in the United States 
do not have higher levels of use than those without, and more 
significantly, the Netherlands, with its de facto legally regulated 
cannabis availability (for adults), does not have higher levels than its 
prohibitionist neighbors (for all age groups).5 If there is a deterrent 
effect from increasingly punitive responses to drug use, the evidence 
base for it is strikingly weak. The near universal research aversion 
of governments to this question, despite the central role of punitive 
deterrence in the drug war narrative, is a particularly telling indicator 
of the paradigms roots in populist polemic, rather than science.   
Without diminishing the importance and effect of these emerging 
policy trends, they can, however, be seen primarily as symptomatic 
responses mitigating against harms created by the prohibitionist 
policy environment. Neither directly addresses the public health or 
wider social harms created or exacerbated by the illegal production 
and supply of drugs.
The logic of both, however, ultimately leads to confronting the 
inevitable choice: nonmedical drug markets can remain in the hands 
of unregulated criminal profiteers or they can be controlled and 
regulated by appropriate government authorities. There is no third 
option under which there are no drugs in society.  There is a need to 
make this choice based on a rational objective evaluation of which 
option may deliver the best outcomes in terms of minimizing harms, 
both domestic and international, associated with drug production, 
supply, and use. The impact on different policy regimes on vulnerable 
populations will naturally be one of the priority indicators of any 
policy’s success or failure.
Exploring legal regulatory approaches does not preclude demand 
reduction as a legitimate long-term policy goal, indeed it is argued 
that it may facilitate it among vulnerable groups. Acknowledging 
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the need for regulation does, however, accept that policy must also 
deal with the reality of high levels of demand as they exist now. 
However, a historical stumbling block in this debate has been that 
the eloquent and detailed critiques of the drug war have not been 
matched by a vision for its replacement.  Unless a credible public 
health-led model of drug market regulation is proposed, the myths 
and misrepresentations will inevitably fill the void.  So what would 
such a model look like?
A	“Blueprint	for	Regulation”
Transform Drug Policy Foundation’s 2009 After the War on Drugs: 
Blueprint for Regulation attempts to answer this question by offering 
a menu of options for controls over all aspects of production, supply/
availability, and use. This includes controls over products (dosage, 
preparation, price, and packaging); vendors (licensing, vetting and 
training requirements, marketing, and promotions); outlets (location, 
outlet density, appearance); where and when drugs can be consumed; 
and, crucially for this discussion, who has access to the legally 
regulated availability including age controls, along with explorations 
of licensed buyer and club membership access models.6
Blueprint then rationally explores options for different drugs and 
different using populations to suggest the regulatory models that may 
deliver the best outcomes. Lessons are drawn from successes and 
failings with alcohol and tobacco regulation in the UK and beyond, as 
well as controls over pharmaceutical drugs and other risky products 
and activities that are regulated by government. Such regulated 
models occupy a space on the continuum of policy options between 
the poles of the absolute prohibitions of a war on drugs and entirely 
unregulated free market models (such as the online sales of “legal 
highs” such as mephedrone).
Moves toward legal regulation of drug markets would naturally 
need to be phased in cautiously over a number of years, with close 
evaluation and monitoring of results and any unintended negative 
consequences being essential elements of any roll out—not least the 
negative effects on the most vulnerable. Where problems emerge 
controls could be adapted with alternative approaches or increased 
levels of regulation. 
Clearly, there are particularly important lessons to be learned from 
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alcohol and tobacco policy, most significantly the corrosive effects on 
public health of unregulated commercial promotion aimed at children 
and young people. These experiences and the variety of responses 
to them over the past century do, however, mean that we now at 
least have a clear idea of how to effectively regulate these products 
to reduce the harm they cause to society. This understanding—
while far from universally adopted—is clearly outlined in guidelines 
produced by the World Health Organization, in documents such as 
the Framework for Alcohol Policy in the WHO European Region, and 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, that in many respects 
embody precisely the kind of rational public health-based regulatory 
approaches to drug control being advocated by the drug law reform 
movement.
There is, of course, no universal regulatory model. A flexible range 
of regulatory tools would be available and applied differentially across 
the spectrum of products and production/supply/using environments. 
Naturally, the more restrictive controls would be deployed for more 
risky products, and, correspondingly, less restrictive controls for 
lower-risk products. This potential for differential application of 
regulatory controls according to risk could additionally help create a 
“risk-availability gradient.” This holds the potential not only to reduce 
harms associated with illicit supply and patterns of consumption as 
they currently exist but also, in the longer term, to progressively 
encourage or “nudge” patterns of use to move toward safer products, 
behaviors, and using environments.
An understanding of such processes is emerging from both the 
literature on alcohol control (for example, progressive tax increases 
according to alcohol content) and the emerging understanding of 
route transition interventions7 aimed at encouraging injecting drug 
users to move to lower risk noninjecting modes of administration 
via, for example, providing foil for smoking heroin. This process is 
the precise opposite of what has happened under prohibition, where 
an unregulated profit-driven dynamic has tended to tilt the market 
toward ever more potent (but profitable) drugs and drug preparations, 
as well as encouraging riskier behaviors in high-risk settings. 
The oversight and enforcement of new regulatory regimes would fall 
to a range of public health, regulatory, and enforcement agencies—
including established health and safety and policing infrastructure. 
Activities that take place outside of the regulatory framework would 
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naturally remain prohibited and subject to civil or criminal sanctions, 
or appropriate nonpunitive interventions for nonadults as deemed 
appropriate and established to be effective.
Children	in	a	Post-Prohibition	Model?	
Restricting or preventing access to drugs by nonadults is a key 
element of any existing or future regulatory models. Any rights of 
access to psychoactive drugs and freedom of choice over drug-taking 
decisions should only be granted to consenting adults. This is partly 
because of the more general concerns regarding child vs. adult rights 
and responsibilities. More important, however, in line with a risk-
based regulatory logic, the specific short- and long-term health risks 
associated with drug use are significantly higher for children, and, of 
course, the younger they are, the greater the risks.
This combination of legal principle and public health management 
legitimizes a strict age-control policy. In practical terms, it should 
also be noted that stringent restrictions on young people’s access to 
drugs—while inevitably imperfect—are more feasible and easier to 
police than population-wide prohibitions. Generally speaking, children 
are subject to a range of social and state controls to which adults are 
not. More specifically, drug restrictions for minors command near 
universal adult support—making them a more practical proposition 
than the widely flouted laws criminalizing adult drug use.
Combined with this is the fact that while markets created by 
any prohibition will always attract criminal interest, the nonadult 
market for drugs is a small fraction of the total adult market. Thus, 
enforcement could be brought to bear on it with far more efficiency, 
and correspondingly greater chances of success. 
It is also worth pointing out that one ironic and unintended side 
effect of prohibition can potentially make illegal drug markets, that 
have no age thresholds, easier for young people to access than legally 
regulated markets for (say) alcohol or tobacco. According to the U.S. 
drug use surveillance systems funded by the U.S. National Institutes 
on Drug Abuse, over the past thirty years of cannabis prohibition, the 
drug has remained “almost universally available to American 12th 
graders,” with 80–90 percent over this period saying the drug is “very 
easy” or “fairly easy” to obtain.8 
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Of course, there is an important debate around what age constitutes 
an acceptable age/access threshold. Different countries have adopted 
different thresholds for tobacco and alcohol, generally ranging from 
fourteen to twenty-one for purchase or access to licensed premises. 
Where this threshold should lie for a given drug product will depend 
on a range of pragmatic choices. These should be informed by objective 
risk assessments, evaluated by individual states or local licensing 
authorities, and balanced in accordance with their own priorities.
As with all areas of regulatory policy there needs to be some 
flexibility allowed in response to changing circumstances or emerging 
evidence. In the UK, for example, the age of access for tobacco 
purchase has recently been raised from sixteen to eighteen, while in 
the United States there is a growing debate over whether the alcohol 
age threshold of twenty-one is too high. The Amethyst Initiative 
(supported by 135 chancellors and presidents of U.S. universities 
and colleges) argues, for example, that the age twenty-one limit 
has created “a culture of dangerous, clandestine ‘binge-drinking’—
often conducted off-campus” and that “by choosing to use fake IDs, 
students make ethical compromises that erode respect for the law.”9 
Even within a legal regulatory framework, inappropriate prohibitions 
evidently have the potential to create unintended consequences. They 
can undermine, rather than augment, the development of social 
controls and responsible norms regarding drugs and drug use. It 
is clear that age limits need to be realistic and, crucially, properly 
enforced to be effective.
In the UK, for example—where “binge-drinking” among young 
people has been a growing problem—there has been a widespread 
lack of age restriction enforcement, with Alcohol Concern reporting 
that: “10–15% of licensed premises are found to persistently sell 
alcohol to the under-aged yet only 0.5% licensed premises are called 
up for review.”10 Secondary supply of legitimately obtained drugs to 
nonadults will also require appropriate enforcement and sanction, 
perhaps with a graded severity depending on distance in age from the 
legal threshold.
Legal age controls can, of course, only ever be part of the solution 
to reducing drug-related harms among young people. Effective 
regulation and access controls must be supported by concerted 
prevention efforts. These should include evidence-based, targeted 
drug education that balances the need to encourage healthy lifestyles 
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(including abstinence) while not ignoring the need to reduce the 
related risks. Funding for such programs could be easily met by the 
inevitable savings in criminal justice and enforcement expenditure as 
a program of reform is rolled out. 
Drug	Policy:		Trying	to	See	the	Bigger	Picture
Perhaps more important is longer-term investment in social 
capital. Young people—particularly those most at risk in marginal/
vulnerable populations—need and should be given meaningful 
alternatives to drug use, and there is a strong evidence base to support 
the effectiveness of such interventions. The SMART program in the 
United States, for example, which works on public housing estates, 
has found that providing youth clubs has a real influence on reducing 
drug use, dealing, and overall criminal activity in both young people 
and adults.11 It is also worth noting that the Netherlands and Sweden 
regularly top the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) child 
well-being table and have relatively low levels of drug misuse (despite 
markedly different drug policies), while the United States and the 
United Kingdom invariably sit at or near the bottom and have 
relatively high levels of misuse and a lower age of misusers.12
It is increasingly clear that levels of problematic drug use 
(among all age groups) primarily reflect a complex interplay of 
social, economic, and cultural variables. Key drivers include social 
deprivation, inequality, and broader measures of personal and social 
well-being. The corollary of this is that the results of drug policy as 
traditionally conceived (prevention, treatment, and enforcement) 
should not be overestimated, may be marginal, and, in many cases, 
irrelevant, relative to the underlying social determinants of drug-
using behaviors. 
This analysis—that problematic use is essentially a barometer of 
a social well-being (or its lack)—has obvious implications for longer-
term prevention and harm reduction strategies. It suggests that 
success is likely to flow more from investing in social capital and 
addressing multiple deprivation and inequality issues, particularly as 
they affect young people, rather than from pouring ever more money 
into more conventional interventions that are poorly supported by 
evidence. This naturally points to a much broader program of social 
policy reform and investment, and notably highlights the need for 
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drug policy to emerge from its drug war bunker mentality, adopt 
a more holistic worldview, and integrate far more effectively with 
parallel disciplines and institutions involved with social and public 
health policy.  
While conventional drug policy may only be able to achieve, at best, 
fairly marginal effects with respect to the prevalence of problematic 
use, the overarching prohibitionist legal framework can clearly have 
a dramatic influence on levels of harm associated with drug use, both 
by increasing health risks associated with use, and through the wider 
social harms created or exacerbated by the illegal drug market.
While it is specifically not envisaged that legal availability of 
drugs would be extended to children, it remains the case that illegal 
production and supply serves to maximize the risk associated with use 
itself for all age groups. As already discussed, an unregulated market 
serving the interests of criminal profiteers will tend to shift toward 
the most concentrated products—for example, why you can buy crack 
on the streets of London, but not coca. Furthermore, illegal products 
are of unknown strength and purity, often cut or contaminated, 
and without packaging information about dosage, safety, or risks. 
Legally regulated products—even if sold or passed on in an informal 
secondary marketplace or via peer networks—would be intrinsically 
less risky than their illicit counterparts. Furthermore, barriers 
and distrust between youth and authority figures perpetuated by 
punitive prohibitions—be they educators or law enforcers—would be 
progressively reduced, facilitating more effective communication and 
dialogue about drug risks and healthy lifestyles. 
Arguably much more significant would be the reduction in harms 
to children and young people that would follow the progressive 
contraction of the illegal drug market as the trade shifted into 
the legally regulated models. As has been so eloquently described 
elsewhere in this collection, the harms to children from the war on 
drugs and its unintended consequences—quite aside from drug use—
are profound and terrifying in scale. Even a small reduction in the 
extent of these harms, which include the brutality of the markets 
whose frontline children live on, the conflict fueled by illicit drug 
profits, and the destabilization of social infrastructure by illicit 
drug market-related corruption and violence, would be a huge social 
positive.
Prohibitions on commodities for which there is high demand 
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inevitably create criminal opportunities, pushing production, supply, 
and consumption into an illicit parallel economy. Such illicit activity 
is flexible and opportunistic, naturally exploiting the most vulnerable 
workforce and seeking out locations where it can operate with 
minimum cost and interference, hence the attrac tion of geographically 
marginal regions and fragile, failing or failed states. As a result, 
many countries or regions involved in drug production and transit 
have weak or chaotic governance and state infrastructure. 
The illegal drug trade can be seen as providing a vital income 
stream for a range of insurgents, militias, and terrorist groups. 
The cocaine trade, for example, directly fuels the long-running civil 
wars in Colombia, and now undermines emerging transit states 
in West Africa, such as Guinea Bissau. The opiate trade similarly 
contributes to wider regional conflicts in Central Asia—prominently 
in Afghanistan, now spilling over into Pakistan, in which the Taliban 
and various rival political factions and warlords are substantially 
funded via their control of the opium/heroin trade. 
At the same time, Mexico has witnessed a horrifying explosion of 
violence, with estimates of as many as 28,000 deaths in the past four 
years, as the government has tried and failed to use military force 
to crush the drug cartels (sustained by an impoverished population 
providing a ready supply of young foot soldiers), which are now 
powerful and rich enough to outgun state enforcement efforts. A 
similar, although largely unreported, level of violence has unfolded in 
Venezuela, which is also fighting its own very real, but equally futile, 
war on drugs. 
Large-scale illicit activity can thus undermine governance and 
social infrastructure at local regional and even national levels, 
feeding into a downward development spiral. In such a spiral, existing 
social problems are exacerbated and governance further undermined 
through endemic corruption at all levels of government, judiciary, and 
policing, another inevitable feature of illicit drug markets entirely 
controlled by organized criminal profiteers. 
As with all wars, in the drug war it is the young, poor, and 
marginalized who are most vulnerable to the violence and wider 
social harms that conflict creates.
Clearly, any high-value natural resources, whether legal or illegal, 
can potentially fuel conflict. Legal examples include oil, diamonds, 
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and coltan. But for these legal products high value is intrinsic and 
relatively consistent, regardless of international legal frameworks. 
By contrast, drug crops such as opium poppy and coca are essentially 
low-value agricultural commodities. They have only become high 
value as a result of a prohibitionist legal framework (a combination 
of unregulated profiteering and the high risk to producers/traffickers 
is passed on to the consumer), which in turn encourages expanded 
criminal control of the trade. By the time they reach developed world 
users, the alchemy of prohibition is such that they have become 
literally worth more than their weight in gold. 
Progressive shifts toward legal regulation of these products would 
naturally undermine the markets, remove the extraordinary profits 
on offer, and choke off a key a source of funding for so much of the 
conflict and corruption. About half of the world’s opium production 
is entirely legal and regulated—that is, for the medical market. 
This legal production of opium (and indeed coca—albeit on a smaller 
scale) is associated with few, if any, of the problems highlighted 
above.13 In this legal context, they essentially function as regular 
agricultural commodities—much like coffee, tea, or other plant-based 
pharmaceutical precursors. 
Under a legal production regime, drug crops would become part of 
the wider development discourse (and drug products more resemble 
conventionally controlled pharmaceuticals). While such agricultural 
activities still present a raft of serious and urgent challenges to both 
the local and international communities—for example, coping with the 
whims of global capitalist markets and the general lack of a fair trade 
infrastructure—dealing with such issues within a legally regulated 
market framework means they are not additionally impeded by the 
negative consequences of prohibition and the criminal empires it has 
created.
Similar effects would be seen in the reduction of all specifically 
drug war-related harms: increased regulation of production would 
reduce the environmental impacts of the unregulated parallel trade; a 
key driver of urban gang violence would be reduced; family breakups 
related to incarceration of parents and caregivers would be reduced; 
and so on. 
We should be careful not to imagine such reform as a silver bullet 
solution or panacea for the people or regions of the world blighted by 
the unintended fallout of prohibition, or that change could happen 
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overnight. Instead it should be realistically considered more as a 
gradual, probably generational, process of removing a key driver of 
personal and social harms, and an obstacle to longer-term social and 
economic development.   
There can, however, be hope that reform would help facilitate more 
positive change, albeit indirectly, via the potential for the billions, even 
trillions, of dollars still being poured into failed, futile, and actively 
counterproductive enforcement efforts—to be redirected toward more 
socially beneficial ends, be it housing, food security, education, public 
health, environmental protection, or any number of worthwhile social 
programs. This holds enormous promise for the children and young 
people negatively affected by the war on drugs—and indeed, the poor 
and marginalized in society more broadly.  
Different social environments will require different approaches in 
response to the specific challenges they face. Transform’s Blueprint 
does not seek to provide all the answers—but rather seeks to move 
the debate beyond “should we end the war on drugs?” to “what could 
the world look like after the war on drugs?” 
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Discussion	Questions
1.	 What	is	the	connection	between	poverty	and	illicit	crop	
production?	What	are	the	specific	issues	facing	children?	What	
are	the	policy	implications	of	this?
2.	 The	drug	trade	is	a	global	security	threat	requiring	a	military	
response.	Discuss,	considering	the	impact	of	war	and	conflict	on	
children.
3.	 Barra	and	Joloy	claim	that	the	gains	in	Mexico’s	drug	war,	
measured	in	seizures,	frozen	assets,	and	arrests,	are	not	worth	
the	price	that	has	been	paid.	Eighty	percent	of	the	Mexican	
public	appears	to	disagree.1	What	is	your	view?
4.	 Do	you	agree	that	alternative	regulatory	frameworks	may	better	
protect	children	from	drugs?	What	are	the	risks	to	children	of	
this	approach?	How	can	they	be	addressed?
1.	 Richard	Wike,	“Mexicans	Continue	Support	for	Drug	War,”	Pew	Research	Centre,
	 August	12,	2010;	http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1698/mexico-support-drug-war-less	
-supportive-of-american-involvement/.
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Part	2:	
Targets:	Race,	Class,	and	Law	Enforcement
Thirty-two states retain the death penalty for drug offences in 
violation of  international human rights commitments.1 In Georgia, 
drug crackdowns in 2007 resulted in 4 percent of the country’s male 
population being tested for drugs, many under forced conditions. 
Thirty-five percent of these went on to be imprisoned on a drug-related 
charge.2 Military and police have been responsible for hundreds of 
killings in Mexico’s drug war since 2006.3 Singapore applies long-
term imprisonment and corporal punishment (caning) for drug 
dependence.4 In China, hundreds of thousands have been detained 
without trial in drug detention centers and subjected to forced labor 
under the guise of drug treatment,5 while punitive laws and abusive 
policing practices have impeded the response to HIV among injecting 
drug users in country after country around the world.6
The excesses of law enforcement in the war on drugs are clear. 
What is hidden by the top line facts and figures above, however, 
is the fact that, by and large, it is poorer people, those from ethnic 
minorities, and those at the margins of society who feel the brunt of 
these excesses. While law enforcement-based policies have dominated 
drug control for many decades, their focus has been far from equally 
distributed. In Ecuador, for example, women drug mules, often driven 
to the trade by poverty are now disproportionately represented in the 
country’s prisons.7 In Ukraine, people who are drug dependent are 
often seen as “soft targets,” particularly when arrest quotas place 
quantity of arrests over the severity of crimes.8 In the United States, 
approximately half a million people are incarcerated for drug offenses. 
But African Americans are ten times more likely than whites to be 
incarcerated for such crimes.9
The first two chapters in this section deal with this last statistic 
from the perspective of young people. These chapters, which focus on 
racial and class disparities in the war on drugs in the United States, 
hone in on preconceptions about drug users and drug dealers—who 
they are, and what their motivations may be. Deborah Peterson 
Small’s chapter, “Getting the Message: Hip-Hop Reports on the Drug 
War,” is a fascinating and colloquial insight into the effects of the war 
on drugs on young black and Latino American men. She documents 
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messages about drugs, prison, and law enforcement in hip-hop music, 
which has, through the years, been the “newsstand” for young people, 
where information about the realities of life for black and Latino 
communities is passed on. As Peterson Small says, “Anyone seeking 
to understand the effects of decades of drug law enforcement on poor 
black and Latino youth should listen to the lyrics and music of the 
generations of young people who have lived on the frontlines of the 
U.S. ‘war on drugs.’” 
A. Rafik Mohamed and Erik Fritsvold complement these insights 
with a study of drug dealing among fifty affluent, mostly white, male 
college students. Their chapter, “Under Cover of Privilege: College 
Drug Dealing in the United States,” shows that despite what the 
authors called “collective bungling” and the students’ utter lack of 
risk-aversion strategies, few of these dealers were ever the focus of 
law enforcement efforts, nor had they any fear of the drug war. Only 
one was convicted for drug offenses and none were incarcerated for 
their crimes. All but one eventually transitioned out of drug dealing 
and into licit occupations, leaving drugs and the drug war behind. 
The disparity with “open market” dealers in poor, black, and Latino 
neighborhoods, and the experiences of those represented in Peterson 
Small’s chapter, could not be greater.10 
From the United States, the next chapter moves south to Brazil, 
where the war on drugs has been described as “organised armed 
violence.”11 Indeed, “Young Soldiers in Brazil’s Drug War,” by 
Michelle Gueraldi, could be included in part 1, alongside Mexico. It 
has been included here, however, due to the author’s focus on young, 
poor, black boys as targets of the drug war. Gueraldi, a human 
rights lawyer, questions why a more holistic children’s rights-based 
approach, already reflected in Brazilian law, has not been adopted 
given the socioeconomic forces driving involvement in the drug trade 
for many of these children. Her chapter portrays a childhood for 
many of those living in the favelas that is brutal and short—in which 
involvement in the drug trade is a rational choice set against a vacuum 
of realistic options. At the root of Gueraldi’s analysis is the impact 
of public attitudes toward poor, marginalized young people. In her 
words, public opinion has become “cynical to the point of supporting 
or turning a blind eye to the systematic killing of children.”
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5. Getting the Message: Hip-Hop  
Reports on the Drug War
by Deborah Peterson Small
Hip-Hop	and	the	Drug	War
Music and drugs are fellow travelers. Music is a universal medium 
of expression. Drugs have been used throughout human history by 
people of all ages. Both stir emotion and moods, and can alter one’s 
state of mind in minutes. Music is a particularly favored medium of 
youth. Throughout modern history music has provided a means for 
young people to express their concerns and angst. Illicit drug use is 
also a common experience of youth, particularly in the United States. 
According to the most recent Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey 
more than 45 percent of all high school seniors reported using an 
illicit drug in their lifetime. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to say 
that music, drugs, and youth travel in the same circles.
Hip-hop began as an urban movement encompassing rap music, 
break dancing, graffiti art, and fashion. Created in New York City 
during the late 1970s, it reflected the hopes and aspirations as well as 
the many challenges facing inner-city youth. Its dominant feature is 
“rap” (performed by MCs—aka “masters of ceremonies”)—a discursive 
oral art form that traces its roots to the griots of West Africa.1 In 
its purest form, known as “freestyling,” rap is about creating 
extemporaneous poetry delivered to rhythmic beats. A rapper is 
distinguished by verbal agility, demonstrated in competitive “battles.” 
DJs (disc jockeys) create the soundtrack of hip-hop by sampling parts 
of existing songs, looping them, and adding new sounds to create music 
to rap to. Break-dancing is competitive street dancing consisting of 
elements that demonstrate physical agility and strength. Graffiti is a 
popular method used by young urban artists to communicate identity, 
expression, and ideas through drawings, markings, and messages 
painted, written, or scratched on a wall or surface (in New York City, 
the surface was often subway trains). 
The advent of hip-hop coincided with the escalation of the “war on 
drugs” in the United States in the early 1980s. In response to concern 
over growth of the illicit drug trade and increasing use of smokable 
cocaine (known as “crack” or “rocks”) in inner-city communities, 
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Congress passed new laws that intensified the war on drugs, and 
in a short time, state legislators followed suit. At both the federal 
and state levels, lawmakers adopted expansive definitions of “drug-
related crimes” and required the imposition of harsh sentences aimed 
at keeping individuals with any connection to drugs behind bars 
for longer periods of time. Despite the reality of problematic drug 
use among every socioeconomic and demographic group, these new 
laws would be enforced most vigorously in poor black and Latino 
communities—with devastating effects on multiple generations of 
men, women, and children. 
A frequent justification given by U.S. officials for enacting such 
“get tough” approaches is the need to protect vulnerable youth from 
drugs, drug sellers, and drug-related crime. Ironically, the expanding 
definition of “drug-related crimes” increasingly ensnared juveniles 
who were charged and prosecuted as adults for drug offenses. Not 
surprisingly, black youth are disproportionately represented among 
youth arrested and charged with drug offenses and among juveniles 
prosecuted as adults for drug offenses, despite consistent evidence 
that black youth have a lower rate of illicit drug use than their white 
counterparts. According to the most recent MTF survey:
Among the most dramatic and interesting subgroup differences 
are those found among the three largest racial/ethnic groups—
Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. Contrary to 
popular assumption, at all three grade levels African-
American students have substantially lower rates of use 
of most licit and illicit drugs than do Whites. These include 
any illicit drug use, most of the specific illicit drugs, alcohol, and 
cigarettes.2 [emphasis added]
Over the past three decades, legislators throughout the United 
States have adopted a variety of policies that send more minority 
youth to criminal court. These measures include: lowering the age at 
which juveniles can be prosecuted as adults; expanding the categories 
of crimes for which youth are automatically prosecuted in criminal 
court; giving prosecutors the exclusive authority to decide which 
juveniles are charged as adults; and limiting the discretion of judges 
to overturn decisions by prosecutors and law-enforcement officials. 
The impact of these policies has been dramatic, nowhere more so 
than in New York (the first state to adopt long mandatory drug 
sentencing) and California, which have the distinction of sending 
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more young black and Latino men to prison each year than graduate 
from their state colleges and universities. Not surprisingly, New York 
and California have been at the center of major developments in the 
history of hip-hop. 
Much has been written regarding the dramatic growth in the 
U.S. prison population; the role of punitive drug policies in fueling 
this growth; and the racially disparate consequences of drug-law 
enforcement on poor black communities. In addition to the numerous 
books, articles, reports, and research studies chronicling these 
developments, stories of the drug war and its influence pervade hip-
hop music. Anyone seeking to understand the effects of decades of 
drug-law enforcement on poor minority youth should listen to the 
lyrics and music of the generations of young people who have lived on 
the frontlines of the U.S. “war on drugs.” 
Delivering	the	Message:	News	from	the	Streets	to	the	Ears	of	the	World	.	.	.	
Hip-hop was created by alienated and marginalized youth seeking 
to tell their stories. In the 1980s, rappers used hip-hop to express 
their disillusionment, despair, anger, and impatience about what was 
happening to them and their communities. Hip-hop music revealed 
the not-so-hidden consequences of growing income inequality. 
One of the first consciously political hip-hop recordings was “The 
Message” by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five. Released in 
1983, it is a musical exhortation against complacency in the face of 
growing poverty and desperation. Its opening lines paint a bleak but 
honest picture of daily life in many ghettoized communities:
Broken glass everywhere
People pissing on the stairs, you know they just don’t care
I can’t take the smell, I can’t take the noise
Got no money to move out, I guess I got no choice
Rats in the front room, roaches in the back
Junkies in the alley with the baseball bat
A later verse explains how childhood deprivation, living second rate, 
often leads to involvement in the criminal justice system. The lack 
of options for such children is acutely observed—their environment 
mirroring their future—one great big alleyway. 
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You’ll admire all the number book takers
Thugs, pimps, pushers and the big money makers
Driving big cars, spending twenties and tens
And you wanna grow up to be just like them
The attraction of criminality set against such a bleak outlook is 
clear. The song, however, is a warning. It predicts education loss, 
violence, and inevitable incarceration. It predicts the loss of youth. Its 
chorus could not be more explicit or poetic in describing the artists’ 
feelings about this: Don’t push me cause I’m close to the edge.
The issues addressed in “The Message”: poor living conditions; 
dearth of positive male role models; nonengagement with education; 
chronic unemployment; the lure of criminality; police brutality; and 
incarceration are recurring themes in hip-hop music and culture. 
Crack	Game:	Dealing	Drugs,	Employment	Opportunity	for	the	Discarded
Hip-hop developed during a period of extraordinary economic 
transition—the flight of manufacturing and other traditional 
businesses from urban areas left a significant portion of young men 
with minimal employment prospects. Black and Latino males with 
poor grades and especially those who dropped out of school, faced a 
hostile and competitive labor market—long periods of unemployment 
soon became the norm. Into this vacuum stepped drug cartels that 
saw in these young men a ready labor pool with direct ties to new, 
lucrative markets, and considerable drive to make enough money to 
get out of their ghetto neighborhoods. The economic pressures that 
compel many young black and Latino men to enter the illicit drug 
market are described repeatedly in hip-hop music. 
In “Love’s Gonna Get’ Cha/Material Love” (1990) KRS-One tells 
a compelling story of coming of age into the drug business, rapping 
about growing up poor and being lured by the opportunity to make 
money to help his family. Every day I see my mother struggling, now 
it’s time I’ve got to do something, says the narrator, describing then 
the embarrassment of rejection from work and the degradation of 
menial jobs. Easy money comes in the form of a quick delivery for a 
local dealer—I do it once, I do it twice, now there’s steak with the beans 
and rice . . . my family’s happy everything is new, now tell me what the 
fuck am I supposed to do? The narrator soon becomes a moderately 
successful drug dealer able to provide for his family and enjoy some of 
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the finer things in life for a while, but a beef with a rival dealer results 
in the shooting of his brother leading to a gun battle that results in 
the police killing two of his friends. 
Most politicians, community leaders, and media portrayed young 
minority men involved in the street drug trade as lazy, irresponsible 
parasites. As the drug war raged on through the 1980s and 1990s, 
hip-hop artists responded to the demonization of drug dealers by 
pointing to the hypocrisy of a system that rewarded wealth and power 
regardless of the method by which it was acquired and yet penalized 
black men who sought the same by utilizing the few economic options 
available to them. 
In “I Want to Talk to You” (1999), Nas—considered by music 
critics one of the most lyrically gifted hip-hop artists—challenges the 
prevailing condemnation of drug dealing, asserting that for many it 
is a means of survival amid a desert of other options—Niggaz gotta 
go create his own job. He asks the nation’s political leaders what they 
would do in the same situation: Mr. Mayor imagine this was your 
backyard/Mr. Governor imagine it’s your kids that starved. And he 
implicates them in the situation facing young black men, explaining 
in so few words how racism, capitalism, and class make involvement 
in criminality all but unavoidable: all I got is what you left me with, 
I’m gonna get it. 
In “Manifesto” (1998), Talib Kweli tells the truth succinctly:
Supply and the demand it’s all capitalism
People don’t sell crack cause they like to see blacks smoke
People sell crack cause they broke
The rise of hip-hop came at a time when the U.S. music industry 
was in transition. New technologies brought unanticipated changes—
affecting record sales and profits. Hip-hop provided a much needed 
boost to an ailing industry with its new sounds, creativity, and 
energy. The commercial success of hip-hop correspondingly provided 
economic opportunities for marginalized black men at a time when 
other employment options were becoming scarce. One group well 
positioned to seize the opportunities hip-hop provided for financial 
reward was ghetto entrepreneurs (aka drug dealers). Ironically, some 
of the most successful and well-known hip-hop moguls were involved 
in the illicit drug economy early in life. Many leveraged the proceeds 
from illegal drugs to finance their start in the music industry. This 
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path, followed by Russell Simmons, Jay-Z, Master P, Nas, Notorious 
B.I.G., Eazy-E, Suge Knight, 50 Cent, Lil Wayne, and countless 
others, has led generations of hip-hop fans throughout America to 
believe that if you are smart and lucky, selling drugs can be a step 
toward establishing a successful music career. 
In “Drug Dealer” (1992), KRS-One makes the point that historically 
profits from crime have eased the path for many upwardly mobile 
Americans: 
Drug dealer, understand historical fact
Every race got ahead from selling drugs except Black
We are under attack here’s another cold fact
In the 30s and 40s the drug dealer wasn’t Black
They were Jewish, Italian, Irish, Polish etc., etcetera
Now in the 90s their lives are a lot better 
Thugs	with	Drugs:		The	Rise	of	Gangster	Rap	
We treat this rap shit just like handlin weight.
JAY-Z, “Rap Game/Crack Game” (1997)
Given the relationship between hip-hop music and street drug 
culture it is not surprising that rap lyrics reference the many 
similarities between the music and drug businesses.
The economic success of hip-hop music and culture created a new 
path to escape ghetto life. While many inner-city youth dreamed of 
a career in professional sports, achieving it required extraordinary 
physical attributes and gifts that few are born with. Hip-hop 
provided the promise of fame and fortune to the verbally gifted who 
did not sing or dance. Anyone with the ability to write and deliver 
rhymes or create new beats could ostensibly become a star. As hip-
hop continued to grow in popularity and influence, the numbers of 
young black men and women who sought to ride the hip-hop train to 
fame grew exponentially. However, as is true in many markets, the 
proliferation of hip-hop talent made it easy for the industry to exploit 
new and unsophisticated artists. Many artists were unaware that the 
commercial success of hip-hop culture was built on appealing to a 
demographic different from the group the music was initially created 
for. Record companies discovered a highly lucrative market for hip-
hop in alienated suburban white youth who reveled in the violence, 
misogyny, and criminality expressed in some hip-hop music, which 
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they adopted as the authentic experience of inner-city youth. By some 
estimates, 80 percent of hip-hop music is bought by white youth. 
The genre of hip-hop music most appealing to alienated white 
youth is “gangster rap,” celebrating the lifestyle commonly associated 
with gamblers, gangsters, pimps, hustlers, and drug traffickers. Its 
essence is selfish, misogynistic, violent, materialistic, and amoral. 
Gangster rap first developed in Los Angeles and is directly related 
to the growing involvement of LA gangs (primarily the Crips and 
Bloods) in the drug trade. The group that put gangster rap on the map 
was N.W.A. (Niggaz with Attitude). By taking on the hated “N word” 
(nigger) and the negative characteristics associated with it, the group 
was declaring itself outside contemporary society—both white and 
black. By adding the description “with Attitude,” they were serving 
notice that, like gangsters, they were dangerous and not to be messed 
with. One of the founding members, Eazy-E, initially conceived of the 
group and the record label they started as a way to launder the money 
he made selling drugs. As gangster rap grew in notoriety and profits, 
many hip-hop artists promoting themselves as “gangster rappers” 
conspicuously took the names and aliases of well-known mafia and 
drug cartel leaders (e.g., Junior Mafia, Noriega, Gambino, Escobar) to 
establish their affinity with those choosing to live by the “Code of the 
Streets” (1994) as described by Gang Starr:
I’ll organize some brothers and get some crazy loot
Selling d-r-u-g-s and clocking dollars, troop
Cause the phat dough, yo, that suits me fine
I gotta have it so I can leave behind
The mad poverty, never having always needing
If a sucker steps up, then I leave him bleeding
. . .
You gotta be a pro, do what you know
When you’re dealing with the code of the streets
The Wu-Tang Clan succinctly summed up the prevailing value 
in the United States, when they proclaimed in their mega-hit 
“C.R.E.A.M.” (1994), “Cash Rules Everything Around Me, Get the 
Money, Dollar, Dollar Bills Y’all.” Gangster rap celebrates this 
lifestyle with its promise of quick financial gain and easy sexual 
conquests. However, it is worth noting that aside from the prevalence 
of guns, the sentiments and attitudes reflected in gangster rap are 
very similar to the values and behavior that have prevailed on Wall 
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Street over the past three decades. “Greed is good,” has been the 
dominant ethos of mainstream financiers who made billions selling 
toxic products to unwitting customers who became addicted to the 
financial “high” of increasing profits and cheap borrowed money, no 
matter how risky. Unlike the titans of Wall Street who were rescued 
from the consequences of their follies by the federal government and 
successfully avoided prosecution, today’s rappers are increasingly 
caught in a trap partly of their own making. Establishing one’s 
criminal bona fides has become a prerequisite for legitimacy as a 
gangster rapper, and artists vie to exceed each other in verbal boasts 
of flouting the law. Prosecutors have become creative at using the 
lyrics of gangster rappers as evidence of criminal activity, leading to 
several high-profile prosecutions. 
In reality, the life of the average street drug dealer is often harsh, 
dangerous, and financially unrewarding. This is well-described in 
“Last Dayz,” by Onyx (1995). Beginning with a line borrowed from the 
1993 film Menace II Society—I’m America’s nightmare, young black 
and just don’t give a fuck—the track describes a life of zero options, 
crime, and violence. There are messages of suicide—thinking of taking 
my own life, might as well—and violent ends—and I’ll probably bite 
the bullet cause I live by the gun. Perhaps most striking, however, is 
the sense of resignation. The chorus sums it up:
It’s life on the edge, a dangerous
way of livin, never givin a shit
cause we livin in it—we never givin a shit
cause we living in it
The opportunity to earn big money as a street-level drug dealer 
is almost as elusive for most black and Latino men as making it 
into professional sports. Several studies suggest the average street 
drug dealer earns slightly more than minimum wage and receives no 
extras for the safety hazards associated with the job (e.g., gunshots, 
beat-downs, theft), or compensation if hurt or arrested.3 Guns are not 
a vicarious thrill but a fact of life—the number-one cause of death for 
young black men, especially those involved in drug-related activities. 
Nor is going to prison just tough-guy talk but a general eventuality, 
since one in four black men will do time at some point in their lives, 
usually while young. 
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“Sound	of	Da	Police”:	Hip-Hop	on	Law	Enforcement	
The rise of hip-hop paralleled the exponential growth of 
imprisonment fueled by drug law enforcement. Hip-hop expresses the 
sentiments of minority inner-city youth who profoundly distrust the 
criminal justice system. This distrust begins with law enforcement. 
The police are viewed by many as a legal gang with which minority 
youth are perpetually at war.  
In “Sound of da Police” (1993), KRS-One expands the critique of 
police harassment suggested at the end of “The Message” with a direct 
attack that connects modern-day police practices with the behavior of 
plantation overseers during chattel slavery:
Take the word “overseer,” like a sample
Repeat it very quickly in a crew for example
Overseer, Overseer, Overseer, Overseer!
Officer, Officer, Officer, Officer!
Yeah, officer from overseer
You need a little clarity?
Check the similarity!
. . .
The overseer had the right to get ill
And if you fought back, the overseer had the right to kill
The officer has the right to arrest
And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest!
N.W.A. (Niggaz with Attitude) gained fame and notoriety for 
expressing the absolute contempt many young black Angelenos had 
for the Los Angeles Police Department, which was considered to be 
brutal and corrupt. In “Fuck tha Police” (1988) the group holds a 
mock trial where they find the police guilty of multiple crimes against 
young black men from Compton. They describe harassment:
Fuckin with me cuz I’m a teenager
With a little bit of gold and a pager
Searchin my car, lookin for the product
Thinkin every nigga is sellin narcotics
and racially motivated violence, accusing the police of claiming the 
authority to kill a minority.
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Bass,	How	Low	Can	You	Go?	Hip-Hop	on	Drug	Addiction
Bass, How Low Can You Go? is the famous double entendre opening 
to “Bring in the Noise,” the opening track to Public Enemy’s 1988 
album It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back. Bass, of course, 
refers to a male vocal range, the bass guitar, the bass drum, a bass 
line. Base, on the other hand, refers to freebase. “White Lines” (1983) 
by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, however, was one of 
the first hip-hop songs to address the problem of drug addiction—
in particular, the growing menace posed by cocaine, specifically 
freebasing.
Ticket to ride, white line highway
Tell all your friends, they can go my way
Pay your toll, sell your soul
Pound for pound costs more than gold
The longer you stay, the more you pay
My white lines go a long way
Either up your nose or through your vein
With nothin to gain except killin’ your brain 
While drinking and cannabis smoking are often glorified in gangster 
rap (e.g., the entire Doggystyle album by Snoop Doggy Dogg, 1993), 
this is not reflective of hip-hop more broadly. “I Need Drugs” (2000) 
is an amusingly ironic ode to crack cocaine addiction by Necro. While 
funny in places, it glorifies nothing. If anything, the core message is 
a sense of shame:
I ain’t got no pride, While buying the shit
I’m lying to myself telling the runner I’m trying to quit
It’s all make believe, I pretend that I’m true
When you give me credit, I’ll dodge you every chance that I get to
Even if it’s good, I’ll sniff it up in a minute
Beep you back and complain that you put too much cut in it
 
What	We	Seeing	Is	.	.	.	:	Hip-Hop	on	Prison
Public Enemy’s “Bring the Noise,” quoted above, relates not only to 
addiction but also to the drug trade and prisons. Bass, how low can 
you go? is the question. Death row, what a brother know is the answer. 
In just twelve words, Chuck D had drawn the connection between 
drugs, addiction, the consequences of involvement in the drug trade, 
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and the violence that surrounds it for young black men. Throughout 
the many genres of hip-hop music, there are messages about prison 
and prison life. While gangster rap is best known for its glorification 
of drug dealing, gang banging, and lifestyles of hedonistic criminality, 
many of the same groups that made gangster rap popular also rap 
about prison life, much based on personal experience. Hip-hop artists 
who have been through the criminal justice system are too numerous 
to count, a reflection of the prevalence of incarceration among young 
black men. Since “The Message,” hip-hop music has included tales of 
incarceration. 
In “Locked in Spofford” (1993) Mobb Deep describes juvenile 
detention and violent necessities of getting by—Here, it takes a lot of 
heart to live . . . Niggaz got me fightin for my life, cause shit is real. 
DMX, meanwhile, describes the revolving door of the criminal justice 
system and lock-down in maximum security in 2001’s “Who We Be”:
The release, the warning, “Try not to get in trouble”
The snitches, the odds, probation, parole
The new charge, the bail, the warrant, the hole
. . .
The twenty-three hours that’s locked, the one hour that’s not
The silence, the dark, the mind, so fragile
Ludacris’s “Do Your Time” (2006) develops this theme. The track is 
a call to those incarcerated to endure:
I’d dream that I could tell Martin Luther we made it
But half of my black brothers are still incarcerated
. . .
If you doin 25 to life—stay up homie
I got your money on ice so—stay up homie
If you locked in the box keep makin it through
Do your time (do your time) don’t let your time do you
In an imaginative take on the subject Nas, “Last Words” (1999), 
writes from the perspective of the prison, describing its relationship 
with the inmates who inhabit its world. The approach amplifies the 
experience for the listener, and brings home the reality of prison, in 
particular, the utter lack of privacy:
Convicts think they alone but if they listen close
They can hear me groan touch the wall feel my pulse
All the pictures you put up is stuck to my skin
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I hear ya prayers (even when ya whisperin)
. . . 
And the erosion of dignity:
I saw too many inmates fallin apart
Call for the guards to let them out at night when it’s dark
. . .
No remorse for your tears I seen em too often
When you cry I make you feel alive inside a coffin 
Conclusion
It is difficult to fully appreciate the influence of hip-hop culture 
on generations of young men of color growing up in the era of the 
modern “war on drugs” in the United States. Rather than attempting 
to encapsulate it, I leave it to the eloquent words contained in the 
following quotation from Aneraé “X-Raided” Brown, a California 
inmate:
I am the fabled crack baby. A boy who became a teen during what 
some argue was one of the roughest, most dangerous periods in 
U.S. history. I turned 14 in 1988, a black boy, a fledgling member 
of the notorious Crip gang, trying to learn how to fly, in the wrong 
direction, unknowingly, with lead wings. Pistols, cocaine, HIV/
AIDS, the Cold War; how those things became the concerns of a 
14 year old . . . God only knows. A boy who learned by what he 
decried, I was an impressionable teen absorbing the teachings 
that emanated from the conditions I saw on a daily basis, which 
included police brutality, the devastation of the gang and crack 
epidemics on the black community, and an overall fear and disdain 
of both white people and law enforcement, issues which were 
largely ignored by the mainstream media. The only journalistic 
reports being published that addressed these matters to reach my 
eyes and ears were coming to me in the form of hip-hop music, 
videos, movies and magazines . . . and the strongest voices of all, 
which came from a few little groups you may have heard of that 
went by the names of Public Enemy, NWA, and the Geto Boys. 
They were, to the streets, what The Beatles were to white folk. 
What James Brown, Curtis Mayfield and Marvin Gaye were to 
older black folk. They were the voices of our generation. Chuck D 
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and Ice Cube’s voices are as recognizable to us as Paul McCartney 
and John Lennon’s are to, say, a Baby Boomer, for perspective. 
“Fight the Power,” “Fu*k the Police”—You know Chuck D and Ice 
Cube’s voices and the sounds of Dr. Dre and The Bomb Squad, 
even if you do not know their names and faces.4
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6. Under Cover of Privilege: College 
Drug Dealing in the United States
by A. Rafik Mohamed and Erik D. Fritsvold
For nearly forty years, the United States has been the driving force 
behind the international drug-eradication effort commonly referred 
to as the “war on drugs.”1 Most of the United States’ partners in this 
“war” share an interest in reducing the harms associated with illicit 
drug use; however, the drug-war approach taken by United States 
differs in significant ways from the tactics preferred by most of its 
partner nations. While the majority of Western industrialized nations 
have responded to the global drug crisis by adopting harm-reduction, 
therapeutic, and public-health models in their efforts to curtail illegal 
drug use, and others have considered the decriminalization of drug 
use for personal possession, drug policies in the United States have 
been distinguished by strict prohibitionist “get tough” policies and a 
heavy dependence upon the criminal justice system. The direct result 
of this approach, discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s next 
section, has been a quadrupling of the jail and prison population in 
the United States and the disenfranchisement of millions of U.S. 
citizens.
However, as our research on college drug dealers reveals, the 
war on drugs in the United States has not been waged with an 
even hand. Instead, despite the unyielding “zero-tolerance” zealotry 
accompanying U.S. drug policy, the illicit drug-using and drug-dealing 
behaviors of the most vulnerable and marginalized members of U.S. 
society have been more heavily scrutinized by the drug war hawks 
than similarly illicit behaviors of those with more social, political, and 
economic capital.
What follows in this chapter is a short synopsis of the effect of the 
U.S. war on drugs on incarceration and its disproportionate focus 
on African Americans; and a summary of a six-year ethnography in 
which we observed and interviewed approximately fifty affluent drug 
dealers, all of whom were current or former college students and 
nearly all of whom were white males. Despite operating significant 
and frequently conspicuous drug-dealing enterprises, and despite 
their collective bungling and a dearth of risk-aversion tactics, few 
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of these dorm-room dealers were ever entangled in the drug war 
web. While a handful of the dealers serving as our informants had 
brushes with the law for their illicit drug activities, only one was 
convicted for drug law violations and none were incarcerated for 
their crimes. Unlike their street-corner peers, likely in part due to 
the fact they were never formally stigmatized for their drug-dealing 
activities, all but one of our study’s subjects ultimately transitioned 
out of their statuses as drug dealers and into the licit workforce. 
Ultimately, the drug-dealing network we uncovered challenges 
the archetypical “shadowy figure” portrayal of drug dealers in the 
United States and calls into question some of the foundational 
elements of contemporary U.S. drug policy, particularly in light of 
seemingly more successful strategies employed by other members of 
the international community in their efforts to curtail drug abuse.
The	War	on	Drugs
In 2005, while reflecting upon the state of international drug 
control efforts, then executive director of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa, remarked, “This is 
not a small enemy against which we struggle. It is a monster. With 
such an enormous amount of capital at its disposal, it is bound to be 
an extremely tenacious one.”2 At the time of Costa’s assessment, the 
UNODC estimated the worldwide retail market for illegal drugs at 
US$320 billion,3 larger than the gross domestic product of 88 percent 
of the world’s nations.
The U.S. demand for illicit drugs is perhaps the most substantial 
catalyst behind this “monster” global drug trade. An estimated 44 
percent of the retail sales of illegal drugs worldwide are in North 
America.4 According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, more than 20 
million Americans aged twelve or older were current illicit drug users, 
meaning they had used an illegal drug at least once in the past month. 
U.S. Americans are the world’s largest consumers of cocaine and, 
according to the 2009 UNODC World Drug Report, about 6 million of 
the estimated 16–21 million individuals who used cocaine one or more 
times in 2007 were in the United States.5 Further, Americans rank 
among the top consumers of other drugs like heroin, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine,6 prompting the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
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(DEA) to conclude that “The illegal drug market in the United States 
is one of the most profitable in the world.”7
In response to drug use and drug trafficking, the United 
States has pursued a zero-tolerance, law-enforcement-focused 
prohibitionist policy since the mid-1970s. While quite literally 
millions of primarily minor drug offenders have been arrested over 
the course of the U.S. war on drugs and hundreds of thousands 
have been incarcerated in U.S. prisons for drug law violations, little 
has been accomplished in reducing either supply of or demand for 
illicit drugs in the United States. On the contrary, after forty years 
of criminal justice-centered drug-eradication efforts, in the United 
States, illicit drugs are “more accessible, more widely utilized, and 
more potent than ever before.”8
What the United States has succeeded in doing during its drug 
war is to amass the largest jail and prison populations in the world. 
Inhabitants of the United States comprise approximately 5 percent 
of the world’s population, but inhabitants of U.S. jails and prisons 
make up about 25 percent of the world’s incarcerated population,9 
giving “the land of the free” the contradictory distinction of having 
the highest incarceration rate of any country on the planet.10 While 
these figures are startling in and of themselves, they only tell part 
of the U.S. criminal justice story in the new millennium. These data 
fail to show the extent to which the present-day girth of the U.S. 
criminal justice system has been fed by excessively punitive drug 
policies, enacted primarily during the Ronald Reagan and George 
H. W. Bush administrations and enhanced during the subsequent 
continuation of the war on drugs by the Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush administrations. Over the course of these four administrations, 
the number of incarcerated drug offenders rose by more than 1,000 
percent, primarily as a result of increased law-enforcement scrutiny 
and not as a result of increased rates of offending.11 Currently in 
the United States, approximately 20 percent of state prisoners and 
more than 50 percent of federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug-
law violations as their most serious offense.12 In the pre–drug-war 
context, in 1980, only 6.5 percent of state and 25 percent of federal 
prison inmates were sentenced to prison for drug-law violations.13
Perhaps the most widely commented upon and ethically problematic 
outcome of the war on drugs has been the disparate and negative 
effects of these policies on poor and minority communities in the 
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United States, the brunt of which has been felt in particular by African 
Americans. While constituting only 13 percent of the U.S. population, 
African Americans make up nearly one-half of all people behind bars 
in the United States, approximately 35 percent of all people arrested 
for drug-abuse violations,14 and 45 percent of state prison inmates 
serving time for drug offenses.15 This is despite the fact that federal 
government drug-use surveys indicate that African Americans make 
up about 15 percent of the total drug-user population while white 
Americans comprise over 70 percent of all drug users.16  
In contrast to this overrepresentation of the poor and minorities, 
relatively well-off and white Americans have been conspicuously 
underrepresented among those arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated 
for drug offenses. In the particular context of our study, affluent college 
students have been nearly invisible in the criminal justice data. This 
is in spite of this population’s seemingly disproportionate embrace of 
recreational drug use and high levels of conspicuous drug-trafficking 
activity organized around supplying collegiate drug-use demands.
The	College	Drug	Scene
Stopper (college drug dealer): Where I’m from, stoners were kids 
who wore hemp. We have a kind of granola culture. But these 
kids [at this university], you weren’t looking at the 4.0 students,17 
but they were normal, they were involved, good majors—business 
majors—they didn’t fit the stereotype of what a drug user would 
look like. These kids were pretty upstanding kids to most people. 
They just smoked a lot of weed.
In the midst of the sweeping international drug-control efforts 
and the draconian drug-control policies adopted by the federal and 
various state governments in the United States, just a short distance 
north of the U.S. southern border with Mexico, a drug market thrives, 
ostensibly immune to the force of the drug war. Over a six-year 
period, we had access to this market and observed, interviewed, and 
otherwise interacted with approximately fifty drug dealers and user-
dealers, all of whom were prosperous students at Southern California 
colleges and universities.18 We initially gained entrée to this drug-
dealing network through key informants whom we knew beforehand. 
From this point of access, we were able to establish trust and rapport 
with some of the network’s other drug dealers, ultimately culminating 
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in hundreds of hours of observation and dozens of formal interviews 
with current and former dealers and their clients conducted by us and 
our research assistants. When we began this research, we anticipated 
that we would find low-level college drug use and only modest drug 
dealing. However, rather early in the research process, we were 
genuinely surprised by the scope and extent of criminality engaged 
in by the affluent college drug dealers who served as the network’s 
nucleus.
These dealers ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-four. 
With the exception of three women, all of the dealers we formally 
interviewed or observed were men and all but six were Caucasian. 
Disproportionately, the subjects’ chosen course of study was business 
administration, economics, and accounting, and the overwhelmingly 
majority of the dealers in the network were from upper-middle- to 
upper-class families. In fact, most of our dealers’ parents held 
prestigious social and professional positions that ranged from high 
level business executives, business owners, medical doctors, and 
accounting executives, to political figures.
The illicit market in which our dealers sold their goods functioned 
as a “closed” drug market with dealers only selling to other college 
students, friends, acquaintances, and people who could be directly 
vouched for by other known buyers. While closed markets are quite 
common in the United States, they deviate significantly from the 
“open” drug markets that have come to characterize the urban drug 
scene. These open markets typically operate around known “drug 
spots” and dealers actively solicit strangers as customers.
Our network’s members sold and consumed various types of drugs, 
but most of the network’s drug activity revolved around the sale and 
consumption of marijuana. That understood, some of our dealers did 
traffic in modest quantities of cocaine, and others sold party drugs, 
with ecstasy being the most common. While not entirely mutually 
exclusive, of our fifty subjects, roughly thirty focused primarily on 
marijuana and other “street drugs.” The remaining twenty subjects 
typified the “user-dealer” model and focused their transactions 
around the nonmedical use of prescription drugs including stimulants 
(Adderall, Ritalin), opioids (OxyContin, Percocet, Vicodin), and central 
nervous-system depressants (Valium, Xanax, Librium).
Our dealer-subjects ranged from those who sold drugs solely to 
support their own drug habit (sometimes unsuccessfully) to those who 
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provided relatively large quantities of drugs that were then distributed 
to a significant number of drug consumers and smaller distributors 
at area colleges. The half-dozen largest dealers in our sample sold 
between one and two pounds of high-quality, high-potency marijuana 
per week.19 These dealers would typically buy their wholesale 
marijuana in multipound bundles costing between $4,000 and $4,400 
per pound. They would then break the marijuana down into market-
standard one-eighth or one-quarter pound increments for retail sale. 
Diamond, the largest dealer in our sample, eventually became one 
of the region’s foremost marijuana dealers, moving anywhere from 
five to ten pounds of marijuana per week and earning gross profits 
of $80,000 to $160,000 per month. Despite the significance of their 
criminality, even the largest dealers in our sample haphazardly 
approached their drug transactions in a manner that suggested a 
genuine lack of concern for law enforcement.
In striking contrast to the drug-dealing networks commonly 
described in the criminological literature, this affluent college network 
did not employ even rudimentary risk-minimization strategies. Ounces 
or pounds of marijuana were often thrown into school backpacks 
or Styrofoam coolers, or simply stuffed into pockets. Sophisticated 
packaging was rare and most transportation techniques could be 
characterized as reckless. Primarily, these college drug dealers 
operated out of the same rented apartments or on-campus housing 
in which they resided. With few exceptions, most of their illegal 
business was on full display upon walking through their front door. 
Incriminating evidence was rarely hidden in backrooms; legitimate 
houseguests, neighbors, and solicitors regularly had a full view of 
these ongoing drug operations. By way of example, upon arriving 
at a dealer’s home for an interview and observation session, ounces 
of marijuana, a scale, and large amounts of cash and paraphernalia 
were clearly visible from a relatively busy street. On another occasion, 
one of our subjects reported forgetting four ounces of marijuana (with 
a street value between $1,200 and $1,600) in a university classroom. 
He returned a few hours later to find left behind only the sweatshirt 
in which he had casually “concealed” the drugs. Most interestingly, 
especially among college-educated criminal entrepreneurs, there 
was virtually no discussion about or apparent awareness of core U.S. 
constitutional protections, the Fourth Amendment, probable cause, 
and other presumably obvious matters that would seem valuable 
in minimizing police detection and prosecution. These dealers’ 
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pervasive lack of basic security precautions reflected the fact that law 
enforcement was not perceived as a substantial threat within this 
network.
By virtue of their social location and their status as college students, 
all of the dealers we interviewed and observed were poised to live 
successful and materially comfortable lives after college. Unlike 
many of their street-corner counterparts, they were not driven to 
illicit drug sales out of desperation or bleak economic and educational 
opportunities. Thus, these affluent college drug dealers were making a 
seemingly irrational choice to sell drugs, one that caused us to wonder 
why they would place their near-certain positive futures in jeopardy. 
We ultimately found that these college dealers were motivated by a 
series of material and nonmaterial rewards. Further, because of their 
heeling and the lack of law enforcement scrutiny of their activities, 
they were largely oblivious to the criminal justice consequences 
that could befall them if the drug war were to be waged in a less 
discriminatory fashion.
Regarding their particular motivations, we found that many of 
the dealers began selling drugs to their college peers as a means to 
underwrite the costs of their personal drug use and other incidental 
and entertainment expenses associated with the college lifestyle. 
In addition, many dealers were inspired by the spirit of capitalism; 
recognizing an opportunity in the marketplace fueled by unyielding 
demand, drug dealing offered them a practical business opportunity 
to earn a relatively low-risk return on an investment. And since these 
dealers had their basic living expenses and tuition paid for by their 
parents, their drug profits were directly parlayed into entertainment 
monies, international vacations, accessories for their already 
expensive vehicles, and other impulsive expenditures.
Beyond these and other tangible and material rewards of being 
a dorm-room dealer, we also found a host of nonmaterial identity-
based rewards that served as enticements for some of our subjects’ 
beginnings in the drug trade. Among the relatively elite collegiate 
set, some degree of ego gratification and elevation in social status 
could be achieved by becoming a campus drug dealer and challenging 
society’s conventional norms. More precisely, a significant number of 
the nonprescription-drug dealers in our sample seemed motivated by 
the simple thrill of deviant behavior, the excitement of getting away 
with activities they knew to be criminal, and otherwise displaying 
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the ornaments of pseudo “gangstaism.” As Jack Katz contends in his 
book, Seductions of Crime, “It is not the taste for the pizza that leads 
to the crime; the crime makes the pizza tasty.”20 Therefore, for some 
of our dealers, it seemed that the “sneaky thrills”21 associated with 
antiauthoritarianism and attempting to outwit formal agents of social 
control served as an enticement into criminality. Indeed, the pseudo-
gangster airs exuded and often internalized by some of our dealers 
seemed somewhat conspicuous attempts to combat the appearance 
of being a coddled child of privilege and to stand out among equally 
affluent peers. Interestingly, in spite of these outwardly displayed 
rejections of legal conventions, a core finding of our research was that 
these apparent risks were somewhat artificial. Paradoxically, the 
very privilege many of these dealers seemed to be rebelling against is 
the same privilege that ultimately provided them sanctuary from law 
enforcement scrutiny and the ire of the drug war.
In fact, despite the collective bungling of dealers in our network, 
there were noticeably few interactions with law enforcement. 
Moreover, even when suspected of drug activity (or, in the very rare 
case, caught for drug activity) the symbolic,22 political, and actual 
capital possessed by our dealers and their families mitigated the 
formal consequences of their criminality. Throughout the course of 
the entire study, there were only a handful of arrests of any of our 
dorm-room dealers or their associates. Relatively early in the study, 
Beefy, a twenty-one year-old white middle-class college drug dealer 
with a 3.1 grade point average, had been apprehended by campus 
police and cited for possession of drug paraphernalia. While clearly 
in violation of campus drug policies as well as state laws, Beefy’s 
transgressions were never brought to the attention of local or state 
police. Instead, Beefy’s case remained internal to his university, he 
received a small fine, and he continued on as a relatively significant 
campus marijuana dealer. As Beefy said of his final disposition:
You were supposed to pay a $150 fine and go to like two drug 
classes and some kind of shit. I never called. They never did 
anything. There’s no block on my account so . . . Pop’s probably 
paid for it. [laughs] Who knows? I never checked any receipts so 
I don’t have any idea of what happened to it. But they’ve never 
contacted me to take any of the classes and I’ve never contacted 
them so . . . 
LaCoste was perhaps our study’s most colorful character. He was 
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a blonde-haired, blue-eyed, freshman from the midwestern United 
States who, by his own declaration, was “untouchably wealthy” and, 
in our assessment, worked hard to portray a “gangsta” persona. 
He dealt marijuana, cocaine, and ecstasy out of his dorm room and 
routinely took his operation mobile in the $50,000 Cadillac Escalade 
SUV purchased for him by his parents. He was also one of the very 
few dealers in our study to have significant prior encounters with the 
criminal justice system.
LaCoste: Yeah, for like ah . . . I don’t know, I got real good lawyers 
[laughs]. Like real good lawyers . . . and I got a concealed gun 
charge and a possession over an ounce charge and they were trying 
to give me some intent to distribute. But I just got a possession ticket 
that’s all and then the weapon and everything else disappeared.
Interviewer: How did you pay for these lawyers?
LaCoste: Na, that’s not me . . . I’m not gonna claim to have paid 
for those. Turn that off [points to the tape recorder], I don’t want 
to say that [laughs]. No, but that would have to be my dad. Or my 
parents . . . I can’t pay for fucking like six lawyers.
In what proved to be a signature moment, our initial point person 
into this particular drug market, Brice, was arrested on federal 
felony drug cultivation and distribution charges that carried a six-
year prison sentence if he were to be convicted. After raiding his 
two-bedroom apartment (with a garage that he used exclusively for 
marijuana cultivation), federal and local authorities seized roughly 
$30,000 of Brice’s cultivation equipment and over 100 marijuana 
plants at various stages of maturation. Brice immediately turned to 
his parents, admitted to them his involvement in marijuana dealing, 
and they, in turn, paid a prominent attorney to defend Brice in 
federal court. As Brice’s case unfolded, it vividly illustrated many of 
the theoretical and substantive critiques of bias in the U.S. criminal 
justice system and drug war, and his case also put a tangible face on 
the concepts of symbolic capital and privilege. In an email he sent the 
day after his final hearing in federal court, Brice wrote:
Just signed a deal yesterday! . . . Basically, they dropped the 
big charge, and the other will not be on my record within 18 
months. I have to do 100 hours community service, lose my 4th 
Amendment, get drug tested, and have to remain in therapy for at 
least 6 months. However, once it’s all over I can answer that I’ve 
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never been arrested, and nothing will ever be on my record. Even 
now, it’s not recorded anywhere since they never made a judgment 
against me. Kind of like the diversion program, but better, because 
I have no parole or probation counselor. I am free to leave the 
state any time I want, I just cannot get any misdemeanor offenses 
otherwise I break the terms of the deal.
Conclusions
While perhaps not as expansively as Brice, every college drug 
dealer we encountered over the course of this research routinely sold 
large enough quantities of marijuana and other drugs to be prosecuted 
under the harsh laws that have come to characterize the U.S.-led 
war on drugs. Yet, all but one of the fifty dorm-room dealers we 
encountered over the course of our six-year study emerged unscathed 
from their forays as drug dealers. Around the same time that we were 
bringing our research on this network to a close, we were informed 
that LaCoste had been academically disqualified from college, had 
returned to his home in the midwestern United States, and was facing 
several unknown felony charges. With that sole exception, all of our 
dealers completed their respective college degrees and transitioned 
into conventionally productive lives in the legitimate economy.
Perhaps most important, all of our dealers were fully aware that 
they benefited from a luxury that their street-corner peers did not; they 
all knew that the war on drugs was not a war waged in their direction, 
and, consequently, in spite of their flagrantly illegal behaviors, they 
were a relatively low priority on the law-enforcement totem pole. When 
asked why they felt that was the case, our dealers acknowledged that 
physical and social location, socioeconomic status, and race influenced 
the way their activities were perceived by police and other officials. As 
Ann, one of the few female dealers in our study said:
I mean if someone really wanted to bust us they could, all they 
would have to do was get someone to sit on our house to get some 
evidence against us to be able to go in there. No one cares that 
much. I think a lot of it has to do with the people we are, we don’t 
live in the ghetto. We don’t make noise, we don’t have parties, we 
don’t bring attention to ourselves, we are quiet, we pay everything 
on time. In the beach environment you can get away with a lot 
more.
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While the particular characteristics that defined our network might 
have been specific to this drug market, it is reasonable to assume that 
drug networks like ours exist and thrive at and around universities 
across the United States. In February 2002, police made six arrests on 
the American University campus in Washington, DC, seizing ecstasy, 
marijuana, and $15,000. In the months following the conclusion of 
this study, a significant drug bust at Southern California’s San Diego 
State University resulted in 125 arrests, the seizure of $60,000, fifty 
pounds of marijuana, four pounds of cocaine, and an assortment of 
other illicit drugs. In April 2010, fourteen Illinois State University 
students and two others faced felony drug charges after a drug sweep 
by state and local police. In December 2010, five Columbia University 
students were arrested for the alleged sale of LSD, cocaine, and 
ecstasy on their Ivy League campus. And, as Colin Diver, president of 
Reed College, remarked of his university in early 2010, “When you say 
Reed, two words often come to mind. One is brains. One is drugs.”23
Nonetheless, in spite of these well-publicized drug busts and public 
acknowledgments of illegal drug activity on college campuses, the 
actors in these networks remain largely unpoliced and conspicuously 
off the radar of the American drug war. As criminologist William 
J. Chambliss concluded in his classic study of societal responses to 
delinquency, “Selective perception and labeling—finding, processing 
and punishing some kinds of criminality and not others—means that 
visible, poor, non-mobile, outspoken, undiplomatic ‘tough’ kids will 
be noticed, whether their actions are seriously delinquent or not.”24 
Extending Chambliss’s conclusions, the deliberately invisible people 
of relative privilege in our society who fundamentally exist behind 
veils of immunity, like those people who made up the majority of 
dealers in our study, will continue to be largely unnoticed whether 
their actions are law-abiding or not.
Rather clearly, the “get tough” drug-war strategies employed by the 
United States have been misguided, ineffective, and rife with bias. 
After spending hundreds of billions of dollars fighting this metaphorical 
war, little has changed with regard to drug use in the United States or 
U.S. dependence upon the illicit international underground to supply 
these needs. What has changed substantially is the vastness of the 
U.S. criminal justice system, an expansion largely attributable to the 
policing and prosecution of poor and minority members of our society, 
often for relatively minor drug-abuse violations.
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However, there are signs suggesting that the United States might 
be poised to turn a corner in its approach toward drugs and drug 
crimes, and that the nation that has been attempting to navigate the 
course of the drug war for the better part of a century might begin 
to tack back in a direction more in step with its European drug war 
partners. In the United States, several states have enacted laws 
decriminalizing marijuana possession, creating a medicinal marijuana 
backdoor through which people can lawfully obtain marijuana with a 
doctor’s permission, and in one case proposing legislation to legalize 
and tax marijuana as a source of state revenue. Perhaps as the most 
encouraging statement in the rethinking of U.S. drug policy, Barack 
Obama, shortly after taking office as president of the United States, 
ordered the Department of Justice to discontinue raids on state-
licensed medicinal marijuana dispensaries. It is hoped that these 
trends, along with research shedding light on the disparities and 
hypocrisy of the U.S. drug war, will continue to spark conversation 
about a more reasonable, equitable, and balanced set of international 
and domestic drug policies as we move forward in the new millennium.
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7. Young Soldiers in Brazil’s Drug War
by Michelle Gueraldi
Introduction
In recent decades, Brazil has become an increasingly important transit 
route for illicit drugs.1 This is partly because traffickers are avoiding 
traditional routes as these have become more heavily targeted by law 
enforcement. The expansion of drug trafficking in the country has 
been combined with both a strong militarization of the gangs and an 
increase in the participation of children.2 These children are mostly 
poor, black boys—favela (slum) residents fighting for their lives in a 
country of deep socioeconomic inequality. Meanwhile, repressive drug 
control policies turn the favelas and adjacent areas into battlefields.
Young people, especially black males, constitute a high proportion 
of homicides in Brazil, a situation that is aggravated by the war on 
drugs. These children, whose lives are short, are a very sad picture 
of abandonment, discrimination, poverty, and rights violations in 
Brazil. Set against the backdrop of the moral stigmatization and 
demonization of favela children, this chapter looks at the underlying 
conditions of poverty and social neglect driving children’s involvement 
in the drug trade, and the impact of activities and drug-related 
violence on children’s rights.
Public	Attitudes	to	Marginalized	Children
Brazil was one of the first countries to ratify the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990. The new civilian government 
announced to the nation that children would be the absolute priority 
in the country. The president publicly recognized the tragic picture of 
abandonment and marginalization in which Brazilian children lived 
and died. At the time, Brazil had around 65 million children below the 
age of nineteen. Of those, annually: 250,000 died before completing 
their first year; one in four suffered from malnutrition; 61 percent 
of children aged one to four lived without basic sanitation; and more 
than 4 million children from seven to fourteen years of age were out 
of school. In the same year, the Statute of the Child and Adolescent 
(SCA) was adopted, incorporating the CRC into national legislation. 
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The new legal regime, rooted in the rights of the child, required 
fundamental changes in social policy toward children in the country. 
Unfortunately, today inequality and poor socioeconomic conditions 
continue to pose significant barriers to the full realization of the rights 
of the child in the country.3 In addition, negative public attitudes 
toward marginalized children contribute to their vulnerability.
Prior to the adoption of the 1990 act, the Minors’ Code of 1979 was 
the primary legislation relating to children. By this doctrine, there were 
two kinds of children: those in “regular” and “irregular” situations. The 
Minors’ Code was aimed at the latter—those in need of special protection 
such as children without parental care, without a home, or at risk of 
violence, or children who have infringed the law. It adopted a punitive 
and corrective approach and viewed such “irregular” situations as 
pathological.4 The powers available to police and judges were extensive, 
including imprisonment without a judicial order and without a crime 
being committed. The status of being a minor was sufficient. This is 
reflected in article 1 of the code, which refers to “vigilance” relating to 
minors.5 In contrast to this, the SCA (considered by many to be one of 
the most advanced pieces of child rights legislation in the world) applied 
to all, and focused on the holistic protection of children rather than on 
disciplinary intervention. The law, in keeping with the CRC, saw the 
child as a rights bearer, and an active participant in seeing those rights 
fulfilled. There was no distinction or discrimination between classes or 
groups of children. It was a major shift, but one that has yet to take root 
in public opinion.
The Minors’ Code was a reflection of a time when children who did 
not belong to the middle or upper classes, or who were orphans, and in 
need of state protection, were referred to as “minors.” They were not 
“children,” as such, but a different breed—so-called minors who collided 
with the existing and generally approved social order. The Minors’ Code 
reinforced this view. While intended to protect vulnerable children, it 
perpetuated a culture of stigmatization and discrimination that can 
still be felt by street children today, despite the changes brought in 
following the adoption of the SCA. This culture contaminates the 
state institutional apparatus and the mentality of a great part of the 
population—and even the children themselves. The dominant ideology 
in society is one that criminalizes poverty and blames victims of 
inequality for the situations in which they find themselves. Punishment 
is presented as the most effective measure against violence and crime. 
Rather than these being understood as social phenomena, generated 
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by society, they are considered to be generated by an individual will for 
delinquency.
Current debates relating to the age of criminal responsibility 
highlight this view, which is held by many. At present those under 
eighteen cannot be responsible for their criminal acts. The Penal 
Code is applied to adults and the SCA to crimes committed by 
children. The maximum penalty for adults in Brazil is thirty years 
of imprisonment while the penalties applied by the SCA are “social-
educative measures,” adequate to the incomplete development of 
children. The most severe measure applied to children is detention 
in state shelters for a maximum period of three years. However, 
congress members in the National House of Representatives 
strongly campaign for a shift in the legislation in order to lower the 
age of criminal responsibility. As one congressman, Jair Bolsonaro, 
stated, “We deny the arguments of those who are against reducing 
the legal age for criminal responsibility, for we choose to overcrowd 
prisons with marginalized minors rather than fill cemeteries with 
innocents.”6
Such statements show just how far from reality the vision of the 
SCA is, the abiding view of marginalized children as separate from the 
mainstream, and the culture of blame contributing to the targeting of 
these children in the drug war.
Violence	and	Rights	Violations	Against	Children	in	the	Drug	War
The children most likely to suffer violations of their fundamental 
rights due to the drug war are those living in the slums where 
drug dealers assemble their armies and build their factories. Some 
are engaged in the drug trade, working for criminal organizations, 
while others coexist with them without direct involvement. Their 
vulnerability has many sources. Apart from their age, most are black 
and poor. They live in conditions of poverty and in a situation of 
“organized armed violence.”7 While the state has specific obligations 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child to protect these 
children, according to testimony from children themselves, the state 
not only enables violence but generates it.
In 2008, several nongovernmental organizations, coordinated by 
the Brazilian Association of Child’s Defense Centers and Terre des 
Hommes Foundation, prepared a civil society report about child 
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rights in Brazil. The report was prepared focusing on Article 12 of 
the CRC, which recognizes the right of children to be heard and 
have their views taken into account. Four hundred children were 
listened to throughout Brazil, and included many vulnerable groups 
including children raised in landless movement camps, sheltered 
girls, physically challenged children, and those of African descent. 
While the report was broader in focus, several lived in situations of 
armed violence.8 The reports9 convey the children’s opinions on many 
issues and also the positive experiences and views they had about 
their lives and about the country. Answering the question “What is 
it like to be a child in Brazil?” a seventeen-year-old boy from Rio de 
Janeiro responded:
Good and difficult. Good, because I feel free. Bad because there is 
much evil . . . police, trafficking, and drugs.10
The children’s views reveal deep concerns about their basic rights, 
such as access to education and health care, their families’ well-being, 
and how the state fails to provide for them. The children criticize 
politicians and identify the police and drug dealers as violent and 
guilty of committing terrible crimes. They also explain that robbery 
and crime are their only choice in order to make money for survival 
due to state abandonment. Asked about the most serious problems 
facing the country, one boy, also seventeen years old from Rio de 
Janeiro, said:
I agree with them, but disagree when they say that Brazil’s 
problem is the violence. Do you know why I disagree? Because 
violence is a consequence of what they (the politicians) make out 
of politics. [W]ith that division in social classes, the person that 
lives in a community and needs money, the way to get it quick is 
stealing, selling drugs. 
Other children provided accounts of more specific problems:
I was with my cousins. The police stopped us and said many 
things: “Pull up your shirt.” I said: “I’m no bandit.” And so he 
said: “Go.” (Iago, nine years old)
The police beat the boy, slap in the head. The bandit said that, 
when police arrive, I must let him know. If I don’t, I’ll get hurt. 
The police job is to protect criminals. (Matheus, eight years old)
Thieves walk by us holding guns in order to make us fear them. 
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My father’s wife’s son got shot only because the man did not like 
him. He’s a paralytic now. (Kilvia, thirteen years old) 
From the statements above, a number of themes come through: the 
assumption of guilt toward children from the slums; the involvement 
of the police with drug dealers and their disrespect for the rights of 
the child; and the violence surrounding the children on a daily basis.
Invasive	Searches	and	the	Presumption	of	Guilt
Iago’s testimony above refers to a time when police officers 
attempted to search him, looking for guns. Iago lives in Vicente de 
Carvalho community in Rio de Janeiro, an area rife with armed 
violence. In these communities, police searches of children’s backpacks 
and clothes are common and frequently result in abuses. In Morro 
do Alemão, for example, during a major confrontation between police 
and the drug traffickers in 2007, police were publicly denounced for 
searching under young girls’ skirts.
Police searches, according to Brazilian penal law, can occur 
only when there is strong evidence that the person is suspected of 
involvement in criminal acts. In addition, the CRC and the SCA 
recognize both that the best interests of the child must be a primary 
consideration and that the child has rights to freedom from unlawful 
interference with his or her privacy. Due to these ongoing searches, 
however, families have sought the assistance of human rights groups. 
In 2007, a child rights nongovernmental organization from Rio de 
Janeiro, Projeto Legal, filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of 
children living in the favela of Vigário Geral who were subjected to 
embarrassing invasions of their privacy during police searches. The 
petition focused on Patrick (age four), Bruna (age eleven), and Brenda 
(age fifteen), and was filed against the order given by Rio de Janeiro’s 
Public Security secretary to search Vigário Geral residents, including 
children, for drugs. Projecto Legal, in its petition, stated:
Yesterday morning, 15th of March 2007, at about 8 a.m., 
a police operation coordinated by the Explosives and Guns 
Repression Precinct took place in Vigário Geral Community, 
with the participation of around 100 policemen. . . . In daytime, 
in a residential area, due to Rio de Janeiro’s political strategy 
of state enforcement through direct armed conflict, there was a 
long shootout between the police and members of a drug dealing 
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organization. During the operation, a significant number of school 
children were searched by policemen, due to an alleged suspicion 
of drugs and guns inside children’s backpacks. . . . It is all about 
the old and well known public security project, based on the idea 
of militarization of social crises and criminalization of Rio de 
Janeiro’s subordinated population . . . violating the principles 
established in the Constitution of the Republic and the Statute of 
the Child and Adolescent.11 
The organization alleged that the searches violated the 
constitutionally recognized rights of the child to freedom and privacy 
and claimed that it was not part of public security authorities’ powers 
to create and implement policies aimed at children, especially those 
in a situation of great vulnerability, as in this case. Initially, a judicial 
order to stop child searches was given, but afterward it was adapted, 
sparing only children under twelve years of age. According to the 
Brazilian legislation, “child” means someone up to the age of twelve 
and an “adolescent” is someone aged twelve to eighteen. The final 
decision was based on the assumption that, for the most part, children 
under twelve are not involved with drug dealers. It was an arbitrary 
distinction, and those over twelve years of age, though guaranteed in 
law the same rights as those under twelve, continued to be targets of 
the police searches and to be considered natural suspects as working 
for drug dealers, simply because they live in the favela.
Child	Homicide:	A	Growing,	Selective	Crisis
Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with 
over 48,000 people killed each year. Murders by gangs, inmates, 
police, death squads, and hired killers regularly make headlines 
around Brazil and the world. Extrajudicial executions and 
vigilante justice are supported by a sizable proportion of the 
population who fear high crime rates, and who perceive that 
the criminal justice system is too slow to effectively prosecute 
criminals. Many politicians, keen to curry favour with a fearful 
electorate, have failed to demonstrate the political will necessary 
to curb executions by police.
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, Philip Alston, 200812
Young people are overrepresented in homicide13 statistics in 
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Brazil. This is reflected in several UNESCO reports, known as 
Maps of Violence. Published since 1998, the most recent one in 2010 
reflects the “anatomy of child homicides in Brazil.”14 The Maps of 
Violence recognize Brazil as a violent place for young people to live. 
According to the third map of violence published in 2002, in the 
1990s the number of youth homicides rose by 77 percent, against 
a 50.2 percent rise among the entire population. According to the 
report, 4.7 percent of deaths in the entire population are caused by 
homicide, while that figure is 39.2 percent among youth. In some 
cities, such as Rio de Janeiro, Vitória, and São Paulo, it can be as 
high as 50 percent.15
The 2010 Map of Violence showed that until 2003, the overall 
rates of homicide were growing more than 5 percent per year. After 
2003, those rates decreased. Among children, however, they stayed 
the same, and among adolescents the number of homicides has been 
growing drastically. From 1997 to 2007, homicides rose 24 percent 
among those aged twelve to eighteen. Although youth represented 
only 18.6 percent of the Brazilian population in 2007, the rate of 
homicide affecting them was of 36 percent.
A 2001 study carried out by CLAVES/Fiocruz, a renowned Brazilian 
research center, affirmed that one of the most serious issues facing 
Brazil was the scale of death, injury, and trauma among children 
and young people due to violence. CLAVES, using public data on the 
mortality of young people aged fifteen to twenty-four from 1990 to 
1998, indicated an endemic situation and an increase in homicides 
among this group.16 According to data assembled by CLAVES, in 
1998, throughout Brazil, 65 percent of youth homicides involved 
guns, which is corroborated by the UNESCO Maps of Violence. 
In addition, and of particular concern is that the CLAVES study 
indicated a sort of specie selection due the victims’ common profile: 
young, male, resident in poor peripheral areas of major cities, and 
of African descent.
But who is responsible for the youth homicides? During the 1980s, 
death squads, formed by urban vigilantes, and groups of policemen 
played a large role in the killings; a form of “social cleansing” as 
indicated by several case studies and promoted by Justiça Global, a 
Rio de Janeiro-based nongovernmental organization.17 However, the 
profile of the death squads changed during the 1990s as they began 
working for drug traffickers. With the absence of the state in the 
Part 2: targets 	 111
slums, traffickers are becoming better equipped in terms of weapons 
and technology, and the employment of children and killings of young 
people in the context of the drug trade has escalated.
In a report submitted to the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in 2004, the Brazilian Association of Child’s Defense Centers 
identified three kinds of exterminators in the 1990s: those who gave 
the orders; the killers themselves; and the advocates of extermination, 
people who occupy prominent positions and status in the community. 
Among them were drug traffickers and police. Philip Alston, 
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, following his mission to Brazil in 2008 explained that:
Members of the police forces too often contribute to the problem 
of extrajudicial executions rather than to its solution. In part, 
there is a significant problem with on-duty police using excessive 
force and committing extrajudicial executions in illegal and 
counterproductive efforts to combat crime. But there is also 
a problem with off-duty police themselves forming criminal 
organizations which also engage in killings.18 
According to Amnesty International, cases of battering, shootings 
(at hands or feet), and executions performed by the drug traffickers 
are common. These are directed not only at rivals but also at alleged 
offenders and criminals inside the areas in which they operate.19 Again, 
this is a form of “social cleansing,” ridding their area of undesirables 
and rivals. Due to the absence of any official state presence in those 
areas, criminal activities thrive. It is estimated in the Amnesty 
International report that approximately 10,000 armed drug dealers, 
including 6,000 children, are directly involved with drug dealing in 
Rio de Janeiro.
Children	Employed	in	the	Drug	Trade
Luke Dowdney, following an in-depth study of children involved in 
the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro, attributes the increased involvement 
of children during the 1980s to the greater need for the gangs to 
defend themselves and the use of light guns by the dealers. Dowdney 
identified a number of aspects characterizing their employment, such 
as: voluntary recruitment;20 an average age of first employment at 
thirteen, and of becoming a soldier (i.e., to be allowed to carry guns) 
at fifteen to seventeen; a strong hierarchy, enforced by punishment, 
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rules, and orders; regular payment; and active and progressive 
involvement in armed conflict.21
An independent documentary made in 2006, Falcão: meninos 
do tráfico (Falcons: Boys of the Drug Trade)22 portraits the lives 
of seventeen boys working in the drug trade in slums throughout 
Brazil. Their stories reveal the reasons that led them into crime as 
well as the violence perpetrated and suffered by them due to their 
activities. Several testimonials point to the absence of a father figure, 
the absence of a family, the discrimination that prevents them from 
finding a job, the desire to help their mothers, inadequate education, 
and the dream of leaving crime behind. One of the boys told how his 
work in the drug trade pays him 500 reais per month (about US$300). 
“I deal for my mother,” he said. According to another boy:
I’m no outlaw . . . I don’t want to see my mother suffering.
The testimonials also lucidly demonstrate the awareness of danger, 
the reasons for getting involved in crime, related drug addiction, and 
social exclusion.
I do not get sad about anything. I’m always drugging myself. I 
am a thief. I rob because no one gives me anything . . . I have to 
rob. I rob to live. 
If the men arrive, we’ll be treated like outlaws, they kill everyone. 
Reporter: What do you want to be when you grow up?
Outlaw. Because it makes money and helps. Hell is where we are. 
. . . Here we live the reality, where there are bullets everywhere 
and the law is the worst possible. My mother already has three 
dead children. 
Bribery and corruption are also recurring themes:
If ending crime, the police must end too, as we give money to the 
police. We pay them so we can work. If not for the drug dealing, 
the police would only “take” their wages. They take more. . . . So, 
drug dealing will not be over any time soon.
Reporter: Tell me about your day.
Not my day, my night. Because I sleep during the day and 
stay awake during the night. During the day (there are) lots of 
policeman in the slum. At night there’s bribery. 
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The boys were under no illusions about their bleak futures.
Reporter: And if you die?
If I die another one like me will be born. . . . If I die I will rest. It is 
too much bashing in this life. My future is three ways: wheelchair, 
death, or prison.
By the end of the research all but one of these young boys was dead, 
having never reached their eighteenth birthday. 
Accompanying the film was a diary written by the filmmakers.23 In 
one section, one of the producers explains how he wanted to film the 
children playing in order to show that the children of these communities 
were not born to be criminals. When he approached a group of children 
they were pretending to be traffickers, playing out the violence.
Conclusion
Long before becoming adults, young soldiers in Brazil’s drug war 
have given up their dreams. They grow up learning to accept that an 
education is not a reasonable goal; that there is no medicine at the 
public hospitals they have access to; that their parents have died or 
are missing; that politicians are corrupt and not to be trusted; and 
that the police are discriminatory, violent, and on the take. In this 
scenario, many see joining the drug traffickers as their only option, 
despite knowing that in doing so they may cut their own lives short.
The many violations of the rights of the child associated with this 
situation are exacerbated by indiscriminate repressive drug-control 
policies. While being ineffective, given that the traffickers are now 
stronger than ever, the favelas have been turned into battlefields. 
In the midst of the violence, boy soldiers end up being killed by the 
police, while those who are not involved in the drug trade are caught 
in the crossfire. Added to this, violent and corrupt police are the only 
state presence in these areas, transforming traffickers into local 
authorities who own the land and dictate the laws applied to it.
Of the thousands of Brazilians who die each year from gunfire, it is 
accepted that they have a common profile: poor, black, and young. Those 
in this group are regarded as potential enemies rather than human 
beings—a prejudice held by many in Brazilian society and a legacy of 
past policies relating to “minors.” A human rights perspective seems to 
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be the only way to reaffirm the values of humanity in a society that has 
become cynical to the point of supporting or turning a blind eye to the 
systematic killing of children.
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Discussion	Questions
1.  How important is public opinion in drug policy? What is the role of 
popular culture in this regard?
2.  Are criminal laws an appropriate basis for drug control? What 
are the limitations of the law in dealing with drugs and children’s 
involvement in the drug trade?
3.  Peterson Small, and Mohamed and Fritsvold show that drug laws 
are not equally applied in the United States. Why? How may this 
be resolved?
4.  Gueraldi’s article suggests that the root of Brazil’s problems with 
drug-related violence is not the drug trade itself, but socioeconomic 
and racial disparities in Brazilian society. Do you agree?
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Part	3:
Home	Front:	Families	and	Drug	Policy
The family1 is at the core of the social, emotional, and psychological 
development of the child. It therefore has a special place in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in which the family is seen as 
key to the full realization of the rights contained within the treaty.2 
No book about children in the context of the war on drugs would be 
complete if the effects on families were omitted. Drug dependence 
within a family, for example, can have a massive devastating 
influence. This is particularly the case when it comes to children of 
drug dependent parents.3 This section, however, is not about drug 
use and drug-related harms. It is about how policies affect families—
policies relating to drug dependence, law enforcement, prisons, and 
child protection.
The section begins with “Dancing with Despair: A Mother’s 
Perspective,” a personal account by Gretchen Burns Bergman, 
executive director of A New PATH (Parents for Addiction Treatment 
and Healing) of her experiences as a mother of two sons who are both 
heroin dependent. Both have been involved in the criminal justice 
system. She tells of her own feelings of despair, fear, and guilt, the 
effects on her family, and the conclusions she has reached about drug 
policies based on her experiences. For Bergman, the war on drugs 
only served to further harm her sons. While many parents who have 
lost children to drug dependence or overdose call for tougher law-
enforcement measures with the intention of protecting others from 
such tragedy,4 Bergman calls for harm reduction and legal regulation 
of drugs with the exact same intention.
The following two pieces deal more closely with the effects of 
incarceration for drug offenses on women, children, and families. 
Jennifer Fleetwood and Andreina Torres show how women, intentional 
targets of the war on drugs, are overrepresented for minor offenses 
(the chapter may be read in conjunction with Part 2). “Mothers and 
Children of the Drug War: A View from a Women’s Prison in Quito, 
Ecuador” shows how the proportion of women—many of whom are 
primary caregivers to children—in prisons for drug offenses has risen, 
due to a focus on drug mules in order to meet arrest and prosecution 
quotas. Through ethnographic research at a women’s prison, the effects 
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of incarceration on these women and their attempts to continue being 
active mothers despite their imprisonment (sometimes far from home) 
are discussed. For some, their only option is to have their children 
imprisoned with them in the same poor, overcrowded conditions.
Not all harms are headline catching. Some are smaller, more 
personal, yet of great importance for the individuals affected. 
Focusing on the effects of incarceration of parents and/or siblings, 
Asmin Fransiska, Ajeng Larasati, and Ricky Gunawan, consider two 
case studies in Jakarta, Indonesia: Diego, a young boy whose mother 
(who is drug dependent) has been both incarcerated for drug offenses 
and placed in compulsory residential treatment; and Mario, the eldest 
child of a poor family entrapped for a minor possession charge, and 
imprisoned. “Between Diego and Mario: Children, Families, and 
the Drug War in Indonesia” discusses the economic, emotional, and 
psychological harms associated with incarceration and experienced 
by the whole family. For many, imprisonment of a family member 
will plunge the whole family further into poverty. The authors ask 
whether it is defensible, from a children’s rights perspective, that the 
best interests of dependent children are not currently a consideration 
in sentencing for nonviolent drug offenses.
A recent report from the UK charity ChildLine highlighted the 
neglect, abuse, and distress experienced by children of drug- and 
alcohol-dependent parents through direct quotes from callers to the 
charity’s helpline:
“My dad is beating me and my younger brother. Dad injects 
something into his arm and shouts at me and beats me. My brother 
and I have bruises. My teachers see this and when they ask, I tell 
them I had a fall.” (Tyrone, age twelve)
“My mom hit me and pushed me into a wall. Every weekend she 
gets drunk and has a go at me. Mom leaves me in the house until 
11 pm. I have to make my own food. My dad died when I was five.” 
(Michelle, age nine)
“My mom is taking drugs and stealing my things, which is upsetting 
me. I live alone with mom. My brother died when he was two years old 
and my dad committed suicide.” (Angie, age thirteen)5
It is important to note, of course, that all of these children were 
calling a helpline because they were already in distress, so this is not 
to suggest that these experiences are indicative of every child living 
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in a household with drug- or alcohol-dependent parents. But there are 
nonetheless too many children experiencing these kinds of problems, 
as a range of qualitative research studies show.6 Such potential for 
harm justifies increased, close attention to parental drug use. In turn, 
policies relating to parental drug use demand scrutiny.
Part 3 concludes with “ ‘Ants Facing an Elephant’: Mothers’ Grief, 
Loss, and Work for Change Following the Placement of Children in the 
Care of Child Protection Authorities,” by Kathleen Kenny and Amy 
Druker of Canada, which considers the aftermath of removing a child 
from custody of mothers with drug and/or alcohol problems. It is not 
disputed (by the authors or the mothers represented in the chapter) 
that the best interests of the child must come first and that removal of 
a child from an unsafe environment may be necessary. In some cases it 
is requested by the mothers involved. However, the authors, through 
a description of their work with mothers who have lost custody of 
their child(ren), challenge the widely held view that mothers who use 
drugs are always or necessarily bad parents. They also challenge the 
presumption that removal from custody is always in the child’s best 
interests, and they detail the women’s recommendations for improved 
child protection policies7 and parental support.8
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8. Dancing with Despair: A Mother’s 
Perspective
by Gretchen Burns Bergman
The world of addiction is like a never-ending dance, twisting, turning, 
and weaving a web of disaster. For people with addictive illness, the 
twirling and whirling engagement with drugs continues to escalate 
until an outside force restrains them or they die. For the family 
members, it is an intricate, partially choreographed and partly 
improvisational pattern. You exhaust yourself with hope, and then 
release yourself to frustration. You manipulate for change, only to 
abandon yourself to abusive victimization.
Long before I became a social advocate, and way before I was a 
mother—in fact from the time I was five years old—I have been a 
dancer. I taught dance for more than twenty-five years and seem to 
see the universe in terms of dance movement. I chose the label of 
“dancer” for myself, because it identified how I felt, and I believe that 
the quest for self-knowledge is one of life’s most important journeys. I 
have become very aware of labels over the years, as they can often be 
punitive and discriminatory, particularly when society places them 
on you. “Codependent,” “addict,” “dysfunctional family,” “ex-convict,” 
“enabler” . . . these are all societal assignations.
Of all the roles I have played in my life, motherhood is the most 
treasured. I delivered my babies by natural childbirth because my 
pregnancies gave me a real sense of the central core of myself, and 
I just knew that returning to the natural rhythms of life was right. 
I mean, who were these doctors to take away a woman’s right to be 
in charge of the delivery of her own child and be guided by her own 
maternal instincts! The fear of blundering when it comes to something 
so deeply important drove many women to turn the process over to a 
medical professional, and the fear of pain made it easier to numb the 
experience with drugs.
I loved being a mother and nursing my babies. It was a time of 
pure give and take, simple supply and demand. It felt natural and 
organic. It gave me a chance to breathe in the sweet sweaty smells 
of my infants’ heads and to rock in harmony with them and the 
universe. I enjoyed being a mother to young boys who were full of 
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life and mischief. I can still conjure up the smell of dirty socks after 
a little league game, the sound of laughter at “bathroom humor,” and 
wet kisses from an exuberantly affectionate eight-year-old.
I remember other parents having such tension-laden concerns 
about their children being smarter than others, as if it were a 
competition. My two sons were bright and beautiful. One had big 
brown eyes, brunet curls, and a thoughtful nature, and the other 
was a sunny freckle-faced blond with a carefree attitude. Both were 
clearly intelligent, so my greatest hope was that they become happy 
and healthy adults.
Sadly, happiness, for the most part, has eluded them, and their 
health has been severely affected by the insidious disease of drug 
addiction. Both began experimenting with drugs in their early teens, 
and drugs became the sludge that seeped through all the layers 
of our lives. Now, in their thirties, both are heroin addicts, one in 
long-term recovery and one still struggling to find a way to leave the 
tenacious and demanding grip of narcotics. They will grapple with 
the challenges of this chronic illness throughout their lives, and our 
family will continue to work to denounce stigma-induced guilt, and to 
walk the never-ending tightrope of when to help our loved ones and 
when helping is hurting.
My story of lives being derailed by addiction has an even darker 
chapter and a deeper emotional wound, as my older son spent eleven 
years of his young life in the criminal justice system cycling in and 
out of prison for nonviolent drug offenses and relapses. It took him 
longer to stop seeing himself as an ex-convict who did not deserve to 
have an enriched and fulfilling life, than to stop seeing himself as a 
hopeless addict.
People who do not have addictive illness cannot understand why 
an addict does not just stop the destruction of their disease. What we 
do not understand, we fear, and what we fear, we hate. This is how 
prejudice is nurtured, and why the war on drugs became such a lethal 
plague to our society, a constant and continuing battle that does worse 
damage to children and their families than the drug abuse.
When I was riding the emotional waves of my first son’s active 
addiction and incarceration I wrote a piece of prose called “Strangulation 
Tango” to describe the enmeshed interaction and relationship between 
mother and son. I described the incomprehensible irony of my son’s 
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drug use as choosing only neon sparklers in a sea of gray, instead of 
the vibrant and constant colors of life.
The pain that families endure is almost unbearable, but what is 
more intolerable is that they must also deal with the anger, blame, 
and shame of a fearful and ignorant society. The spider web of the 
criminal justice system and the punitive policies of mass incarceration 
that are unleashed by the drug war throw acid on open wounds. 
Nonviolent drug users are thrown into a violent prison atmosphere 
that is a breeding ground for their transformation into criminals and 
drug dealers.
Like a floodgate, images come back to me of the frail bodies and 
hollowed eyes of my eldest son and his girlfriend during their heroin 
heydays; of trashed apartments filled with the stench of stained 
mattresses, week-old garbage, dog feces, and piles of dirty clothes. I 
remember searching for him at night on the streets, days after vowing 
to let him go, but unable to rest until I found him alive. I piercingly 
remember earlier days and the hatred in his eyes when I tried to step 
between him and his drugs, and I choke over the memory of him being 
led down the courthouse hall, drug-sick in manacles, attached to a 
line of other young men. I clearly recall visiting him in prison when he 
appeared behind glass in an orange jumpsuit, and I could not reach 
out and touch my own son, whom I had nursed and nurtured; and I 
screamed at the cruelty of a system that would not allow a mother 
to hug her own sick child. Then he started the prison swagger and 
clipped convict conversation, and I watched his expression disappear 
behind a blank facial facade.
I re-experienced the survivor’s guilt after each weekly prison visit, 
having endured the process of going into the prison and being made 
to feel like a criminal myself; the depression provoked by the cold, 
cruel atmosphere seeping into my bones; the relief of freedom when 
the outside gate clicked behind me, and the immediate feeling of a 
mother’s guilt that I was leaving my son behind in this violent cement 
jungle.
It is impressive to see how each parental fear led to forced 
acceptance, only to be replaced by a greater trepidation. The first 
fear was about drug use—then expulsion from high school—then 
homelessness—then arrest—then overdose—then prison—then 
overdose again. A close friend and social worker says that mothers of 
drug addicts have a high tolerance for aberrant behavior. She is right, 
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and most of us have tried and would again try anything to save the 
lives of our children. When people tell us to let them “hit bottom,” we 
know that after witnessing so many overdoses, their “bottom” could 
mean death, so we continue to try to keep them “alive for the cure.”
It is generally accepted that drug addiction is our number-one 
public-health problem, yet despite decades of research showing that 
addiction treatment is successful at reducing drug use and arrests, 
we continue to employ “tough on crime” tactics, rather than providing 
treatment programs. We allow addiction to be handled by a criminal 
justice system that is totally incapable of understanding the intricacies 
of the disease, and is highly motivated to incarcerate its way out of 
the problem.
My experiences have led me to advocate against this failed policy. 
Our children are at the forefront of the war on drugs, and our families 
are the collateral damage. Instead of working in partnership with 
health care providers and criminal justice to intervene and usher a sick 
individual into proper services, families are stranded in our collective 
frustration and grief. There are an estimated 2.3 million people 
behind bars in the United States today (one in a hundred adults).1 
Approximately one-quarter of those people held in U.S. prisons or 
jails have been convicted of a drug offense.2 Half a million people 
are incarcerated for drug crimes, more than the European Union 
incarcerates for all crimes, and they have 100 million more people. 
The United States represents 5 percent of the world’s population, but 
25 percent of the world’s prison population.3 Now California has a 
$10 billion prison budget, largely because of drug offenses and drug-
related parole violations. California spends approximately $49,000 
per year to house an inmate.4 Two-thirds of people admitted to prison 
in California are parole violators,5 which I find to be the absolute 
definition of “revolving door” insanity.
The increasing incarceration numbers are a direct response to 
our failed policies. Now it is estimated that one in four U.S. families 
struggles with a loved one’s addiction to drugs or alcohol,6 so in addition 
to coping with the painful process of addictive illness, more and more 
families are also experiencing the devastation of having a loved one 
behind bars. In many neighborhoods of color and/or poverty, it has 
become the norm to have a parent locked away in prison for drug use 
or drug-related behavior. The consequences of a drug conviction may 
include permanent loss of educational and employment opportunities, 
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as well as public housing, food stamps, and in many states, the right 
to vote.
My younger son has recently been arrested on drug possession 
charges, so once again our family is trying to navigate the cumbersome 
and challenging criminal justice system. In the year 2000 I served as 
California state chair of Proposition 36, which mandates treatment 
instead of incarceration for nonviolent drug offenders. It was passed 
by 61 percent of state voters, proving that the people were ahead of the 
politicians in understanding this problem and the need for alternative 
sentencing. Every year since 2001, more than 30,000 individuals have 
been sent to this court-mandated treatment, and half of them had 
never received treatment before.7 At the time Proposition 36 was 
passed, my older son was in prison, and although I knew that he 
would not be helped by this measure, I felt that it would help so many 
others for years to come, and would be instrumental in changing 
public opinion about the true nature of addictive illness as well as the 
addicted individual’s right to services and recovery. How ironic that 
my second son just received alternative sentencing under Proposition 
36 a decade later. It would seem that we have come full circle.
But now funding for this life-saving law has been slashed, while 
the war on drugs costs U.S. taxpayers roughly $40 billion annually in 
direct costs and tens of billions in indirect costs.8 And yet, after four 
decades of the drug war, it seems that drugs are cheaper, purer, and 
more easily obtained than ever before, while our prisons are filled 
with drugs, drug users, and drug dealing. We will never eradicate 
drugs from our society, so we had better figure out how to more 
conscientiously reduce the harm.
A dancer is both an artist and an athlete . . . a risk-taker with a 
safety net. You must be a daredevil in order to explore freedom of 
expression, while at the same time remaining grounded and controlled 
while practicing and strengthening the body. With a dancer’s spirit I 
understand the hunger to get high, to experience more, and to enhance 
emotion. What is hard to fathom is watching a beautiful and bright 
individual lose his freedom and soul by not being able to stop the drug 
demons from destroying his life. But what is even more difficult to 
accept is the calamitous devastation of the drug war.
As I get older I am less free as a dancer. I can no longer fling 
myself into the universe with the same spirit of abandon. Thoughts 
of protecting bones and joints caution me to be more careful, just as 
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I try to avoid the emotional turbulence of an addicted offspring. My 
experience warns me not to get so distraught over their troubles, if I 
am to be around to enjoy their reemergence into life through eventual 
recovery. I say eventual, because my heart cannot dance without 
hope, as long as the music of life is still playing.
Ending our dependence on drugs is not just a problem in the United 
States; it is a global concern. The ravages of the drug wars seep through 
layers of our lives, and the futures of our offspring. It is not just in my 
own family, our communities, our state, and our country, but in other 
countries as well. It affects our relationship with the rest of the world. 
We need to teach our children to fight for human rights and dignity, 
and to believe in the importance and sanctity of human existence. We 
must advocate for an end to the war on drugs, and begin policies of 
tolerance, compassion, restoration, harm reduction, and healing that 
are directed to positive solutions for the future of our children.
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9. Mothers and Children of the Drug 
War: A View from a Women’s Prison in 
Quito, Ecuador
by Jennifer Fleetwood and Andreina Torres 
Introduction
The “war on drugs” harms women and their children worldwide. 
Mandatory minimum sentences for drug possession have driven the 
dramatic increase in the number of women in prison, not only in the 
United States but across the globe wherever a war on drugs is being 
fought. This chapter looks at the case of Ecuador where the number 
of women imprisoned has soared since 1991. The chapter draws 
on ethnographic research conducted by both authors in the largest 
women’s prison, located in Quito, the capital city of Ecuador. The first 
section looks at the supply-side interdiction policies implemented in 
Ecuador and demonstrates that women are not collateral damage 
but intended targets. Next, it describes how the war on drugs has 
changed prison and the profile of inmates as a result of interdiction 
efforts. The second section describes the effects of these policies 
from the perspective of two groups of women imprisoned in Quito: 
Ecuadorians and foreign nationals. We conclude that while these 
women’s experience as mothers/prisoners differs greatly, the war on 
drugs produces a number of outcomes that disproportionately punish 
women and their families.
Women	Mules:	Targets	of	the	“War	on	Drugs”
Women drug mules are often described as “collateral damage” 
of the war on drugs.1 However, the situation in Ecuador clearly 
demonstrates that interdiction efforts focus disproportionately on low-
level offenders, where most women in the drug trade are positioned. 
Furthermore, international policies have had indirect consequences 
that have negatively affected women and their families, both locally 
and internationally.
International interventions have promoted a “head count” logic to 
drug interdiction in Ecuador. In 2005, Ecuador and the United States 
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signed a bilateral agreement stipulating that for an investment 
of $15.7 million in the security of the country, the United States 
demanded a 12 percent increase in the capturing and processing of 
“narco-traffickers” and a 10 percent increase in the capture of drugs 
in relation to the year 2004.2 This logic of quantification directs 
interdiction efforts to interventions where large numbers of people 
can be arrested; in short, toward mules instead of middlemen or 
managers. This has disproportionately affected women.
These internationally set quotas are “topped up” with street-level 
drug users and dealers. The majority come from marginal populations; 
many are homeless, ethnic-minority women, and men of color who 
are arrested with insignificant quantities of drugs.3 Since there is 
only one drug law, users and dealers are sentenced as if they were 
international traffickers.
Sentencing practices also fail to take into account the reasons 
for women’s offending, or the outcomes of imprisoning women for 
very long periods of time. In Ecuador, the Law of Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (Ley 108) was passed in 1991. The 
minimum sentence was originally ten years. In 2003 this was 
increased to twelve years, one of the highest sentences for drug 
trafficking across the continent.4 Mandatory minimums rule out the 
relevance of mitigating circumstances. In 1997, the law was modified 
to allow judges to take into account some extenuating circumstances 
such as terminal illness, age, and good behavior but not child care.5 
Judges adhere strictly to standard penalties to avoid potentially 
career-ending accusations of bribery and corruption. Thus, family 
situations, such as being the sole caretaker of children or parents 
are not taken into consideration. This disproportionately affects 
women, insofar as many drug mules become involved in response to 
poverty as a way to provide for their families. The only way to reduce 
one’s sentence is to provide information to the police, something few 
mules are able to do.
Women’s	Prisons	in	the	Epoch	of	the	“War	on	Drugs”
The war on drugs has had a dramatic effect on the structuring and 
functioning of prisons in Ecuador. The 1980s marked the beginning of a 
radical change in the profile of the female prison population, a process 
that took place throughout Latin America.6 Women’s involvement in 
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drug trafficking replaced traditionally “feminine” criminalization—
murders enacted in the private sphere, usually against husbands, 
brothers, or sons. Between 1936 and 1941, these crimes constituted 
82 percent of those committed by women in prison, while 18 percent 
were property crimes.7 By 1980, 38.2 percent of imprisoned women 
had committed drug-related crimes, while homicides represented 
only 21.8 percent of offenses and property crimes, 20.4 percent.8 In 
2004, the proportion of women imprisoned for drug-related charges 
had risen to 77 percent, many of whom were “mules,”9 making the 
increase for such charges much more significant in women’s prisons 
than in men’s. By 2004 the proportion of men imprisoned for drug 
offenses was just 33.5 percent, while property crimes represented 
36.4 percent and homicides 15.8 percent.10 Consequently, the female 
prison population increased dramatically in recent decades; by 2004 
it represented 10 percent of the total prison population, while in the 
1970s it was only 4 percent. Such an increase can only be understood 
in the context of the aforementioned policies that have promoted a 
“head count” logic to drug law enforcement, often leading to the use of 
women as scapegoats in sentencing processes under Ley 108.
One of the most visible consequences of this population increase is 
the current state of women’s prisons, characterized by overcrowding, 
lack of funding, and generally precarious living conditions for inmates. 
This research was conducted in “El Inca,” the second largest women’s 
prison in Ecuador. Women’s prisons (like men’s prisons) suffer from 
chronic underfunding. State funds barely cover the cost of low-quality 
food (the prison spends an average of 75 cents per prisoner per day on 
food) and the salaries of underpaid prison guards and administrative 
staff. Consequently, inmates routinely complained about deficiencies 
in personnel that often led to mistreatment:
prison guards here lack any formal training, they are ignorant 
and don’t know how to treat inmates. . . . We know we are 
prisoners but we are human beings and they treat us as if we were 
the “worst,” even though some of us have a university education. 
(Interview with Teresa, El Inca, January 2005)
Overcrowding, lack of resources (including staff) meant that 
much of prison management was done by inmates. Improvements 
in infrastructure (mainly cells) and the provision of basic utilities, 
such as gas for the kitchens in each pavilion/block, are obtained either 
through collective fundraising or individual resources that usually 
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come from family support. In this context, “rehabilitation” efforts also 
become the responsibility of imprisoned women:
if it weren’t for us, we would not have anything, our own initiative 
has allowed us to have sewing workshops, dance, theater, and 
choreography groups, the choir . . . but this is only possible 
because of our own enthusiasm, if it weren’t for us we would only 
have the labor workshop in which we are exploited. (Interview 
with Luisa, El Inca, January 2005)
Depending on which prison block an inmate lives in (there are 
three), life at this women’s prison can be more or less expensive.11 
Moreover, inmate designation to the different pavilions responds 
to class and ethnic rather than “technical” criteria, such as crimes 
committed, time of sentence, past offenses, and so forth.
We try to group inmates according to a certain degree of affinity 
or homogeneity for them to be able to share a very small space. . 
. . We believe we can strive for a “progress” regime for those with 
a higher status, better customs, and who play an important role 
in prison and excel. These people are placed in the new pavilions 
and obviously have certain privileges, such as sharing a room 
only with one more person.12 (Interview with prison psychologist, 
El Inca, February 2005)
Interrupted	Motherhood	in	“El	Inca”
Conventional conceptions of motherhood center on the notion of 
the family that lives together, has shared priorities, and in which the 
mother is the primary caregiver.13 For all women interviewed for this 
research and their children, being arrested and imprisoned caused a 
sudden, unanticipated interruption in their lives, relationships, and 
identities. Motherhood is a central aspect of Ecuadorian and foreign 
national women’s experience of imprisonment. A survey of inmates 
showed that most of the women imprisoned for drug trafficking were 
married or in common-law marriages.14 About 40 percent of respondents 
were mothers, half of them shared parenting duties with their 
partners and the other half were single mothers.15 A large proportion 
of mules and women involved in international drug trafficking were 
single mothers, but these groups were primarily composed of foreign 
nationals. Imprisonment posed specific challenges to Ecuadorian and 
foreign national women. These will be examined in turn.
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Mothering	on	the	Inside:	National	Women	and	Their	Children
Faced with little or deficient state responses for their children’s 
situations, Ecuadorian women make difficult decisions about 
continuing to be mothers after imprisonment. Some who choose to 
have their children imprisoned with them experience the pain of 
seeing their children grow up in a highly negative environment. 
Others choose to leave them in the care of relatives and try to maintain 
contact with their children through visits. Some women prefer to cut 
themselves off entirely from the life of their children to spare them 
from the stigma attached to criminalization. None of these are easy 
decisions.16
“Shared”	Parenting
In contrast to foreign nationals, Ecuadorian women are more 
likely to maintain their romantic relationships once in prison. In fact, 
many couples “do their time” in prison together. Through a series 
of interviews conducted with women drug mules it was possible to 
identify the importance of women’s romantic relationships in their 
decisions and motivations to get involved in drug trafficking. Many 
women saw their involvement in drug trafficking as an opportunity 
to “save” a relationship troubled by a difficult economic situation, as 
well as an opportunity to provide a better future for their children.
there really aren’t any jobs, there are no jobs . . . it’s not easy to 
find a job and even though it is hard for many of us to get involved 
in drug trafficking, it’s something easy, and you can get money, 
this is the most important thing, that you can get the money you 
need to support your children, to support your family, that’s why 
as head of our households we are immersed in all of this. (Teresa, 
mother of two, El Inca)
In other cases women become the victims of their partner’s illegal 
activities and enter drug-trafficking activities without having full 
knowledge of their partner’s role. In these cases they are legally 
incapable of accusing their spouses and are charged with the same 
punitive sentences. As a result many women put an end to their 
relationships.
For the majority, however, maintaining contact with their partners 
after imprisonment becomes paramount. Having their partners’ 
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emotional and economic support may facilitate motherhood while in 
prison. The possibility of having a weekly or monthly conjugal visit 
is an important element in maintaining family unity and support. 
At El Inca, inmates fought for the right to have a weekly visit to the 
men’s prison in Quito, where many of their spouses were imprisoned. 
In order to make this possible they had to pay collectively for the bus 
ride, given prison authorities’ reluctance to provide this service.
While maintaining contact with spouses provided women with 
hope and made them feel they were not alone in motherhood, often 
their partner’s lack of interest and responsibility for their children’s 
upbringing generated anxiety and resentment, especially when they 
did not help financially. Following persistent gender patterns, when 
both parents are in prison, women or relatives (especially mothers 
or grandmothers) are ultimately responsible for the care of children.
Imprisoned	Children
Women at El Inca are also allowed to live with their children in 
prison. The majority of women who opted for this arrangement were 
Ecuadorians who did not have the resources or family support to 
arrange for the care of their children outside the prison. For many of 
these women the only other option was to leave their children in the 
streets. Other women simply did not trust state or privately funded 
services available for their children’s care. Institutional ambiguity 
regarding the age limit of children allowed to live in prison with their 
mothers generated complex situations. This was illustrated by the 
case of a seven-year-old boy who suffered from learning disabilities 
and whose sexual behavior (as well as inmates’ behavior toward him) 
was beginning to concern the authorities.
Prison authorities did not make any adjustments to assess and 
meet the needs of mothers. Since children were not considered part of 
the prison population, there was a lack of basic services such as food 
and accommodation. Many women had to share prison food with their 
children or make arrangements to buy additional food. Mothers along 
with their children were also concentrated in one of the most crowded 
pavilions, characterized by concentrating a large number of poor 
black and indigenous women. This pavilion was the most problematic 
in terms of general lack of coverage of basic necessities, intensity 
of conflicts and fights, drug consumption, and other issues. Many 
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children had to grow up and live their childhoods in this environment. 
This was a large price to be paid by women who fought to be close to 
their children or simply had no other choice.
Institutional support for imprisoned women’s children was deficient. 
The only service available was a day-care center for infants (four to 
five months up to two years old) in which they were able to spend the 
day until lockup time (from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.). Additional resources for 
Ecuadorian women were provided by private foundations, religious 
organizations, or state-funded programs. Nonetheless, imprisoned 
women have developed strong distrust regarding the services provided 
by these outside institutions. There is a general fear about the way 
their children are treated by strangers, and reports of actual cases of 
abuse and mistreatment. This fear and distrust explained why some 
women preferred to have their children inside the prison, despite the 
harsh reality that prison life entailed for them.
At the day-care center children received general supervision and 
food. However, this center was severely underfunded and depended 
largely on charity. During a visit to this center we were informed that 
much of the food provided to children came from discarded produce 
donated by large supermarkets. The caregivers also demonstrated 
a lack of sensitivity toward the mother’s situation and continually 
expressed disapproval of their care practices. Children were 
viewed as victims of their mothers’ “wretched” behavior and lack of 
responsibility. While this was particularly emphasized in the case of 
drug users, who were often accused of trading goods such as clothes, 
diapers, or formula in order to obtain drugs, very little attention was 
given to the rehabilitation of drug users inside the prison.
Imprisoned women’s ability to be “good” mothers was called into 
question. Their efforts to stay close to their children were seen as 
selfish and irresponsible. These judgments were also made regarding 
women who became pregnant after being imprisoned. In fact women 
were required to be practicing contraceptive methods in order to 
be granted the conjugal visit. As the director of the day-care center 
expressed:
We need to make mothers realize that they cannot have any more 
children. Their children are future criminals. (Interview with 
director of day care “La Macarena,” El Inca, January 2005)
Thus, women’s desire to be and become mothers while in prison 
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was seen as irrational. Such accusations failed to understand 
motherhood as a source of pride and a reason for women to maintain a 
sense of purpose. Borrowing from Bourgois’s account of the meanings 
of motherhood among women living in El Barrio (East Harlem, New 
York), it is precisely the “wretched living conditions” of imprisonment 
that make “motherhood so appealing.”17 In a context in which women 
are considered to have transgressed the law but also the gender 
norm, reclaiming femininity becomes an important way to achieve 
redemption and forgiveness. For women involved in prison politics, 
motherhood gave female prisoners a moral advantage (regarding 
their male counterparts) and became a source of legitimating their 
claims as imprisoned women but above all as imprisoned mothers.
Mediated	Motherhood
Continued family support is also an important element for 
Ecuadorian mothers doing time at El Inca, especially for those who 
prefer to leave their children in the care of relatives. Women at El 
Inca were allowed three visit days per week (Saturday, Sunday, and 
Wednesday). These days were extremely important for prisoners 
as they represented an opportunity to stay in touch with relatives, 
their children, and their partners. During visits relatives brought 
in food and general goods (hygiene, cleaning products, money, etc.) 
essential for survival inside the prison. Visits lasted all day.
Even though these visits may represent an advantage for Ecuadorian 
women, life in prison undoubtedly took a toll on family relationships 
and motherhood. With time, visit days generated anxiety and sadness 
in those who noted with melancholy how visits gradually became more 
scarce and irregular. Thus, maintaining contact with their children 
through visits and the help of relatives could become a fragile and 
ephemeral enterprise for imprisoned women.
Mediated motherhood was not possible for all Ecuadorian women. 
Some of them did not have relatives or friends who lived close enough 
to be able to visit regularly, or at all. Others had relatives who 
condemned their incarceration and preferred to isolate children from 
their imprisoned and “immoral” mothers.
In one visit my relatives told me that my sister resented me, that 
she didn’t understand how could I have done this, how could I 
become involved in something like this, and she didn’t want to 
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come, she didn’t want anything to do with these type of things. 
(Teresa, mother of two, El Inca)
In other cases, women themselves prevented their children from 
knowing that they were imprisoned. Many told their children they 
were working or studying far away. These women could only stay 
in touch with their children through phone calls. Many Ecuadorian 
women felt as isolated from their family as foreign nationals. In turn 
they had to develop similar strategies to stay in touch or reinvent 
their role as mothers while being far away.
 
Interrupted	Motherhood:	Foreign	National	Women	and	Their	
Children
At the time of this fieldwork (2005–7) approximately one-third of 
women in El Inca were foreign nationals. They came from all over the 
world (Europe, North America, Africa, and Southeast Asia) but most 
were Colombian. As noted above, almost all of the foreign women 
imprisoned in El Inca were drug offenders, the majority of whom were 
drug mules. Women mules became involved in the international drug 
trade through diverse routes. A minority had been coerced through 
violent threats (toward them and their families); many worked as 
drug mules in response to relative deprivation. This section looks at 
how foreign national women in prison managed being mothers and 
coping with motherhood while imprisoned far from home for long 
periods of time.
Arrest	and	Interruption
All of the foreign national women were arrested as they were 
leaving Ecuador. Most had stayed in the country for a short amount 
of time and had left their children at home, usually with friends and 
family temporarily since many were single parents. Most claimed to 
be going to visit a relative or friend in another city or to be working 
away. All expected to be back in a few days time. Of the many worries 
women experienced once they were arrested, those with children were 
immediately concerned with the urgent issue of child care:
I was frightened. And I was thinking my God, my life is over. . . . 
My children, what’s gonna happen to them? Are they gonna go into 
my house and take all my family away? (Sarah, mother of two)
136	 CHildren oF tHe drug War
Most respondents urgently needed to contact their family after 
they were arrested. However, there was no provision for arrestees to 
phone home. Some respondents had to wait several days before they 
could telephone (usually through a guard or lawyer). In some cases, 
families were notified by their national embassy. Donna remembers 
her first phone call home:
One of the policemen . . . made me call my mom. He hid me in 
the cell . . . and I called my mom and said please forgive me. She 
says, “you’re really in jail?” I said “yes, in Ecuador, in Quito”. . . 
I was like crying and I was flipping out going please don’t tell my 
daughter. She goes, “Your daughter heard me.” So my daughter 
knew I was in jail but she didn’t know why. (Donna, mother of 
one)
In the short term, children usually moved in with godparents or 
relatives since most women were single parents; in the long term, 
most women lost their family home.
Children of drug mules lost their parents suddenly and in secretive 
circumstances. Women experienced an acute sense of shame and 
most kept the reasons for their arrest hidden from family. Some 
claimed to be at college or imprisoned for less problematic crimes 
such as incorrect immigration documentation. However, due to the 
high-profile nature of the crime, children sometimes found out why 
their parent was in prison from other sources. Children of drug mules 
experienced additional stigma in relation to their parent’s crime. 
Older children often figured out that their mother was in prison 
and had to keep it a secret from younger siblings. Although there 
are important differences according to the offense committed, the 
effects of having a parent imprisoned are well known. Children often 
experience behavioral difficulties, and may become withdrawn and 
feel abandoned and rejected.18 Children of drug mules experienced 
additional confusion and trauma due to the sudden and secretive 
nature of their parent’s disappearance compounded by not being able 
to visit prison. Those who did know that their mother was imprisoned 
in Ecuador were very worried that something bad would happen.
Many women were the sole earner supporting children and/or 
parents before they were arrested, and loss of the breadwinner caused 
financial difficulties for the family. Additionally, many of the costs of 
imprisonment were passed on to the family: especially legal and health 
care costs. Although lawyers were formally provided by Ecuador, they 
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were notoriously unreliable and corrupt. Already poor families had to 
raise sums, sometimes several thousand dollars, to get a fair trial. As 
described above, most inmates had to pay their own way while they 
were in prison. This included health care, and sometimes even meals 
and taxis for the guards who accompanied them to hospital. Foreign 
national prisoners were often perceived to be rich and were tricked or 
bribed by corrupt guards as well as their fellow inmates.
Long-Distance	Motherhood
Drug mules served long sentences of about six to eight years. Exiled 
from the context in which they had learned to mother, imprisoned 
women invented new ways to be part of their child’s daily life and to 
maintain their identity as mothers. Nonetheless, women’s attempts 
were severely limited by physical distance from home and the lack of 
resources available to support their efforts.
Since visits were impossible, phone calls were elevated to a new 
level of importance as an opportunity to maintain the parenting bond 
and reassure children that they still cared about them:
When I talk to them on the phone you know, they know that their 
mommy still loves them and one day I’m gonna get out of here 
safe and sound and things, you know, for me to go home and take 
care of them, they’re depending on me, their father left them, I’m a 
single parent: they’re my first priority. (Amanda, mother of four)
However, the prison made no provision for inmates to maintain 
contact with their children. The small number of public telephones in 
prison were identical to those on the outside in price and function.19 
Calls to the United States were some of the least expensive but calling 
farther away (to Africa or the Far East) was more expensive. Inmates 
were not monitored by staff but had little privacy as a result of prison 
overcrowding. Considerable effort was put into raising the funds to be 
able to call home. Many foreign national women worked in a greeting 
card-workshop run by an international group of missionaries. Some 
managed small “businesses” such as cutting hair, sewing, or selling 
crafts as well as cooking and cleaning. Thus, inmate mothers replaced 
the everyday labor of parenting with the labor of raising funds to 
maintain contact with children.
Women struggled to make sense of ways to be a mother when they 
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were so far from home when their family was facing a crisis. This was 
especially the case if a family member died. Two women lost their 
children while they were in prison. Women, either individually or 
collectively, had no way to deal with the death of a child. Women spoke 
of feeling powerless to do anything for their families. Praying took 
on a new importance as something that was not weakened by either 
distance from children or lack of economic resources. Women prayed 
together as an act of solidarity. For many women prayer was seen as a 
strong enough force to effect material change in their children’s lives.
In addition to the daily task of raising resources to maintain contact 
with children, women embodied motherhood in daily life. In their 
rooms, they proudly displayed photos of their children and drawings 
or letters from children. Others had their children’s names tattooed 
on their bodies: a permanent reminder of their identities on the 
outside. Furthermore, women cared for children who were resident or 
visiting prison. Renewing their identity as (and ability to be) a mother 
was constructed in light of the crisis in identity experienced when 
they were arrested. The mothering-caring identity, as the opposite 
of the criminal identity, was for many to form the basis of a renewed 
identity when they would leave prison.
Planning and preparing for their release from prison was an 
important aspect of being a mother in prison. Many commented that 
they were in prison for a higher purpose. In particular, those with 
drug addictions used imprisonment as an opportunity to get “clean” 
so that when they returned home they could be better mothers than 
they had been. Nonetheless, the very small drug rehabilitation unit 
was underfunded and overcrowded. Its success was largely dependent 
on inmates who ran it themselves. Furthermore, there was almost no 
training or education for women in prison. The only classes available 
were high school classes that were of little use to foreign national 
women.
Finally, while this chapter has focused on mothering, this was one 
of many “caring” relationships and responsibilities in women’s lives. 
In the same way that women felt anxiety for having “abandoned” 
their children, many women (not all of whom were mothers) felt 
ashamed that they could not fulfill their duty to care for parents and 
grandparents, especially as they grew older.
I want to go home to see my kids, my husband and all, but most 
of all, my mother. Jennifer, it’s like please, please do not die when 
Part 3: Home Front 	 139
I’m here. You know, (voice starts to break) the way she’s sick ’n 
everything is like, God, don’t let anything happen to her while I’m 
here! Let me go home to hug her, just to hold her. You know, cause 
she’s getting weaker every day. She can’t walk anymore, and you 
know, I think my mom’s the most special person to me. And if she 
did die while I’m here, I know I wouldn’t be able to deal with it. 
(Sarah)
Conclusion
Men and women do not forfeit their right to parent their children 
because of involvement in drug trafficking. The women we spoke to 
in El Inca fought hard to be mothers in very difficult circumstances. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that motherhood and families are brutally 
interrupted and reconfigured by imprisonment. It would be easy to 
conclude here with a set of recommendations. Women’s prisons should 
be better resourced to take into account the needs of families and it is 
clear that deporting foreign national women to serve their sentences 
at home where they can be closer to their families would give families 
a chance. However, we offer a more radical conclusion. As stated at the 
start, the large number of women imprisoned worldwide as a result 
of the “war on drugs” is not “collateral damage” but rather supply-
side policies premised on a “head count” logic that makes women 
intentional targets. Such policies have disproportionately affected 
women and their families.20 Furthermore, mandatory minimum 
sentences that do not take mitigating circumstances into account 
punish women disproportionately.21 Moreover, we contend that the 
suffering of women in prison that we witnessed served no purpose. 
Women mules did not need to spend eight years in prison to prevent 
them from reoffending. They did not become rehabilitated or better 
able to provide for their family as a result of imprisonment.
However, positive directions for the future can be found in 
Ecuador. Since finishing fieldwork in 2007, some significant changes 
have occurred. At the end of 2008, about 1,500 “micro-traffickers” 
were released (those arrested with less than two kilos of drugs).22 By 
September of 2009, the number had risen to 2,570.23 The “pardon for 
drug mules” approved in July 2008 had a significant effect on women. 
El Inca experienced a dramatic drop in its prison population. While in 
2007 the population had risen to 507,24 by 2009 this figure had fallen 
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to just 296.25 The pardon recognized that a large portion of people 
imprisoned for drug crimes were not appropriate targets, but rather 
minor players who were being punished as scapegoats. This measure, 
however, will have lasting effects only if it is accompanied by a broad 
reform of drug legislation, a process that seems to be brewing but has 
yet to materialize.26
Author’s note:
Jennifer Fleetwood revisited the prison in October 2010. The pardon 
for “micro-traffickers” has had a dramatic effect on conditions in the 
prison. The prison is visibly and audibly calmer. Women reported 
that they had been sentenced quickly, were accommodated in humane 
conditions, and even had access to a small number of rehabilitation 
programs. Nonetheless, sentences remained high (around six to eight 
years), the effects of the pardon are not permanent, and the number 
of women in prison for drug trafficking is slowly increasing.
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10. Between Diego and Mario: Children, 
Families, and the Drug War in Indonesia
by Asmin Fransiska, Ajeng Larasati, and Ricky Gunawan
Introduction:	Incarceration,	Family,	and	the	Best	Interests	of	the	Child
Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)1 in 1990.2 Twelve years later, Child Protection Law No. 23 was 
adopted to incorporate the CRC into the domestic legal framework. 
According to the convention, the best interests of the child must be 
“a primary consideration” in all matters concerning children (Article 
3). When laws are adopted, policies developed, or decisions made 
in specific cases, the best interests of the child (determined with 
reference to the facts of the case and the full range of the rights of the 
child)3 must be foremost in the conclusions reached.
The role of the family, and the importance of the family environment 
for the development of the child,4 is explicitly stated in the convention. 
The preamble, which reflects the ethos of the document, though it is 
not legally binding itself, recognizes the family as “the fundamental 
group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-
being of all its members and particularly children.” It says that the 
family “should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so 
that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community” 
in order that the child “for the full and harmonious development of 
his or her personality” may “grow up in a family environment, in an 
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.”
The binding articles of the treaty follow from this. Article 5 
requires states to “respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family . . . 
to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the 
child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child 
of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” Article 7, unique 
to the CRC within the UN human rights treaties, states that the 
child has the right “as far as possible to know and be cared for by his 
or her parents.” Article 8 states that the child’s “identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations” shall be respected without 
unlawful interference. Article 18 is specific to the family and requires, 
among other guarantees, that “For the purpose of guaranteeing and 
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promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States 
Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal 
guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities 
and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and 
services for the care of children” (Article 18.2).
The family is therefore strongly protected within the Convention as 
an essential condition for the full realization of the rights of the child.
Imprisonment of a parent is specifically referred to in Article 9 in 
the context of the separation of a child from his or her parents. The 
article requires that children should be informed of the whereabouts 
of their parents where this is in their best interests (Article 9.4). While 
it is not explicitly stated in the CRC, it seems clear that the effect on 
the child or children of the accused (or dependent siblings or other 
children dependent on the accused), must be taken into account in 
criminal proceedings and sentencing. This may not be determinative, 
but without such consideration, the best interests of the child, and 
the protection afforded the family in the CRC, are not being given due 
regard.
Indonesia is a country that strongly adopts the war on drugs 
approach. The government has made drugs the first and foremost 
enemy and made it a top priority to eliminate drugs from Indonesia 
to the extent that visitors entering the country are greeted with signs 
reading “death penalty for drug traffickers.”5 This hard-line approach 
has been reflected in law and policy for decades. The Narcotics Law 
states that all drug-related offenses shall be punishable by penal 
sanctions. A provision exists to permit offenders to be diverted to a 
rehabilitation center, but this is at the judge’s discretion and as such 
is rarely used. For most it remains simply words on paper. There 
is, however, little attention to the consequences for children when a 
parent or sibling is imprisoned in this way. Law enforcement bodies 
tend to strictly enforce the laws in a legalistic manner, and pay no 
attention to the social background of a defendant. How the law, as 
applied, can somehow affect a dependent child’s life has never been 
taken into consideration.
In Indonesia, bonds within a family are strong. Family, as 
Indonesians are taught from elementary school, is the primary 
environment for the development of the child and from which people 
are prepared to enter into society. One’s behavior is a reflection of one’s 
family. The problems of one member of the family will affect the other 
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members. It should be understood that incarceration for drug-related 
cases is not just a punishment for defendants—it also affects their 
families. If they have children, young sisters or brothers, or parents 
living with them, imprisonment will cause them considerable harm, 
including reduced economic security, reduction in psychological and 
emotional well-being, and stigma within the community or in school. 
Some crimes, of course, are serious and require imprisonment. But 
in the context of drugs, the vast majority are sentenced for nonviolent 
drug offenses or simply for personal possession. The price, paid by the 
defendant and the family, is extremely high.
The following two stories, based on interviews with the families 
involved, highlight the negative emotional, economic, educational, 
and psychological effects of incarceration on children. They show how 
the best interests of the child and the protection of the family are 
ignored in the war on drugs in Indonesia. They are just two of many, 
many similar stories.
Diego:		A	Boy	with	a	Big	Dream
Diego6 is a twelve-year-old boy. He is a sixth grade student at a 
public elementary school. Just like many other children he likes to 
play football [soccer]. His favorite player is the famous Cristiano 
Ronaldo. He has always been a huge fan of Ronaldo, but although 
he adores an international football player, he never forgets where he 
came from, and that is Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. He is a diehard 
fan of Persib, a local football club. At school, perhaps like many other 
children, he does not like mathematics, but he likes Indonesian and 
nature science, particularly astronomy. “But he doesn’t want to be an 
astronaut or astronomer” says Diana, his grandmother, with whom 
Diego lives, “he wants to be a football player, just like Ronaldo.”
In addition to football he is also crazy about rock music. He likes 
Linkin Park, a modern-rock band from the United States. This is 
nothing strange for a twelve-year-old boy, but what is surprising is 
that he is so fanatical about Metallica, a legendary rock band. This is 
odd because Metallica is not that popular among others of Diego’s age. 
But this is not strange for him—his father was a vocalist in a famous 
underground, heavy metal band in Bandung. His father, a drug user, 
died of cephalitis on July 26, 2006.
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 Diego and his mother have lived with his grandmother since he 
was born. However, since last year, his mother, Rose, has not lived 
with them. She was put on trial for drug use, incarcerated, and later 
placed in a drug-dependence hospital located in Cibubur, outside 
Jakarta. 
Rose has been using drugs for more than ten years, during which 
she has been arrested a number of times. On January 23, 2009, she 
was arrested by the police, and after a lengthy legal process, received 
a court decision on July 27. The court ordered her to be imprisoned for 
one year and eight months, but to begin with a period of rehabilitation 
for six months. This meant that once she got out of rehab she would 
still have to stay in prison for one year and two months. Since she 
had already served six months in detention waiting for her court 
hearing, however, that would be deducted from the total sentence. 
However, as it happened, Rose had to endure imprisonment first and 
then rehabilitation.7 
Rose was transferred from Pondok Bambu Detention Center to 
Cibubur Drug Dependence Hospital (RSKO Cibubur), on Monday, 
February 8, 2010. It took months after her July sentence for the 
corrupt detention system to actually move her to the hospital. Once 
she arrived, hospital staff examined Rose regarding her addiction, 
and gave her some medication. They charged a fee of around 
US$42. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat (LBH Masyarakat) 
argued on Rose’s behalf that she was transferred to the hospital by 
court order, and that she came from a poor family. Therefore, she 
should be released from any fees. The administration officer at the 
RSKO Cibubur responded that in order to get free drug treatment, 
a health insurance card (jamkesmas—insurance for poor people) 
would be required. Otherwise, Rose would be liable for the fees 
of about US$270/month for six months—an astronomical sum for 
an impoverished Indonesian family. After a lengthy, tortuous, and 
bewildering process, Rose was finally accepted for treatment at the 
hospital without any cost.8
It has been a tough and difficult year for Diego since Rose was 
arrested, imprisoned, and placed in rehabilitation. When Rose was 
at home, she liked to take Diego to school and pick him up afterward. 
She liked to help him with his homework. “She is very caring when 
it comes to studying together. She helped me a lot,” says Diego. 
Often, Diego slept in the same room with Rose because it helped to 
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comfort him, especially having lost his father. He was particularly 
upset that he could not celebrate his graduation to junior high school 
with his mother. Since the trial, Diego has seen Rose only once after 
she was transferred to the drug dependence hospital. When Diego 
came to visit his mother, Rose advised him to study well and obey his 
grandmother’s guidance. “I was told not to play around and [that I] 
should study more often,” said Diego.
Diana shared her grief about the change in Diego’s behavior since 
Rose has been absent. He has become “dispirited” ever since, and 
“indisposed to study.” He is reluctant to listen to his Grandmother’s 
guidance and his schoolwork has deteriorated. Diana has to give extra 
attention to Diego, and she needs to get tough in order to ensure that 
he complies with her direction. 
The family’s income has been badly affected. Before Rose was 
arrested, Diana had run a small kiosk to support the family needs, 
but since the arrest, Diana has had to close it to pay full attention to 
Diego’s development. 
Diego does not know why his mother is staying at the hospital. 
He has been told she works there. He also does not understand the 
connection between Rose’s case and the hospital. Once Diego attended 
a hearing, but thought that Rose was on trial for a traffic offense. 
Diana has sought to protect him from the stigma associated with 
having a parent who is a drug user. She kept Rose’s addiction from 
him to protect him emotionally and psychologically and to ensure that 
he would not be bullied at school. It is widely known that drug users 
or addicts in Indonesia are portrayed as morally corrupt. A number of 
government-initiated advertising campaigns depict drug users as an 
evil that needs to be eliminated from earth, and other such messages. 
This is a result of the government’s so-called war on drugs policy. 
As a natural consequence of the narcotics law and the advertisement 
campaigns, discrimination against drug users is a common feature 
in Indonesian public life.9 “I don’t want my grandson to suffer stigma 
and be ridiculed by his friends at school because of his mother. He has 
enough of it,” said Diana.10 
Mario:		The	Hope	of	a	Family
Mario is twenty-one years old and grew up in a dense, grubby, 
slum area. His house, along with hundreds more, is located next to 
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a railway in Roxy—one of many highly populated places in Central 
Jakarta. From the main street, it is about ten minutes’ walk to reach 
his house. The street is not paved. At the end is a traditional market 
that makes the streets wet and attracts flies. At the end of this street 
market, Mario lives with his sister, Kate (age fifteen), three brothers, 
Mike (ten), Tony (five) and Andy (two), and his parents. Kate has a 
four-month-old baby named Jane. Mario’s house is only two floors of 
six square feet, consisting of one room, where they watch television 
in the afternoon and sleep at night, and a very small bathroom on the 
first floor. The second floor is wooden and crosses from one side of the 
street to another side, like a bridge. It is also used as a bedroom.
Mario’s father, John, works as waste plastic scavenger. He spends 
most days collecting waste, such as water cups and plastic drink 
bottles. In a week, he could collect approximately twenty kilos, 
earning about IDR 10,000 per kilo from scrap dealers—about US$1. 
Meanwhile, his mother, Mary, works as a coconut seller at the market, 
just five meters away from their house.
As the oldest child, Mario’s family has huge expectations of him. 
Since finishing high school, Mario has helped his parents to earn 
money by working as an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver. He is the 
backbone of his family. 
Unfortunately, Mario was entrapped by the police not far from his 
house in March 2009. 
Mario and his friend were sitting on a couch in front of his house 
having returned from work. It was almost two o’clock in the morning 
when another friend arrived asking if they wanted to use shabu 
(methamphetamine). Mario himself is an occasional drug user, using 
drugs only when gathering with friends who also use. Mario was 
given IDR 100,000 (about US$10) and asked to buy the shabu. The 
dealer’s house is not too far from Mario’s but moments after knocking 
on the door, two police officers arrested him. He was charged with 
drug (psychotropic) possession despite the fact that he had not yet 
paid for the drugs.11 On July 13, 2009, Central Jakarta District Court 
found him guilty of possession and sentenced him to one year and four 
months imprisonment and a fine of IDR 2 million (about US$220). If 
a defendant cannot pay such a fine, he or she must spend two more 
months in prison. This was the case with Mario, taking his sentence 
to a year and a half.
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During the process, Mario was detained in Salemba Detention 
Center, and that was when the family’s misery began. For rich people, 
going into a detention center will render them poor, and poor people 
will become poorer. That is what happened to Mario’s family. His 
income as an ojek driver was eliminated and the costs of visiting him 
in prison and keeping him safe inside placed enormous burdens on 
the family. 
Mario’s family visits him once a week or once every two weeks. 
They take public transportation and travel quite a distance to see 
him. Even though it costs only about IDR 3,000–5,000 (about US$.50 
cents) per person for the transportation, this is still a large amount for 
this family. On arrival, more money must be spent. Every door they 
pass requires money: to allow Mario to come out of his cell to a hall in 
which he can meet his family. Every time they visit Mario, they have 
to spend more than IDR 300,000. This money is spent to buy decent 
food for Mario because of the poor quality of food in the prison. They 
give daily allowances of about IDR 100,000 so he can buy essential 
items and mobile phone vouchers costing approximately IDR 10,000–
25,000 every two days (this is despite the fact that mobile phones 
are prohibited). This voucher is used to be resold again inside. In a 
month, the total expense for Mario is approximately IDR 700,000–1 
million (about US$900). 
Spending an extra IDR 700,000–1 million is extremely difficult for 
this family. Their monthly income is only about IDR 1.5–2 million. 
Sometimes, the income is less if the parents do not sell coconuts or 
cannot go out to collect plastic waste. Half of the income is consumed 
by Mario’s needs. The other half is used for the family. It is a very 
small amount with seven people to care for including two young 
children in school, a preschool-age child, and a baby. Every family 
member, including the children, faces hardship and must forgo not 
just treats, but essentials such as milk, clothes, and books.
Added to this, and perhaps the saddest aspect for Mario’s siblings, 
is the feeling of being neglected. Since Mario was arrested his parents 
have had to give their full attention to him. Even though they do 
not visit Mario every day, most of their days are preoccupied with 
worrying about his condition. Before the arrest Mario’s parents loved 
to play with their daughter, sons, and granddaughter. Now, the 
children are often left behind at home when the parents visit Mario, 
with no one to watch them. 
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The children have also lost Mario, and he was very much relied 
upon. Even though Kate can sometimes substitute for Mario’s role 
as the oldest, she has a baby to take care of. Andy, the youngest, 
is always asking about Mario. “When will aa (brother) come home, 
mom?” he asks. 
Conclusion
It is informally known that every police officer has an arrest target 
of a minimum of five drug cases a month. This quota makes drug 
users primary targets, not to mention those innocent people who also 
become targets because of the need to reach quotas. Entrapment is 
common. Based on the Narcotics Law, entrapment and undercover 
purchasing of drugs is permitted. Illegal entrapment (i.e., without a 
superior’s explicit permission as per Article 79 of the Narcotics Law) 
is a widespread occurrence. 
Arrest quotas, entrapment, and these high conviction rates increase 
the number of people in already overcrowded prisons. One chamber 
is often occupied by 10 to 20 people, while the actual capacity is only 
half that. Food is poor, sanitation even worse. If a prisoner falls ill, 
the medical center inside cannot provide the appropriate treatment. 
This includes, of course, people who are drug dependent. These 
conditions are what Mario faces in prison. This, too, is what Rose 
faced. Meanwhile, Mario’s family has suffered and Diego and Diana 
have suffered along with them. 
The verdicts in these two cases failed to consider the best interests 
of the children who would be affected by the decisions. In Rose’s case, 
the judges did not take into account the fact that she is a mother. 
In Mario’s case, his importance as a breadwinner and emotional and 
practical support within a poor family was not considered.  These 
factual backgrounds must be taken into account as a matter of priority 
if the best interests of the child as enshrined in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Indonesian Law are to be given due regard. 
In this context, there is no evidence that the war on drugs has led to a 
decrease in drug use and/or criminality. Indeed, the evidence appears 
to point in the opposite direction. 
According to the National Narcotic Agency (BNN) annual report 
for 2010, 35,299 people were convicted of drug offences from 28,382 
cases. Most are for non-violent or possession offences like those above. 
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Based on the two cases presented here, one can only imagine the scale 
of harm caused to their families, their dependents and their children.
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11. “Ants Facing an Elephant”: Mothers’ 
Grief, Loss, and Work for Change 
Following the Placement of a Child in 
the Care of Child Protection Authorities
by Kathleen Kenny and Amy Druker
Introduction
Society most often associates the combination of illicit drugs and 
parenting with neglected children and inadequate parenting. This 
school of thought is deeply entrenched in the political ideology of 
the war on drugs and abstinence-based frameworks, and ignores the 
social, economic, and cultural realities shaping parental drug use.1 
It fails also to mention strategies parents may use to mitigate risks 
of drug use. Though placing children in the care of child protection 
authorities (CPA) may in some cases be necessary or requested by a 
parent, the long-standing fracturing of family relationships resulting 
from this practice can have far-reaching and devastating impacts on 
children and parents.
This chapter will shed light on the complicated grieving experience 
of mothers who have lost custody of their children to CPA. First, 
we present relevant research on this topic, including findings 
from community-based research conducted in 2008 in Toronto, 
Canada. Drawing on this research, we share women’s insights into 
the connection between diminished mental health and feelings of 
hopelessness, anger, isolation, loneliness, and suicide and how these 
affect drug use and relationships with their children. Second, we 
describe a recently established project that brings women together 
to support each other, to discuss coping strategies, and to learn and 
share experiences through telling stories, consciousness raising, art 
making, and social action. Finally, we discuss steps taken by the group 
to establish a dialogue with CPA, and how it is hoped this ongoing 
dialogue can contribute to a growing shift in practice within the 
CPA from an abstinence-based framework toward a harm reduction 
approach.
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Background	Research
While some forms of socially induced suffering perpetuated by the 
war on drugs (e.g., militarization, police violence, drug overdose deaths, 
and incarceration of drug users), may be more readily identifiable, 
parental grief following the loss of a child to CPA remains largely 
hidden and unacknowledged in society. Though grief is a beneficial 
response in processing loss, a mother’s grief following the loss of a 
child to CPA can be complicated by a host of factors rooted in society’s 
judgment of those who transgress gender-appropriate mothering 
norms; ambiguity and confusion as to whether the loss is temporary 
or final; lack of societal acknowledgment and understanding of the 
loss; the resulting trauma and its compounding effects; and finally, 
systemic demands placed on mothers by CPA following the loss of 
custody.
There is a paucity of research and information on suffering 
experienced following the loss of a child to CPA. Socially unacknowledged 
grief has been referred to as “disenfranchised,” defined as a grief that 
is not openly acknowledged, socially accepted, or publicly mourned, 
and where the griever is unrecognized and often cut off from social 
supports in dealing with her loss.2 Rather than the traditional ritual 
of the community gathering to support each other in the aftermath of 
a loss, in the case of losing a child to CPA, the mother is often avoided 
and shamed for having deviated from mothering norms of caretaking 
and selflessness. A leading grief theorist, William Worden, whose 
work informs much of the practice of bereavement counseling and 
support groups in North America, describes the “tasks of grief” in four 
steps: to accept the reality of the loss; to experience and work through 
the pain of grief; to adjust to an environment in which the lost one is 
missing; and to emotionally relocate and memorialize the lost one and 
to move on with life.3 Traditional funeral rites facilitate and validate 
the grieving process. The loss is announced; there is recognition of 
the deceased person’s relationship to others; there is allowance for 
public expression of grief; there is support for the bereaved; and there 
is an opportunity for members of the community to gather and to 
support each other. In contrast, when a mother loses a child to CPA, 
the significance of the loss often goes unrecognized and there are no 
rituals to acknowledge it. 
The uncertainty of permanence surrounding losses of children to 
CPA also complicates grieving experiences. Pauline Boss labels losses 
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that are not clear or final as “ambiguous.” She explains experiences 
of ambiguous loss as when a loved one is physically present but 
psychologically absent (e.g., the experience of caring for a loved one 
who has Alzheimer’s disease) or when a loved one is physically absent 
but psychologically present (e.g., the experience of parents with 
“empty nest syndrome” in the aftermath of a young adult moving 
out of the family home). When a woman experiences losing a child 
to CPA, the loss can be harder to resolve because the mother may 
be psychologically preoccupied with the absent child. The loss may 
also be perceived as reversible, and therefore Worden’s first task in 
accepting the loss is far more challenging and obscured by a mother’s 
hope for reunion with her child. This can have the effect of placing 
the mother on an emotional rollercoaster alternating between hope 
and hopelessness. The lack of formal rituals and recognition of grief 
can further increase one’s risk of continuously reexperiencing the 
loss as a trauma for years after the original event. It can also result 
in negative health outcomes such as depression, anxiety, psychic 
numbing, distressing dreams, and symptoms similar to posttraumatic 
stress disorder.4 
The loss of a child to CPA may be framed as “both the loss of a 
loved person and the loss of an abstraction—one’s ideal image of 
oneself as a competent mother,” which for some women can lead to 
their feeling so depressed or hopeless that they are at risk of suicide.5 
De Simone has examined variables that obstruct grieving for women 
who previously relinquished an infant for adoption, and found higher 
levels of grief among mothers who believed they had been coerced 
by others into giving up the child.6 Similarly, Holli Ann Askren and 
Kathleen Bloom’s review of twelve studies of mothers who had their 
children adopted, found that mothers’ initial grief reactions were 
“normal” (anger, guilt, depression) but observed these emotions to 
persist over time and to lead to chronic and unresolved grief.7 
Research	on	Women’s	Experiences	of	Losing	Children	to	Child	
Protection	Authorities
In our community of South Riverdale, Toronto, Canada, a 
community-based study conducted in 2007 with women who use illicit 
drugs and engage in sex work found that a majority of participants 
did not have custody of their children.8 In 2008, we aimed to gain a 
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better understanding of women’s experiences of custody loss and its 
lasting effects. We conducted a qualitative research inquiry with a 
small group of women who had lost custody of their children. We asked 
them what had been helpful and unhelpful following the placement of 
their children in care, and what could be done to support them now.9
Two focus groups and three semistructured interviews were 
conducted with nine women who currently use illicit drugs and are 
street involved. Participation was voluntary and participants were 
provided anonymity. There was variation in the number of children 
women had lost custody of, as well as in the custodial arrangements 
with CPA and in the time period since children were placed in care. 
Overarching themes emerging from the data found that almost all 
those involved in the research project experienced increased mental 
health struggles and marginalization as a result of losing children to 
CPA. Participants also provided insight into what had been/would be 
helpful in terms of dealing with the loss. Significantly, many women 
expressed how the research process represented the first time they 
had been invited to share their experiences. 
In our analysis, women’s experiences are described on two levels, 
comprising both individual and structural dimensions of grief and 
loss.(see Figure 1) At the individual level, the women expressed a 
range of emotionally destabilizing factors that contributed to declines 
in mental health following the loss of their child(ren). Almost all of 
the participants described increased drug use or reinitiated drug use 
to cope with pain, and to numb feelings such as hopelessness and 
lack of purpose following the sudden and often unanticipated shift in 
parenting roles. As one woman recalled of her experience following 
the loss of her child:
My life was empty. There was nothing else to live for. That was 
the purpose of my life. I had no purpose. My drug use got worse. I 
felt hopeless. Nothing helped.
The women described the importance of holding on to memories 
of their child(ren) and viewed memories to have both negative and 
positive effects on their mental health. Half of the women expressed 
having suicidal ideation in trying to cope with the immediate aftermath 
of losing a child. One woman described the emotional impact of the 
experience as far-reaching and negatively affecting her mental and 
physical well-being:
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Figure	1: At the individual level, almost all of the women interviewed reported increased mental health struggles 
(reflected in the upward pointing arrow), as a result of a range of destabilizing factors (reflected in the irregular 
structure of bricks supporting the arrow). 
I don’t feel any more. I’m cold and distant. This feeling is not 
going away . . . I got into prostitution, drugs, I was suicidal . . . I 
don’t give a fuck.
Guilt was also identified as a source of anguish and diminished self-
worth for some women, while others associated structural barriers 
as the target of their anger and blame rather than burdening the 
guilt upon themselves. A small number of women reported feelings 
of detachment from their child following apprehensions that took 
place directly after the child’s birth. They described feelings of guilt 
because of the absence of an emotional bond with their children. For 
the majority, the trauma experienced following a child apprehension 
by CPA and the continuous reexperiencing of this event was viewed 
as debilitating and as having compounding effects on mental health 
problems. All of the women had extensive histories of trauma in their 
lives. One woman recounted her experience:
It seemed like she just came out of my belly and these people were 
ripping her away from me . . . I lost my housing; I couldn’t be in 
the house without my kid . . . I couldn’t walk by her room to go to 
the bathroom and see the room empty. It was devastating.
Drug	Use Anger Guilt
Detachment Trauma
Memories
Isolation Suicidal	thoughts
Hopelessness
Mental	
health	
struggles
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A consistent experience was the lack of support in dealing with 
the emotional pain, deep-rooted anger, and social isolation following 
the loss of custody, while concurrently facing great demands from 
CPA. Individual-level experiences following the loss of child(ren) 
were found to be largely mediated by structural forces such as 
poverty and unresponsive social service agencies. Commenting on 
their experiences of systems following loss of child custody, all of 
the women spoke about ways in which structural forces resulted in 
instability, feeling judged by society, and loss of parental rights. They 
expressed that they either had not been offered social support to deal 
with the loss of their children or that the support offered was largely 
unhelpful. They also shared a small number of initiatives considered 
helpful, and these included kinship custody arrangements through 
CPA, as well as harm reduction services and programs targeting 
pregnant women/mothers who use drugs and/or alcohol (see Figure 
2). In terms of unhelpful experiences with systems, women expressed 
feeling powerlessness, as well as negatively and unfairly judged in 
their encounters with CPA:
If you’re poor, you’re a bad parent . . . you’re classified . . . belittled 
by [CPA]. . . . You’re judged.
Figure	2:	On a structural level, all of the women reported lack of support following the loss of custody. Participants 
talked about the different ways that society and social systems affected their lives and experiences with CPA. Positive 
experiences are depicted as hands, negative experiences are portrayed as swords.
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The experience of having a child placed in care had destabilizing 
effects on the participants’ lives, including losses of housing and 
employment. Many demands were also placed upon them at a time 
when they considered themselves least capable of compliance. Such 
demands included urine screening appointments (often supervised 
by a stranger and not necessarily a woman), hair-strand testing, 
drug use counseling or treatment programs, housing appointments, 
parenting courses, and psychological testing.
A majority of the women considered CPA’s role to be adversarial and 
felt they were not provided with opportunities to prove themselves as 
parents or to establish collaborative relationships with CPA workers. 
One research participant explained:
I would have liked [CPA] to have given me a chance to prove 
myself. . . . Any mother who wants her children should be given a 
chance before putting her child up for adoption.
Feelings of betrayal were also identified and were pointed to as 
a source of distrust felt toward CPA and other service providers. 
Three women reported how their children placed in the care of CPA 
had been raped, assaulted, and/or murdered. These women spoke 
about not being able to come to terms with having been unable to 
protect their children from harm. CPA had removed children from 
family situations considered to be high risk, but it was felt that these 
children faced far greater risk within the CPA system.
Through our research process, insights were also provided into what 
would be helpful to support the grieving process and to address the 
ongoing impacts of custody loss on mothers. Group support and one-
on-one support were considered to be equally beneficial. In discussing 
the possible group structure, emphasis was placed on the importance 
of a small group size, art-based activities, and advocacy initiatives. 
One woman suggested:
Groups would be helpful to share with people going through the 
same thing. We are all mums whether we have just lost custody 
or our kids have been adopted. Holding a discussion group for 
each CPA office would be good, to have them listen to parents 
and to understand what parents are dealing with, so they give 
the support parents need and are considerate of what parents are 
dealing with.
In response to these recommendations, and with their active 
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involvement we began planning a pilot that would serve as a space 
for discussion of experiences, validation of grieving, and advocacy for 
social change. In June 2009 our planning culminated with the start 
of a fifteen-week pilot group called the “Grief and Loss Education and 
Action Project.” 
The	Grief	and	Loss	Education	and	Action	Project
The Grief and Loss Education and Action Project is a partnership 
project between South Riverdale Community Health Centre and the 
Jean Tweed Centre in Toronto and is facilitated by a community 
worker from each of these agencies (the authors of this chapter). At 
present, the project has recently begun a third fifteen-week group 
with women who use illicit drugs and are street-involved. Each two-
hour session begins with a ritual of meal sharing (with seasonally 
available foods) and check-in (where women share how they are 
feeling), and concludes with a check-out (where women evaluate the 
session) and the provision of public transportation tokens and a $10 
honorarium for each participant. During our initial meetings, we 
invite participants to create group guidelines, which include a “no 
judgment policy” related to drug use (in other words, women are 
always welcome to join us regardless of whether they are using or 
not). We also focus on having the women identify topics of interest 
for further exploration and we create a list of possible guest speakers 
(e.g., representatives of CPA, a family lawyer). 
In response to the women’s interests and reinforcing the 
empowerment orientation of our group model, the group is planned 
around the central themes of telling stories, consciousness-raising, 
art making, and social action. Safer coping strategies and self-care 
are also regular topics at each group meeting, and each session 
typically includes the practice of grounding exercises, mindfulness 
meditation, or discussion of strategies for growing compassion toward 
self and others. The ongoing option of one-on-one support from a social 
worker or group facilitator is also available to participants if needed. 
We conclude the fifteen-week group with a celebratory lunch at a 
restaurant during which the women are presented with a certificate 
of participation. In response to participants’ expressed interest project 
“graduates” continue to meet on a monthly basis with facilitators, 
where they provide support to one another, carry on action-oriented 
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work aimed at outreach to other mothers, and raise awareness and 
advocate for changes in how CPA works with mothers who use drugs.
Telling	Stories
Heavy is the heart whose story has not been told. My heart is 
lighter because you listened.
Scottish parable
We live in a world full of stories. Stories tell us who we are 
and where we belong. Stories help us make meaning of our lives. 
Sometimes stories become saturated with problems, but there are 
always openings to create new meanings or ways of viewing ourselves 
in relation to others. Narrative therapy conceptualizes our identity 
as being shaped by narratives or stories shared about ourselves, and 
in this endeavor aims to expose alternative stories of resistance and 
resilience alongside problem-saturated stories. As a starting point in 
this process, we invite women early on in the group to bring with 
them something to share that is symbolic of their grief. One woman 
brought in lyrics of a song, another brought in photographs of her 
children, and another pointed to her tattoo. The activity creates an 
initial opening for stories of grief and loss to be told. 
A second storytelling activity involved mapping out experiences of 
grief and sharing them. In this activity, we describe Worden’s tasks of 
grief (explained earlier in this chapter) and explore how the grieving 
process unfolds in the absence of ritual or acknowledgment of the loss. 
We then invite the women to creatively represent their own stories of 
grief and to share these with the group. Feelings of anger, numbness, 
sadness, and guilt were strongly shared, as were love and hope to 
escape the cycle of grief in the future. Following this, women from 
one group brought together their grieving cycles and collectively 
represented their experiences in an explanatory brochure to share 
with others. 
A third storytelling activity borrowed from narrative therapy, 
involved letter writing to a feeling (such as anger, hopelessness, 
etc.) that women identified as most affecting them in the aftermath 
of their loss. This technique aims to externalize the “problem” from 
the individual, and in so doing, allows women to reconsider their 
relationship to the “problem” and its range of influences in their 
lives—thus the narrative motto: the person is not the problem, the 
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problem is the problem. In discussing what to do with the letters, 
one group decided to discard their letters into the lake—a symbol of 
closure and desire to move forward from these feelings. 
Consciousness	Raising	
Con-scious-ness raising n. an intentional focused awareness on 
a social or political issue, usually involving the linkage of 
personal troubles to larger societal factors.
Consciousness raising, often associated with the social and 
cultural “revolution” of the 1960s, is integral to the process of 
critically analyzing societal forces (e.g., classism, racism, sexism, 
drug policy) contributing to drug use and dependence and the loss 
of custody of a child. It is through group discussion that insights 
are shared and women deepen their social analysis of power 
and social justice, and how these intersect with individual and 
collective experiences with CPA. To further facilitate this process, 
we draw upon an art-based activity called The Road Travelled, a 
variation of a community development activity from the Elsipogtog 
First Nation, a Mi’kmaq community in New Brunswick, Canada. 
The objective of the activity is to examine the intersection of 
individual, community, and system-level factors contributing to 
CPA apprehensions. 
The backdrop of The Road Travelled consists of a painted mural 
of a winding road with mountains, a sun in the background, and 
trees in the foreground. The road symbolizes the women’s journeys 
of losing custody of their child(ren). A series of symbols are then used 
to represent the many factors (individual, societal, or systemic) that 
have had positive or negative influences along the way:
Boulders represent barriers to keeping families together. Women 
identified a range of barriers including low self-esteem; childhood 
abuse; lack of parenting role models; low self-control; relationship 
problems; poverty; judgment concerning responsible drug use; lack 
of support; unfair bias toward parents who were raised in CPA foster 
care; power imbalance between parent and CPA; and loss of parental 
rights once a child is taken into care.
Turtles represent sources of healing for women following the loss of 
child(ren) to CPA, and included holding on to good memories; forgiving 
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oneself; having faith their child will grow up and understand; opening 
up to one’s feelings; and feeling loved by child(ren).
Bears symbolize those strengths that have helped women to survive 
and overcome barriers. These included supportive friends; having 
faith in oneself; having a job; supportive community organizations; 
talking and sharing stories of children; and helping other women.
And finally eagles symbolize those commitments women are prepared 
to make to effect change either on a personal, community, or systemic 
level, such as building relationships with foster families to stay connected 
with children; finding hope and courage for reconnection with children; 
sharing experiences with others; and helping CPA to understand the 
trauma experienced by those who have lost custody of their child(ren). 
Through this activity women gained more awareness of the social 
realities shaping parenting experiences, and were challenged to 
delineate between individual and societal-level forces that resulted 
in losing custody. Insights gained through this re-visioning exercise 
are summarized in a brochure developed by group members, which 
aims to educate service providers and CPA workers about women’s 
experiences. 
Art	Making
We believe that the arts are a means of communication, 
education and liberation, answering the need to express common 
values, concerns and experience; that through the sharing and 
development of creative activity, people—who because of [the 
way that society is structured, pushing some to the margins] are 
seen as receivers and consumers—can become contributors and 
sharers.        
Fran Herman and James Smith, 198810
Throughout the project women responded positively to opportunities 
to make art. These included ongoing availability of art supplies for 
doodling or drawing during meetings, as well as art-based activities 
such as grieving cycles and The Road Travelled. Body mapping, 
however, was enthusiastically embraced as the favorite activity. 
Body mapping’s effectiveness as a storytelling tool was first 
documented in sub-Saharan Africa, where women living with HIV 
sketched and painted stories of their journey with the virus. After 
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explaining this activity, women were invited to outline their bodies 
on large sheets of paper and then artfully represent their stories of 
grief, loss, and hope for the future with paints, words, photographs, 
fabric, and so on. The timing of this activity (about midway through 
the fifteen-week group) was in response to our sense that women 
seemed to be in different places, while some seemed to be wanting 
to keep telling their stories of grief and loss, others seemed ready to 
“take action.” We felt body mapping could meet both of these needs, 
in terms of the process of doing the activity (storytelling), and the 
outcome (the body maps themselves used as advocacy tools). Women 
were invited to write a narrative explanation to accompany their body 
maps. Those who wished, placed their body maps and narratives in 
a brochure with the objective of sharing their stories so that other 
women might not feel so alone in their struggles with CPA, and to 
help service providers gain insight into women’s experiences. 
Social	Action
Ac-tiv-ism n. a doctrine or practice of taking direct intentional 
action to achieve a social, political, economic, or environmental 
change. 
Early in the project, group members identified action-oriented goals 
aiming to change how CPA and other service providers work with 
parents who use drugs. We discussed different ways this might begin 
to happen. The women suggested that the group arrange a meeting 
with a CPA representative to tell their stories of loss and to share 
their ideas about how the child welfare system could change to better 
meet the needs of families affected by illicit drug use. Toward the end 
of our first group cycle, a meeting was arranged with a supervisor 
from Metro Toronto Children’s Aid Society (the largest board-run 
child welfare agency in North America).
The women were surprised at the respectful dialogue that 
ensued with CPA. During the exchange, women spoke about their 
experiences with CPA, both positive and negative, as well as their 
recommendations for change. Group members drew attention to 
the belief that poor families were unduly targeted, that families 
with histories of drug use were prejudged as unfit parents, as 
were those parents who themselves had been in the custody of 
child protection as children. The intrusiveness of child protection 
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services was also identified as feeling belittling and unfair toward 
families. In terms of positive experiences with CPA, one woman 
identified having a worker “who believed in me” and worked from 
a harm reduction perspective. For this woman, it was these two 
factors that made the biggest difference in mitigating the effect of 
having her child apprehended. On a macro level, women flagged 
issues of deep-rooted discrimination against people who use drugs, 
as well as the lack of affordable housing, and poverty. One woman 
discussed how society “assumes that women who use [drugs] don’t 
love their children,” and that “parents who use are bad parents” 
and highlighted the inherent injustice and incorrectness of these 
assumptions. Women also shared educational resources they had 
developed and addressed the urgent need for more child care 
respite to support parents, better screening of foster-care parents, 
as well as support for mothers before, during and after a child goes 
into CPA’s care.
The need for parents to be involved and consulted as much as 
possible in the process of taking children into care was also stressed. 
One woman proposed that a support person be selected by the parent 
to provide immediate support, as well as to inform parents of their 
rights, and to seek out safe housing and mental health support for the 
mother during and after the loss of custody. 
The CPA representative listened to women and affirmed their 
grief, anger, and frustration with the system. She also reported on 
new directions being undertaken by CPA, including a “Best Practice” 
document for CPA intake workers on how to work with families 
affected by drug use. At the end of the meeting, the women were 
invited to consult in the development of this document. The women 
unanimously agreed to participate in an ongoing dialogue with CPA 
concerning this issue and the meeting, they described the experience 
as both positive and empowering, and felt their stories, concerns, and 
ideas were heard and validated.
Learning	from	the	Project
Drawing on quantitative and qualitative measures of grief, self-
esteem, anxiety, depression, social support, and drug use, pre- and 
postevaluations were completed by almost all participants in the 
project. While a comprehensive review of our evaluation findings is 
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beyond the scope of this chapter and the number of mothers (n = 10) 
who completed the program is small, participants spoke about the 
strength derived from sharing their stories and receiving support 
from group members to deal with their pain. Women further reported 
a positive effect of the project on their mental health, including 
increased self-esteem, hopefulness, resiliency, and personal agency, 
as well as reduced isolation, shame, and guilt. Though reunification of 
the family was not an intended outcome of the group, it is also notable 
that almost half of the women in the project have taken steps, with 
the support of group members and facilitators, to reconnect with their 
children in different capacities. 
Two key themes of “dead alone” and “ants facing an elephant” 
emerged from women’s stories shared in the group and are explained 
below.
Dead alone was a poignant phrase one woman used to describe 
her feeling of isolation after losing her child, and this theme 
was unanimously agreed upon as a term that captured women’s 
experiences. Numbing was also identified, and increased drug 
use was viewed as a way of forgetting feelings of shame, guilt, 
“dead aloneness,” sadness, and anger. Women also described self-
punishing behaviors, including unsafe drug use and sex work, and 
even the deliberate placement of themselves in harm’s way, as a 
means of coping with isolation, shame, and pain associated with 
their loss.  
Ants facing an elephant was another striking phrase one woman 
articulated to describe the feeling of powerlessness in relationships 
with CPA. Women identified feeling powerless for many reasons—from 
the deeper issues of poverty, race, gender, and social environment, to 
the system’s failure to support mothers in the traumatic aftermath 
of losing custody, as well as exclusion from the legal process due 
to ineffective legal counsel. Group members also discussed the 
challenging power dynamics with CPA workers who consider illicit 
drugs to be more dangerous than licit drugs and equate parental 
illicit drug use with inadequate parenting. The women also reported 
difficulties with CPA workers who were not versed in (or plainly 
disagreed with) harm reduction approaches, including methadone 
maintenance treatment. 
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Looking	Forward
We began a third fifteen-week group cycle in January 2011 with 
nine women. In response to women’s interest, project “graduates” 
from the previous two groups continue to meet on a monthly basis to 
support each other and to work on projects centered around outreach 
to other mothers, awareness raising, and advocacy efforts to support 
a shift in CPA from an abstinence-based framework toward a harm 
reduction approach. We have also been exploring a historical timeline 
of the child protection system and have begun public-speaking training 
with women to prepare for presentations and educational workshops 
that we hope to offer to social service providers, social work students, 
health practitioners and local CPA organizations. 
Despite the turbulence of daily life and the challenge of working 
through one’s own grief, the women in the project have demonstrated 
remarkable strength to support others who are experiencing similar 
pain. In this capacity, the women have opened up new spaces for 
dialogue with other mothers in our community whose families have 
been involved with CPA. Far exceeding our initial expectation for the 
project, the women have gained much momentum in working toward 
their goal of a transformed child protection system in Canada—where 
all women who want to parent their children are supported in their 
efforts to do so. Recognizing the complex factors shaping drug use and 
associated harms in Canada (e.g., poverty, drug laws, colonization of 
Aboriginal peoples, violence, and inequalities of race, class, sex, and 
gender), it is timely that we introduce alternate and nonjudgmental 
views of mothers who use drugs, particularly mothers who are poor 
and/or from racialized communities, who are most vulnerable to 
state intervention and intersection with the war on drugs. As for 
recommendations toward achieving this aim and realizing women’s 
vision for systemic change, these are best set out in the words of 
the women themselves, who created a manifesto addressed to the 
Children’s Aid Society (CAS) the Canadian equivalent of Child 
Protection Authorities:
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A	Hope	for	Things	to	Change:	Mothers	&	CAS
1.  We are ants facing an elephant. We are women who 
have survived abuse, poverty, lack of parenting role models, and 
have been negatively labelled by society. These experiences make 
us strong and we want workers to see the positives in our lives.
2.  Programs and support should be available to keep 
our families together. We need more affordable child care 
options, safer housing, and health and social services which meet 
our families’ unique needs. Crisis counselling/grief counsellors 
should be present at time of apprehension to offer support to 
parents (and children).
3.  CAS workers should be trained on harm reduction. 
We need workers who are knowledgeable about illicit drugs, 
methadone and other prescription drugs. We want workers who 
recognise ways in which women’s drug use can be shaped by social 
factors, such as poverty, abuse, drug laws, and inequalities of 
race, class, gender, and sexuality. We need workers who believe in 
harm reduction and who respect us as people who practice harm 
reduction. We need workers to be considerate of our feelings as 
mothers and as human beings.
4.  CAS workers should see our strengths and be trained 
on anti-oppression. We need workers who do not want to exert 
power over us. We want workers who see and want to build on 
our strengths, and work with us to figure out steps to reconnect or 
keep our families together.
5.  More rigorous and mandatory screenings and reviews 
of foster parents. Too many children have experienced trauma 
and abuse while in foster care. Parents have rights to know where 
kids are and how they are being treated. We want the right to 
request a hearing if we suspect that our child is being mistreated 
in foster care.
6.  Parents should be provided with regular updates 
on their kids (including report cards, activities, medical 
information). Kids have a right to know about their identity—
their parents, grand-parents, cultural background, and medical 
history. Parents should be able to participate with CAS and foster 
parents in decision-making that affects their kids.
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7.  Visitations should be more personal. Parents should 
feel comfortable and not feel humiliated when visiting children. 
Parents don’t always know how to act on supervised visits and 
should be given tips to relax and get the most out of each visit. 
Ideally, recreational programmes should be available to parents 
and children during access visits.
8.  Mothers should be offered well-informed and 
committed lawyers. Women should be informed about their 
legal rights as parents, and workers should encourage a parent’s 
right to have a lawyer to address issues with CAS.
9.  Mothers need parent-advocates within CAS. Women 
need parent-advocates to support them and ensure they understand 
what is going on with their child and custody arrangement.
10.  Loosen the chains. As women make progress to stabilise 
their lives, CAS should seek out and acknowledge positive 
changes and be open to re-negotiating custody and visitation 
arrangements.
11.  More support groups and counselling for women 
involved with CAS. Governments should give money to 
support different community programmes for women who 
have been involved with CAS both pre and post apprehension. 
Free transportation should be available to ensure women have 
opportunities to share their grief and trauma, and to work for 
change.
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Discussion	Questions
1.	 The	costs	to	individuals	incarcerated	for	drug	offenses,	and	to	their	
children	and	 families,	 are	 outweighed	by	 the	benefits	gained	by	
society.	Discuss.
2.	 Arrest	 quotas	 feature	 in	 two	 of	 the	 chapters	 in	 this	 section.	
What	 is	 the	 role	of	 such	quotas	 in	 law	enforcement?	Are	 they	a	
legitimate	incentive,	or	do	they	lead	to	corruption	and	a	focus	on	
“soft	targets”?
3.	 Fransiska,	 Larasati,	 and	Gunawan	 call	 for	 the	 impact	 on	 child	
dependents	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 sentencing	 for	 nonviolent	 drug	
offenses.	 Do	 you	 agree?	 Which	 considerations	 could	 be	 taken	
into	 account?	 Above	 what	 threshold	 of	 seriousness	 might	 this	
consideration	be	disregarded?	
4.	 The	best	interests	of	the	child	are	always	best	served	by	removing	
children	from	the	custody	of	a	parent	who	uses	drugs.	Discuss.
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Part	4:
Justification:	Children,	Drug	Use,	and	
Dependence	
Part 4 focuses on the policy justification of protecting people, 
especially children, from the harmful effects of drugs, including drug 
dependence. This premise is not challenged. Let us take it as read, 
and agreed by all, that it is not a good idea for children to use drugs, 
and that the use of drugs at an early age can be especially harmful—
physically, socially, and psychologically.1 This is clear from a number 
of the chapters in this section. But policies aimed at dealing with this 
concern must be interrogated. Is the desire to protect children from 
drug use and dependence justification for the measures that have been 
adopted? And what does a closer look say about future strategies? In 
this section, five very different chapters ask searching questions of 
the policy responses that have been put in place to deal with drug use 
among children and young people, and of some of the assumptions 
underlying prevailing views of drugs, drug use, and dependence. 
The first chapter in this section is “Youth Drug-Use Research and 
the Missing Pieces in the Puzzle: How Can Researchers Support 
the Next Generation of Harm Reduction Approaches?” by Catherine 
Cook and Adam Fletcher. The chapter cuts to the root of this central 
justification for the war on drugs, challenging what we really know 
and do not know about drug use among young people.2 It explores 
the extent of our knowledge regarding drug use among young people 
around the world, concluding that far too little is known about 
emerging patterns of drug use in low- and middle-income countries, 
rendering the global picture incomplete. It goes on to challenge 
data collection methodologies and the predominance of “war on 
drugs” discourses that inhibit a deeper understanding of routes 
into problematic use and potential drug-related harms. According 
to the authors, the result is that the most vulnerable young people 
are excluded from the existing empirical evidence and their needs 
are ignored. The chapter concludes with recommendations for a new 
research agenda to inform more appropriate and effective youth-
centered harm reduction interventions.3
Michael Shiner’s chapter, “Taking Drugs Together: Early Adult 
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Transitions and the Limits of Harm Reduction in England and 
Wales,” focuses on recreational drug use among young people. 
According to Shiner, the potential of the harm reduction approach 
has not by any means been explored because of a focus on problematic 
drug use, including injecting, and the prevalence of abstinence-
based messaging. For most young people, the majority of drug use is 
closely tied to the “nighttime economy,” and it is here, claims Shiner, 
that interventions should be focused if the harms associated with 
club drugs such as ecstasy and the consumption of alcohol are to be 
mitigated. In relation to alcohol, this has included “air conditioning, 
ventilation, the availability of drinking water, the demeanor of door 
staff, transport home, the availability of information and outreach 
services, and access to health services.” But for other drugs this 
approach may require a level of tolerance that many are not willing to 
accept. The controversy surrounding “pill testing” to inform clubbers 
of what they have purchased is testament to this, as authorities see 
it as conflicting with messages that condemn drug use.4
Prevention is often seen as the most important aspect of policies 
aiming to address drug use among children.5 Year after year, UN 
member states report to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs about 
the antidrug and prevention campaigns that have been undertaken.6 
Yet despite this, all raise their ongoing concerns about drug use 
among children and young people in their societies. What is clear is 
that prevention campaigns are at best limited in effect. They have 
not, by very definition, worked for young people who do use drugs, 
recreationally or otherwise. Adam Fletcher’s second contribution to 
this section “Drug Testing in Schools: A Case Study in Doing More 
Harm Than Good,” challenges a more direct and intrusive form of 
prevention. In many countries random school drug testing is employed 
both to weed out young people who are using drugs and, more 
important, to act as a deterrent to others who may be thinking about 
starting. Fletcher argues that such programs are lacking not only any 
solid evidence base but also any central theory to explain their aims 
and methods. As a result, he argues, random school drug testing can 
result in more harm than it seeks to prevent, such as school absences, 
distrust of school authorities and teachers, and pushing young people 
toward more dangerous drug use. Meanwhile, he demonstrates, they 
do not reduce drug use.7 For Fletcher the answer is more holistic. 
Far more effective in reducing overall levels of substance use have 
been “school-wide interventions that promote school engagement 
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and positive connections between staff and students, and reduce 
disaffection.”
Jovana Arsenijevic and Andjelka Nikolic, meanwhile, provide a 
fascinating insight into the lives of heroin users in a very different 
part of the world—Serbia. Their chapter, “‘I’ve Been Waiting for This 
My Whole Life’: Life Transitions and Heroin Use,” challenges many 
of the stereotypes attached to people who are drug dependent by 
considering the complex factors contributing to initiation into drug 
use and to drug dependence. The chapter considers the socioeconomic 
status of young drug users attending harm reduction programs, and 
through interviews charts the life trajectories of eight heroin users, 
all of whom started using when they were very young. What emerges 
is an engaging and complicated psychosocial picture against which 
simplistic “just say no” prevention messages and claims that “addiction 
is a choice” are rendered redundant. As the authors succinctly state, 
“There is no universal explanation for heroin addiction” but what is 
an almost universal barrier to addressing it is the social stigma it 
attracts.8
The final chapter in the section, “Why Should Children Suffer? 
Children’s Palliative Care and Pain Management,” by Joan Marston, 
changes direction from reducing drug use to ensuring access to drugs. 
In this case, the drugs in question are essential medicines for child 
palliative care, including morphine. Access to the medicines under 
international control is not often a focus of drug policy discussions,9 
but according to the World Health Organization, about 80 percent of 
the world’s population has no access or insufficient access to opiates 
for pain relief.10 This affects millions suffering from terminal cancer, 
late-stage AIDS, and other conditions. For children, the situation is 
even worse, as child palliative care lags far behind that for adults. In 
most countries there is next to no child palliative care. The reasons for 
this are complex, and Marston sets out many of them as well as the 
range of measures required simultaneously to deal with this problem. 
Important barriers to overcome include overly restrictive narcotics 
laws and regulations, compounded by fears about diversion of 
medicines into the illicit market, and, of course, addiction. According 
to Marston “Where governments see control of illegal trafficking and 
diversion as more important than the relief of suffering, children will 
continue to suffer. We must set our priorities straight.”
174	 children of the drug War
Endnotes
  1. See European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction, thematic page on 
young people, www.emcdda.europa.eu/themes/young-people/.
  2. See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009 (Vienna, 2009), 
23–29, 265–86.
  3. Harm reduction for young people can be particularly controversial as it is seen 
by some to tacitly endorse or tolerate drug use among this group. The reaction 
tends to be to place age restrictions on harm reduction services. See, for example, 
Eurasian Harm Reduction Network, Young People and Injecting Drug Use in 
Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius: EHRN, 2009).
  4. On ecstasy testing, see, for example, J. Johnson et al., “A Survey of Regular 
Ecstasy Users’ Knowledge and Practices Around Determining Pill Content and 
Purity: Implications for Policy and Practice,” International Journal of Drug Policy 
17, no. 6 (2006): 464–72.
  5. See, for example, International Narcotics Control Board, Annual Report for 2009, 
UN Doc. No. E/INCB/2009/1, 1–13. 
  6. See www.cndblog.org, run by Harm Reduction International and the International 
Drug Policy Consortium, which records the statements of Member States of the 
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
  7. Proponents claim that random school drug testing works. See, for example, Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, What You Need to Know About Drug Testing in 
Schools, www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/drug_testing.pdf.
  8. See, for example, C. Lloyd, Sinning and Sinned Against: The Stigmatisation of 
Problem Drug Users, UK Drug Policy Commission, August 2010, www.ukdpc.org.
uk/resources/Stigma_Expert_Commentary_final.pdf. “Problem drug users are 
a very strongly stigmatised group and this has a profound effect on their lives, 
including their ability to escape addiction,” 11.
  9. See, however, the recent Human Rights Watch reports: Needless Pain: 
Government Failure to Provide Palliative Care for Children in Kenya, 2010, www.
hrw.org/en/reports/2010/09/09/needless-pain-0; and Please Do Not Make Us Suffer 
Any More: Access to Pain Treatment as a Human Right, 2009, www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2009/03/02/please-do-not-make-us-suffer-any-more-0/.
10. World Health Organization, Access to Controlled Medicines Programme, “Briefing 
Note,” February 2009, www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/ACMP_
BrNoteGenrl_EN_Feb09.pdf.
Part 4: Justification 	 175
12. Youth Drug-Use Research and 
the Missing Pieces in the Puzzle: 
How Can Researchers Support the 
Next Generation of Harm Reduction 
Approaches?
by Catherine Cook and Adam Fletcher
Introduction
Young people’s use of substances, both illicit and licit, is a global 
phenomenon. Young drug users predominantly use substances 
recreationally with friends, and for many, drug use will not lead to 
negative health, social, or economic harms. However, a small but 
significant proportion of young people who use drugs will experience 
harm and can be particularly vulnerable to health harms for several 
reasons. They are more likely to take risks in their drug-taking 
behavior and may have a poor awareness of their own tolerance to 
substances.1 Young people are also often the first to experiment with 
new substances (including new “legal highs” sold via the Internet) 
and to adopt new drug-taking methods, and they are often strongly 
connected to dense drug-supply networks.2 As with adults, drug-
related harms among young people are also determined by a complex 
of individual, social, and structural factors, such as poverty and social 
exclusion, which can further increase vulnerability and may mean 
that the harms are more profoundly experienced.
Despite these vulnerabilities, harm reduction interventions are 
rarely tailored to young people’s needs and they are often denied 
access to evidence-based interventions such as needle and syringe 
exchange and opioid substitution therapy. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, for example, there are strict age restrictions on access to 
sterile injecting equipment and opioid substitution therapy.3 Even in 
Australia, where harm reduction has a long tradition, an audit found 
that specialist services for young people were “thin on the ground” 
and identified several barriers to their accessing harm reduction 
and drug treatment services, including homelessness, appointment-
based service provision, and a lack of youth-work expertise among 
practitioners.4 The lack of youth-focused harm reduction services 
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represents a missed opportunity to protect and improve the health of 
the next generation of people who use drugs.5 It is also a fundamental 
human right of every young person around the world to have access to 
the highest attainable standard of health, including harm reduction.6 
While this standard continues to be left unmet for the majority of 
young people, their human rights are being violated.
In order to respond with appropriate evidence-based and human 
rights-based approaches, it is necessary to have a clear picture 
regarding the nature and extent of youth drug use, routes into 
problematic use at a young age, and the drug-related harms to which 
young people are vulnerable. Much research is undertaken to study 
youth drug use, but this is not to say the evidence base needed to 
inform harm reduction programs for young people is complete: several 
key pieces in the puzzle are missing. To date, although significant 
attention has been given to reviewing the theoretical literature 
and “organizing pieces of the puzzle” in order to understand the 
determinants of youth drug use,7 limited attention has been given to 
the incompleteness of the empirical evidence base and the limitations 
of the research methods and ideologies that inform data collection.
This chapter explores the extent of our knowledge regarding drug 
use among young people around the world, and the implications of 
this for the next generation of harm reduction. First, far too little is 
known about emerging patterns of drug use in low- and middle-income 
countries, thus the global picture remains incomplete. Second, school-
based surveys are the dominant method used to study prevalence and 
trends in youth drug use and these have several major limitations, 
which are outlined. Third, most “war on drugs” discourses continue 
to focus research as well as policy and practice on prevention, thus 
inhibiting a deeper understanding of routes into problematic use and 
potential drug-related harms. With all three of these limitations, the 
result is that the most vulnerable young people are excluded from 
the existing empirical evidence and their needs ignored. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for a new research agenda to inform 
more appropriate and effective youth-centered harm reduction 
interventions.
An	Incomplete	Global	Picture
At the global level, limited surveillance from many of the world’s 
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most populous nations makes it impossible to accurately estimate 
the total number of drug-involved young people. Many of the best 
available data are restricted to youth drug use in high-income 
countries of Europe and North America. In these countries, cannabis 
remains by far the most widely used drug among school-age youth, 
although levels of use are stabilizing.8 European surveys report that 
more than one in four fifteen- to sixteen-year-old school students have 
smoked cannabis in the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic.9 Rates are even higher in 
the United States and Canada where nearly one in three young people 
have smoked cannabis by the age of sixteen.10
While overall rates of cannabis use among school-age young people 
have stabilized in high-income countries, ecstasy and amphetamine 
use have increased, converging on—and in some cases overtaking—
the high rates of “club drug” use first observed among young people 
in the UK in the mid-1990s. In 2007 a survey of tenth-grade students 
in the United States (aged fifteen to sixteen) found that 11 percent 
had used amphetamines and 5 percent had taken ecstasy, and similar 
levels of ecstasy use (6 percent) have been found among twelve- to 
seventeen-year-olds in Canada and sixteen-year-olds in Australia.11 
Although reports of cocaine use among school students remain much 
rarer than cannabis and “club drug” use, this stimulant is increasingly 
entering the landscape of youth drug cultures, and by the end of the 
1990s, 8 percent of U.S. tenth-graders had used cocaine.12
However, these young people in Europe, North America, and 
Australia represent only a fraction of the total global youth population 
as more than four-fifths of the world’s children and young people live in 
low- and middle-income countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. 
In many parts of these regions there is evidence that illicit drug use 
among young people is rising. As a result, recent United Nations 
reports have drawn attention to “historic highs” of global youth drug 
use.13 For example, in Kenya 19 percent of young people now report 
having smoked cannabis.14 As in the world’s wealthiest countries, 
youth drug use in low- and middle-income countries also goes beyond 
cannabis use, with new practices emerging in some regions. In East 
and Southeast Asia, increased use of methamphetamine among young 
people is of growing concern,15 and recent data suggest that cocaine 
use is increasing among school-aged youth in South America.16
Despite these insights into the prevalence and patterns of youth 
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drug use around the world, data on young people’s drug use in Africa, 
Asia, and South America remain scarce. Monitoring trends in global 
youth drug use is therefore extremely difficult without annual survey 
data from low- and middle-income countries. At present, strategic 
information from such countries is “patchy” with no harmonization 
of methods or measures.17 The surveys that are undertaken in 
developing regions are carried out irregularly and have sampled 
young people differently, often recruiting different age groups, across 
countries and over time, which limits the scope for cross-national and 
temporal analyses. This is the case with the existing mechanism for 
collecting information on young people’s health-related behaviors 
via the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global School-based 
Health Survey (GSHS), whereby surveys are developed locally and 
undertaken by ministries of health with the assistance of the WHO, a 
process that results in different indicators and sampling frames being 
used between countries.
The WHO GSHS also fails to capture information on problematic 
drug use and drug-related harms experienced by young people in low- 
and middle-income countries, instead focusing on how many young 
people have “ever used” drugs, and at what age drugs were first used. 
For instance, one question asks participants to state how many times 
in the past twelve months they have used a particular drug, with 
options ranging from never to ten or more times.18 However, this 
provides no indication of whether or not using the drug has resulted 
in any harm to the young person and does not distinguish between 
occasional, relatively “normalized” patterns of youth drug use19 
and more problematic and chaotic polydrug use. The information 
currently collected is therefore not instructive for informing the 
design and implementation of appropriate harm reduction strategies. 
This represents a wasted opportunity to use a global mechanism of 
data collection to examine more problematic use and the extent of 
drug-related harm experienced by young people.
Inadequate	Data	Collection	Methods
Across high-, middle-, and low-income countries, the majority of 
studies examining the prevalence of drug use among young people 
rely on self-reporting from an accessible group of young people, 
normally school students. These school-based surveys are often 
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cost-effective, drawing on a large number of participants, and when 
the same methodologies are used researchers can make cautious 
comparisons over time and between countries. For example, within 
Europe, similar national reporting mechanisms have allowed some 
cross-national comparisons of patterns in young people’s drug use.20
However, there are important limitations to the reliability and 
representativeness of data collected via school-based surveys. These 
limitations include practical problems in using school-based surveys 
to collect reliable self-report data about students’ use of drugs.21 For 
example, a fear of a lack of anonymity, or of potential repercussions 
for an admittance of drug use may bias results due to underreporting. 
A recent American study comparing data collected via self-completion 
questionnaires with biological markers found that teenagers’ hair 
specimens were fifty-two times more likely to identify cocaine use than 
their self-reporting of drug-use behaviors.22 In addition, while large-
scale surveys provide the “big picture” in terms of the prevalence 
of youth drug use, they are depersonalizing and largely ignore the 
meaning and social context of young people’s actions: drug use is now 
an extremely important source of recreation and identity for many of 
these young people.23
Perhaps most significantly, school-based surveys provide insights 
only into the drug-taking behaviors of young people attending school, 
therefore omitting those who are not attending school or have been 
excluded from school. Where studies have surveyed vulnerable young 
people they find much higher levels of drug use. In the Netherlands, 
for example, researchers found that while 8 percent of twelve- to 
sixteen-year-old school students reported recent cannabis use, this 
increased significantly among students referred to truancy projects 
(35 percent) and homeless young people (76 percent).24 It is these 
most vulnerable groups of young people—such as those who are not 
in education or training, and homeless, runaway, and street youth—
whose drug use is less likely to be transitory and subject to norms of 
self-control, and more likely to progress to more problematic patterns 
of use, such as injecting drugs and sharing injecting equipment, which 
can transmit infections such as HIV and hepatitis B and C. Surveys of 
“street” youth in the United States found that 45 percent had injected 
drugs,25 while in Canada, this figure was 36 percent.26
Street-based surveys of young people, such as the Sydney Street 
Intercept Survey27 and the Vancouver Youth Drug Reporting 
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System,28 are extremely rare at present but could be more widely 
implemented to complement existing monitoring systems. Countries 
in Eastern Europe—which are experiencing a process of social and 
economic transformation, including high unemployment and poverty 
rates—using such street-based survey methods, have begun to 
identify very high rates of HIV infection among young people as a 
result of shared injecting equipment and unsafe sexual practices.29 
For example, a recent citywide survey of more than 300 street youth 
in St. Petersburg, Russia, found 37 percent HIV prevalence.30 These 
drug-involved young people who are living and working on the street, 
and who are at risk of HIV and hepatitis C, also often report a history 
of parental drug use, incarceration, and “survival sex.”31
Another potential source of data on young people’s drug use is 
routine records kept by drug-treatment and harm reduction service 
providers. When a new client comes to a facility, their age may be 
recorded and this can later be used to examine which drugs and 
methods of use are bringing people of different ages into contact with 
services. These types of data are particularly useful for analyzing 
problematic drug use among young people at the population level. 
However, it is clearly limited to assessing patterns among those 
young drug users who are able and willing to access services, and 
this, again, may leave out the most vulnerable young drug users who 
for a variety of reasons may not be able to access services. Indeed, age 
restrictions applied to harm reduction services may inhibit such data 
collection outright.
The	“War	On	Drugs”:		Prioritizing	Prevention	and	Hiding	the	
Harms
Responses to drug use among young people continue to be 
dominated by individually focused and group-based prevention 
strategies, such as school-based drugs education, mass media 
campaigns, and youth development programs.32 In turn, surveys 
on young people’s drug use focus on those questions most pertinent 
to informing such drug prevention efforts, such as “have you ever 
used an illegal drug?” And herein lies a further, major problem 
for informing the next generation of harm reduction approaches. 
Prioritizing prevention through policy and practice inevitably 
means that it tends to be similarly prioritized at a research level, 
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especially where research is funded through governmental sources. 
This has led to a situation where a full and accurate assessment of 
harm reduction needs is not available.
From those rare studies that have focused on understanding and 
uncovering drug-related harms experienced by young people, it is 
apparent that many young people require a harm reduction approach 
tailored to their needs and the nuances of youth drug use. For example, 
problematic drug use is often defined as encompassing injecting and/or 
long-term heroin or cocaine use, but a recent UK report by the charity 
DrugScope on drug use among vulnerable young people concluded 
that the definition should be revisited for this population.33 Heroin 
and crack cocaine were less common among this group than polydrug 
use, particularly the mixing of alcohol with cannabis and other 
drugs. Cannabis is now the most frequently reported “main drug of 
misuse” by under-eighteens attending drug-treatment agencies in the 
UK: in total, 11,582 young people (75 percent of all clients) received 
treatment for cannabis misuse in 2005–6.34
However, these crude population-level data regarding young 
people’s “main drug of misuse” provide only limited insights and, 
more important, DrugScope’s consultation recommended a review of 
data-collection practices in order to gather more valid and responsive 
information on problematic and harmful drug use within the youth 
population.35 Another important recommendation made in this 
report was the establishment of a new national “radar” service 
to provide early warnings of new youth drug trends and emerging 
harms, enabling policymakers and services to make timely, effective 
responses. Such systems would have uses outside of the UK, and 
perhaps at a regional or global level, given the ever-evolving nature 
of drug use, particularly among young people.
In ninety-three countries around the world, harm reduction is 
featured in national policies (often in relation to HIV prevention) 
or is used in practice,36 and there is a wide-ranging body of 
evidence that harm reduction services such as needle and syringe 
programs have been effective in preventing unsafe injecting and 
the transmission of blood-borne viruses such as HIV, including 
among young people.37 However, without adequate research 
into problematic drug use and drug-related harms among young 
people, public health policymakers and practitioners lack the data 
necessary to inform, and provide impetus to and support for, these 
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highly effective harm reduction interventions. The extent of drug-
related harm and young people’s needs remain hidden in the fog of 
the “war on drugs.”
The	Next	Generation	of	Research
Currently, evidence regarding young people’s drug use is focused 
on certain regions of the world, and particularly concerned with 
preventing experimental and recreational drug use. This leaves 
significant pieces of the puzzle missing. Furthermore, the extent to 
which young people are experiencing harms associated with their 
drug use is largely unknown. Nonetheless, small-scale studies from 
low- and middle-income countries have powerfully illustrated how 
young people are engaging in problematic drug use and the resulting 
need for new support and treatment services. In particular, in Central 
Asian and East European countries, it is thought that a quarter of all 
people who inject drugs are now under age twenty,38 and a recent 
assessment found that initiation into injecting begins as young as age 
twelve in countries such as Romania, Russia, and Serbia.39
By missing crucial pieces of evidence, the current research agenda 
and the methods and ideologies underpinning it further reinforce 
existing inequalities in health. The research process could itself be 
conceptualized as part of the broad “risk environment” in which drug-
related harms occur within the youth population. Globally, there is 
a need for a mix of national surveillance and complementary small-
scale studies focusing on the most vulnerable young people and 
problematic drug use, with three particular priority areas needing to 
be addressed urgently.
First, emerging data from low- and middle-income countries 
indicate that youth drug use is a present and growing concern in 
many regions. In the short term, the WHO GSHS provides the 
opportunity for more reliable monitoring of patterns of drug use 
behaviors around the world, but greater attention needs to be focused 
on how these surveys are undertaken. Further high-quality large-
scale epidemiological studies are also needed.
Second, the focus on school-based surveys means that those young 
people who are most “at risk,” such as those who experience school 
exclusion and homelessness, remain largely invisible in official 
statistics—as does their involvement with drugs. Street-based surveys 
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are feasible and should be implemented more widely to complement 
existing monitoring systems, including in those developing countries 
where street-based drug-using youth are a particularly neglected and 
vulnerable group.
Third, “war on drugs” discourses translate into drug policies, 
practices, and research that are largely centered on prevention, 
particularly in relation to young people. There is a need to break 
this cycle and to increase the focus on problematic use and the 
harms associated with it, in order to fuel and inform the necessary 
harm reduction responses. Definitions of what should be termed 
“problematic” will vary according to drug trends and this should be 
monitored at the population level, with early warning systems in place 
to quickly highlight new patterns of drug use among young people.
The limitations of current insights into young people’s drug 
use directly inhibit an effective response, particularly in relation 
to the most problematic kinds of drug use. Young drug users 
worldwide remain extremely vulnerable to harm, a situation that is 
unacceptable from both public health and human rights perspectives. 
It is imperative that policymakers and those funding and conducting 
research address the gaps in current investigatory approaches into 
drug use among young people, in order to build and support an 
effective harm reduction response.
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13. Taking Drugs Together: Early Adult 
Transitions and the Limits of Harm 
Reduction in England and Wales
by Michael Shiner
Introduction
The failings of prohibition and the need for alternative modes of 
regulation were highlighted by British sociologist Jock Young some 
forty years ago. Drug laws, he argued, had proved “damaging” and 
“unworkable” because they cannot stamp out consumer demand 
or illicit supply and inadvertently create spirals of “deviancy 
amplification.” “The problem in a nutshell is that if there is strong 
demand for an illicit activity, then legislation, far from removing that 
demand, will merely pervert and distort it.”1 “Like it or not,” Young 
insisted, “we live in a society which makes extensive and repeated use 
of psychotropic drugs. Effective controls must be instituted if we are 
to avoid a vast amount of unnecessary misery and hardship.”2 “We 
must,” therefore, “learn to live with psychotropic drug use” because 
“it is only by treating citizens as responsible human beings that any 
sane and long-lasting control can be achieved.”3 Drug policy did not, of 
course, move in the direction Young favored. In the very year his work 
was published, Richard Nixon, then president of the United States, 
declared a “total war on drugs,” while in Britain the introduction in 
1971 of the Misuse of Drugs Act signaled a shift toward a more explicit 
enforcement-led approach. Even without the benefit of hindsight, this 
move was noted with a sense of foreboding by liberal critics. Young 
warned that more punitive policies could only exacerbate the problem, 
while Edwin Schur maintained: “It is reasonable to predict that if the 
British do move significantly in the direction of American policy, the 
consequences of doing so will be unhappy ones.”4
The past four decades of global prohibition have confirmed that the 
criminal law cannot stamp out consumer demand or illicit supply. 
Despite a flurry of activity that aimed to strengthen international 
prohibition in the early 1970s, there followed an “explosive 
worldwide growth in the production and trafficking of virtually all 
types of illicit drugs.”5 Consequently, the drug trade is now “a global 
problem of enormous proportions,”6 providing “the largest and most 
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successful form of criminal activity ever developed.”7 According to 
recent estimates, illicit drugs account for 3 percent of world trade, 
making it the third largest sector behind oil and arms.8 International 
comparisons also indicate that the global distribution of drug use 
is not straightforwardly related to drug policy, since countries with 
stringent regimes do not have lower rates of use than those with 
liberal regimes.9 In the United States, for example, the “war on drugs” 
has been escalated by almost every presidential administration since 
Nixon’s10 and yet it has a drug problem worse than that of any other 
wealthy nation.11 A similar paradox is evident in Britain, which has 
developed one of the harshest drug regimes in Europe, yet is host to 
one of its largest drug markets.12 This paradox is examined below, 
first, by considering the place and meaning of illicit drug use among 
young people in England and Wales, and second, by considering the 
narrowness of official approaches to drug prevention.
Taking	Drugs	Together:		From	Counterculture	to	Consumer	
Capitalism
The now well established link between young people and drugs 
can be traced back to the 1960s. This was, lest we forget, a decade 
of unprecedented visibility for British youth, during which society’s 
defenses against drug use were “decisively breached.”13 When Mick 
Jagger and fellow Rolling Stone Keith Richards were prosecuted for 
drugs offenses in 1967 the case became “symbolic of a wider contest 
between traditionalism and a new hedonism, the focal point of which 
was society’s attitude towards recreational drugs.”14 As youth culture 
became more visible and increasingly permeated by drug-friendly 
references, official policy began to take the form of a recurring “moral 
panic.” After the “sixties drugs” of amphetamines and LSD, a string 
of substances were added to the list: “designer drugs, PCP, synthetic 
drugs, ecstasy, solvents, crack cocaine and the new associations: acid-
house, raves, club culture and ‘heroin chic’ supermodels.”15 With the 
rise of ecstasy culture, and related talk of the “democratization” of 
drug use, a raft of surveys during the early 1990s began to show that 
youthful drug use was no longer a minority experience.
The emergence of widespread youthful drug use in Britain, and 
across much of the late industrial world, has been facilitated by broader 
processes of social change.16 Accelerating globalization has stimulated 
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supply, while various factors have combined to accentuate demand. 
Crucially, the expansion of postcompulsory education beginning in 
the mid-1950s, augmented by the collapse of the youth labor market 
during the 1970s and 1980s, created the conditions for an extended 
adolescence. As a result, young people from all social classes began to 
experience a greater gap between leaving school and “settling down,” 
providing more room for hedonistic pursuits. Having previously made 
little effort to court the youth market, moreover, the drinks industry 
began to target young people from the early 1960s, with the result that 
“pub culture” and alcohol were quickly installed as “central pillars” of 
youth-oriented leisure.17 The economic pressures that undermined the 
youth labor market also served to elevate the significance of leisure, 
both as a form of consumption and source of economic growth. Repeated 
urban-regeneration initiatives stimulated a massive expansion of 
the nighttime economy, which was, by the end of the past century, 
responsible for creating one in five of all new jobs.18 Greater competition 
between outlets resulted in heavy discounting, making alcohol much 
more affordable, while various marketing strategies (such as happy 
hours, chasers and shots, etc.) actively encouraged the transgression 
of traditional drinking norms. With an explicit emphasis on adventure, 
intoxication, and release, the nighttime economy has become the 
primary site of “subterranean play” and its expansion has encouraged 
the growth of a distinctly hedonistic leisure style, which has, in turn, 
helped to create a platform for accelerating rates of illicit drug use. As 
a result, recreational drug use has become firmly established within 
the late industrial leisure complex, offering young people a means of 
celebrating freedom from adult roles and responsibilities.
Patterns of youthful drug use have changed somewhat since the 
high tide of dance culture in the early 1990s.19 Overall rates of use 
plateaued toward the end of the decade, with prevalence rates for most 
substances leveling off or falling during the years that have followed 
(see Figure 1). What has caused these fluctuations is not entirely 
clear though it is likely to have involved an interplay of multiple 
factors, including changing tastes and fashions. While much of the 
overall decline in drug use has been driven by reductions in cannabis 
use, neither law enforcement nor prevention programs appear to 
have played a significant role in this regard.20 LSD and amphetamine 
use have fallen sharply as ecstasy and cocaine have become the 
party drugs of choice for young adults,21 though they may, in turn, 
be losing out to alcohol as the expansion of the nighttime economy 
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and the liberalization of licensing laws have been accompanied by 
an increase in “binge” drinking and “determined drunkenness.”22 
Reduced availability and purity of ecstasy and cocaine have also been 
linked to the recent emergence and rapid growth in the use of “legal 
highs” such as mephedrone (now banned) and methylone.23
Even allowing for recent reductions, large numbers of young people 
continue to engage in illicit drug use. According to recent estimates 
nearly two and a half million sixteen- to twenty-four-year-olds in 
England and Wales have used cannabis, with more than a million 
having done so in the past year and more than half a million having 
done so in the past month.24 In addition, an estimated three-quarters 
of a million sixteen- to twenty-four-year-olds have used cocaine, with 
374,000 having done so in the past year and 175,000 having done 
so in the past month. Young people from all social classes are well 
represented among those who engage in such drug use, though the 
vast majority stop doing so by their mid- to late twenties as they 
form stable relationships and start families of their own.25 From 
a developmental perspective, illicit drug use is, for the most part, 
one of a range of behaviors that make up the dominant trajectory 
of “adolescent limited” offending, through which young people test 
boundaries and assert their independence. As an “adaptation” to 
the “maturity gap” between biological maturity and the acquisition 
of adult status, such behavior is “ubiquitous” and it is “statistically 
aberrant to refrain from crime during adolescence.”26 There may even 
be something reassuring about rule breaking during this phase of the 
life course as such behavior is indicative of social integration with 
peers. Nonengagement in deviance, by contrast, may be suggestive of 
interpersonal difficulties: young people who abstain from trying drugs, 
for example, have been found to be “relatively tense, overcontrolled, 
emotionally constricted . . . somewhat socially isolated  and lacking 
in interpersonal skills” while those who had experimented, mainly 
with cannabis, were said to be “the psychologically healthiest subjects, 
healthier than either abstainers or frequent users.”27
The prevalence rates shown in Figure 1 are indicative of a clear 
hierarchy of use, which is, in part, a function of perceptions of harm. 
Normative concerns about managing risk and reducing the potential 
for harm inform various decisions that young people make about 
what to use, what not to use, when to use, and how to use. Such 
concerns have also been found to constitute a more significant source 
of self-regulation than symbolic or instrumental concerns about 
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the law.29 Youthful drug use typically involves a limited repertoire 
of substances, most of which are less harmful than alcohol.30 
Cannabis is both the least harmful and most widely used illicit 
drug, while ecstasy and cocaine tend to be used more fleetingly in 
the context of a “calculated hedonism” regulated by boundaries of 
time, space, company, and intensity.31 Use of the more harmful 
illicit drugs, such as heroin and crack cocaine, remains much 
more limited. Most young people continue to be thoroughly 
convinced of the potential harmfulness of illicit drugs other than 
cannabis,32 and many disapprove of, even, recreational drug use.33
Tackling	Drugs	Together:		The	Limits	of	Harm	Reduction
Drug policy has toughened into a “war” at a time when increasing 
levels of consumption point to a less inhibited popular culture.34 
The 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act was implemented in the wake of the 
newly emerging drug “problems” of the 1960s and has been central to 
British drug policy ever since. Under the terms of the act, controlled 
substances are divided into three classes (A, B, and C) according to 
their perceived harmfulness, and are linked to a sliding scale of legal 
penalties. Substances that are newly identified as a risk can be slotted 
into the established classification, so, for example, amendments were 
recently made to include “legal highs,” such as mephedrone and 
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naphyrone, in Class B.35 Since the mid-1980s, what was already an 
enforcement-led approach has been codified in a series of strategic 
documents, including Tackling Drug Misuse (1985), Tackling Drugs 
Together (1995), Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain (1998), and 
Drugs: Protecting Families and Communities (2008). While combining 
enforcement and prevention, the national strategy clearly prioritizes 
enforcement.36 Prevention has been defined in fairly narrow terms 
and, though significant steps have been taken toward harm reduction, 
the vast potential of this approach has “barely been explored.”37 
Officially sanctioned harm reduction practices were introduced as 
a pragmatic response to the threat of HIV and are almost entirely 
configured around the needs of injecting heroin users, with needle 
exchange, opiate substitution treatment, and some innovative moves 
toward heroin-assisted treatment and drug-consumption rooms.38 The 
overriding policy imperative driving the national strategy remains 
one of “demand reduction,” which, applied to young people, means 
enforcement, primary prevention, and “treatment.” There is, in short, 
no official conception of harm reduction responses to recreational 
drug use. Remarkably, the 2008 drug strategy makes no reference to 
“pubs,” “bars,” “clubs,” or “licensing.”39
Given that recreational drug use is so strongly tied up with the 
activities of the drinks industry, it follows that the nighttime economy 
should provide one of the main focal points for youth-oriented harm 
reduction efforts. While some moves have been made in this direction, 
toward something we might call situational harm reduction, these 
remain largely informal. “Best practice” guidance has been issued 
for those concerned about drug use in the nighttime economy, which 
addresses issues such as overcrowding, air conditioning, ventilation, 
the availability of drinking water, the demeanor of door staff, 
transport home, the availability of information and outreach services, 
and access to health services.40 While such guidance highlights many 
useful interventions, the lack of enforcement remains significant. 
According to a review of the health-care implications of clubbing:
There are easily identifiable initiatives that could significantly 
reduce the impact of clubbing on the NHS [National Health 
Service]. They include the use of unbreakable drink containers, 
the elimination of discarded glass in or around clubs, a national 
registration and training scheme for club doormen, improved first 
aid provision at larger venues, limitations on crowding in clubs, 
and the abolition of drinks promotions that target young people. 
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All of these measures form the basis of voluntary codes of practice 
(such as that published by the London Drug Policy Forum, Dance 
till dawn safely). We suggest that they should urgently become a 
national legal requirement if good clubs are to thrive.41
Best practice could be enforced through various mechanisms, 
including by-laws, health and safety legislation, and/or licensing 
conditions.42 Consider, for example, that recent amendments to 
the Licensing Act 2003 ban “irresponsible promotions,” including 
the dispensing of alcohol directly into the mouth, and require that 
customers have access to free tap water so they can space out their 
drinks.43 The revised conditions also ensure that customers have the 
opportunity to choose small measures of beers, ciders, spirits, and 
wine.
As well as being largely voluntary, good practice guidance has 
been limited by a narrow conception of harm reduction. Despite 
concerns about drug purity and adulterants, for example, the original 
“Safer Clubbing” guidance refused to recommend the use of ecstasy 
testing kits because, among other things: “It is hard to maintain a 
policy that discourages drug use at the same time as offering a pill 
testing service.”44 Such a stance seems strangely at odds with the 
legalized distribution of injecting paraphernalia and the prescription 
of heroin substitutes. A similar tension is evident in the way the 
Select Committee on Home Affairs supported the piloting of heroin 
prescribing and safe-injecting houses, but refused to endorse the 
principle of legally regulated supply more generally on the grounds 
that to do so would be a “gamble” and a “step into the unknown.”45 
While recognizing the need for realistic drug education, moreover, 
the committee singled out Lifeline, a voluntary sector drugs project, 
for particular criticism, arguing that its comic-book harm reduction 
materials, which promise to “tell the truth about drugs”46 “cross the 
line between providing accurate information and encouraging young 
people to experiment with illegal drugs.”47
Conclusion
Much like the characters in the film Groundhog Day, the architects 
of British drug policy seem to be caught in a time loop, reliving the 
same experiences over and over again, repeating previous mistakes 
and failing to learn from the past. Phil, the central character in 
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Groundhog Day, broke the cycle by doing good, which leads us to the 
ultimate question, what would make for a good response to young 
people’s drug use? The central problem, it seems to me, is not so very 
different from the one Jock Young identified some forty years ago, and 
nor are the solutions. We must take seriously both the limitations of the 
criminal law and the harmfulness of illicit drugs. In practical terms, 
this means accepting that the elimination of drug use is an impossible 
task and focusing instead on establishing a system of regulation that 
concentrates on reducing harm. What is required, in other words, is a 
more effective system of regulation than prohibition is able to provide. 
It remains strongly dysfunctional to harass and undermine existing 
drug subcultures because to do so dislocates the most viable source of 
norms and controls. We should, rather, seek to maintain subcultures 
and encourage controlled use through the dissemination of “positive 
propaganda,” or accurate information phrased in terms of the values 
of the subculture, alongside an expanded set of harm reduction 
practices. The ultimate solution may well require a system of state-
regulated supply, which enables consumers to know precisely what 
they are getting, while constraining suppliers—criminal, corporate, 
or otherwise—from pursuing profit at the cost of human well-being.48
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14. Drug Testing in Schools: A Case 
Study in Doing More Harm Than Good
by Adam Fletcher
Introduction
As drug use has spread more widely through the youth population, 
it has become a public health priority to reduce the harms associated 
with it. Secondary schools continue to be the focus for policies 
aiming toward reducing drug use and drug-related harm, although 
traditional classroom-based drugs education has proved insufficient 
for changing students’ behavior and reducing harm. Drug testing in 
schools is now also a prominent part of school life for many children 
around the world. In the United States, school-based drug-testing 
programs are commonplace, and in 2004, President Bush authorized 
the use of federal funds for school-based drug testing in the No Child 
Left Behind Act, placing testing at the heart of the “war on drugs.”
This practice of random, suspicionless drug testing is not confined 
to American high schools. A study by the European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction found that drug testing in schools has 
become an issue for public and political debate throughout Europe, 
and is now implemented in schools in the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden, and also takes place sporadically in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, Belgium, and Hungary.1 In 2009, Russia’s 
antinarcotics agency announced that teenagers will now be tested 
for drugs during regular medical examinations at school, and drug-
testing schemes are being piloted in schools in Kazakhstan and Hong 
Kong. This chapter is critical of these policies because of the practical 
and ethical problems associated with them, because of the lack of 
evidence or logic to support them, and because they will do more harm 
than good.
School	Drug	Testing,	Consent,	and	the	Right	to	Privacy
As drug-testing programs in schools have gained political support 
in America and been exported to other countries, the range of 
technologies used to test for the use of drugs has also expanded and 
now includes methods for the collection and analysis of blood, urine, 
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saliva, hair, nails, or sweat samples. These surveillance practices 
represent an unwelcome and expensive extension of invasive 
surveillance into school life. It has been estimated that programs 
routinely cost as much as US$70 per student tested,2 amounting to 
as much as US$36,000 per school each year.3 New “point of collection 
tests” for use in schools can reduce the overall costs by avoiding 
sending specimens to an outside laboratory, although this requires 
procedures for testing and storing data securely on school sites, and 
risks the confidentiality of results.
Nonlaboratory points of collection tests also limit the reliability and 
accuracy of drug testing, greatly increasing the risk of “false positive” 
test results, and they cannot distinguish between licit and illicit 
drugs. For example, codeine in painkillers or prescribed medication 
can cause a positive test for opiates. Over-the-counter decongestants 
can also produce a “false positive” test result for amphetamines. 
How will young people’s right to privacy about medical conditions 
be maintained under such circumstances? Young people and parents 
should be consulted and asked to consent to a program of invasive 
testing; however, it is not unheard of for a parent or guardian’s refusal 
to consent to equate to the same disciplinary action as would be the 
case if a positive test were recorded.4
This invasion of privacy, potential for highly misleading results, 
and the lack of consent often associated with mandatory drug 
testing have meant that schools have been subject to high-profile 
legal challenges in the United States and elsewhere regarding their 
legitimacy. Indeed, the spread of mandatory drug testing in schools 
is further evidence of “an international environment within which 
human rights violations connected to drug policies are less likely 
to be raised and addressed” as the “war on drugs” trumps young 
people’s rights.5 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires that state parties take “appropriate measures” to protect 
children from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances (Article 33). However, the process of coercive testing and 
the assumption of guilt where consent is withheld raises serious 
concerns in relation to other articles of the convention, including 
Article 16, which states that “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his or her privacy,” and Article 3, a 
general principle of the convention requiring that in all matters 
affecting the child, the child’s best interests shall be “a primary 
consideration.” These protections are difficult to reconcile with 
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random school drug testing, especially given the lack of evidence of 
any positive health outcomes of such programs.
In	Search	of	the	Evidence
Researchers have searched for evidence of effectiveness to support 
the proliferation of drug testing in schools—and have failed to find 
any. Neil McKeganey of the University of Glasgow undertook a 
comprehensive search of studies published in major bibliographic 
databases to assess the effects of drug testing in schools. He found 
that the current evidence base is limited to a few small-scale, 
methodologically weak evaluations.6 Where studies have suggested 
that student drug testing “works,” they have lacked any control 
group, and often have also been politically motivated. A 2008 study 
commissioned by the Australian National Council on Drugs to 
review the evidence relating to drug testing in schools and its effects 
concluded that:
While there is a large volume of literature about drug testing 
programmes for school-aged children, the overwhelming majority 
of articles comprise anecdotal evidence and journalistic comment. 
Few studies have examined specifically the effectiveness of drug 
testing programmes for school students and none has been 
conducted rigorously in a controlled, unbiased manner.7
The largest study to date was undertaken by Ryoko Yamaguchi 
and her colleagues at the University of Michigan. They draw on data 
collected from more than 75,000 students across 410 U.S. high schools 
as part of the Monitoring the Future Study to assess the effect of drug-
testing practices on drug use between 1998 and 2001.8 A total of 74 
out of the 410 schools surveyed reported implementing a drug-testing 
program during the study but there were no differences in either the 
prevalence or frequency of cannabis or other drug use reported by 
students depending upon whether or not drug testing had been taking 
place in their school. In the absence of any prospective, controlled 
studies, this analysis represents the best available evidence at present 
regarding the effectiveness of drug testing in schools and concludes 
that such policies do not deter young people from using drugs.
Meanwhile, studies exploring the views of young people, their 
parents, and education and health professionals consistently find 
that drug testing is unpopular. Young people dislike it, with those 
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who are subjected to it becoming more negative about school following 
testing.9 A study of American parents and high school officials found 
that the majority opposed drug testing programs.10 Even a survey of 
359 American physicians found that 83 percent were opposed to high 
school drug-testing programs.11
In	Search	of	a	Theory
Without any evidence and little popular support to underpin 
further drug testing in schools, it is worth reflecting on the philosophy 
and theoretical justifications that have allowed such practices to 
gain momentum. It is not unusual for new policies and practices to 
emerge without a clear theory or logical model underpinning them. 
For example, despite its widespread adoption, peer education has 
been described as a “method in search of a theory.”12 Drug testing in 
schools is based on naive misconceptions about what influences young 
people’s behavior, and then further limited by misunderstandings 
about the potential for and extent of drug-related harms arising due 
to their drug use.
The policy relies on the premise that a fear of detection and 
punishment will deter teenagers from using drugs, or encourage them 
to stop using. Like many preventive interventions, it is based on the 
principle of modifying individual young people’s perceptions of the 
risks regarding drug use and assumes that they rationally weigh the 
costs versus the benefits of their actions in isolation. They do not, 
and therefore it is not surprising that the threat of drug testing has 
no impact. There are many other, more complex, social, economic, 
and environmental factors that are beyond young people’s immediate 
control and that shape their attitudes and actions relating to drug 
use, such as who their friends are, with whom they live, where they 
live, and what their school experiences are.13 We should not ignore 
the importance of choice and individual responsibility but we must 
recognize these broader social and contextual determinants. As 
Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot put it:
Trying to shift the whole responsibility on the user is clearly 
an inadequate response. This blames the victim, rather than 
addressing the complexities of the social circumstances that 
generate drug use.14
Drug-testing advocates claim that such an approach is also 
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justified in order to refer young drug users to “treatment.” Yet youth 
drug use is characterized by “sensible” experimental and recreational 
patterns of use throughout Europe, North America, and elsewhere. 
Drug use with friends is now relatively normal, and part of a broader 
search for excitement, pleasure, and a sense of identity within the 
context of consumer-oriented and increasingly complex transitions to 
adulthood. Testing for the use of cannabis or “club drugs” is not like 
screening for cancer: the vast majority of young people experience no 
serious harms associated with these drugs. Yet, school-based drug 
tests cannot distinguish between experimental, occasional or regular, 
heavy use, or determine in what context a drug was used, to assess 
the likelihood of harm. Furthermore, surveillance does not work 
unless it is underpinned by a degree of social consensus regarding 
what is inappropriate or “deviant” behavior; but through the process 
of “normalization,” recreational drug use has been accommodated 
into mainstream youth cultures.15
Toxic	Schools:	Doing	More	Harm	Than	Good
Not only is drug testing in schools theoretically misguided but it 
is likely to have unintended, harmful consequences. The first way 
in which harm is likely to arise is via “labeling” those young people 
identified as “drug users” by testing and identifying them as needing 
additional support. This process is likely to reduce their confidence, 
happiness, and self-esteem at school as well as to lower aspirations, 
and thus may lead to escalating drug use.16 While drug testing 
cannot distinguish between occasional, recreational drug use and 
more problematic patterns of use, there is a danger that youngsters 
at very little risk of harm will be “labeled” and drawn into the net 
of counseling services, “treatment” centers, and the criminal justice 
system, potentially introducing them to networks of more “risky” 
drug-using peers.
The consequence of a positive test result also often involves 
suspension or school exclusion.17 Reduced involvement in education 
and early school-leaving are associated with more chaotic and 
problematic drug-use practices, both in the short and long terms.18 
For example, a study published in 2008 of Irish young people who 
were using heroin found the one thing that nearly all of them had 
in common (eighty-one out of eighty-six) was that they were no 
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longer attending school.19 In many cases drug testing will punish 
the most vulnerable young people—such as those from the poorest 
neighborhoods or those whose parents misuse drugs—who most 
need a supportive school environment, and whose drug use is most 
likely to escalate if they are excluded from school and their economic 
opportunities are further limited. Drug dependence and injecting 
drug use is also concentrated in the most disadvantaged areas and 
strongly linked to economic and social exclusion, both as a cause and 
a consequence, in high-income countries such as the United States,20 
and also regions such as Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia.21 
Excluding large numbers of vulnerable young people from schools in 
already disadvantaged areas will only serve to increase drug-related 
harms in these “risk environments.”22
As with all surveillance systems, drug testing in schools is also 
vulnerable to “concealment.” There is potential for such a policy 
to do more harm than good where young people decide to change 
their patterns of drug use or school attendance to avoid detection. 
For example, drug testing can inadvertently divert young people 
to substances that are likely to be more harmful but less easily 
identifiable than cannabis, such as alcohol, amphetamines, or 
volatile substances (e.g., fuel or paint). This is of particular concern 
given the greater acute risks and long-term harms associated with 
excessive alcohol consumption. Furthermore, just as young people 
can switch substances, they can also vote with their feet and some 
may skip school to avoid the possibility of being tested. This increases 
the likelihood that they will fall behind at school and that they may 
become involved with older peers and a wider range of drugs, which 
are likely to present much greater risks than occasional cannabis use.
Drug-testing procedures also incur costs that represent a significant 
and unnecessary diversion of scarce resources in any education 
system, and the time involved in organizing these procedures is an 
additional burden for school managers. This time and money would be 
much better spent on creating a more supportive school environment 
in line with the principles of the health-promoting schools movement: 
social support, engagement, fairness, and democracy.23 Schools 
with a positive, inclusive ethos that foster positive teacher–student 
relationships and promote school engagement have the lowest rates 
of drug use.24 But drug testing only serves to damage relationships 
between students, teachers, and parents, and increase psychological 
distress.25 Young people may also avoid participating in out-of-school, 
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extracurricular activities that help them to form positive relationships 
with teachers, and can divert and protect them from engaging in 
drug use at a young age.26 These dangers associated with a poorer 
school ethos and diminished trust are likely to be compounded further 
by the harms associated with creating a false sense of a drug-free 
environment through drug testing, and limiting the potential for 
schools to create “safe spaces” for young people to learn about, and 
discuss issues to do with, drug use.27
Drug	Testing	in	Schools:		“Just	Say	No!”
Schools are not an appropriate battleground for the “war on drugs.” 
The role of schools is not to police and punish young people. Schools 
are places where young people should be happy, build positive, 
supportive relationships, and have access to information about drugs, 
developing the skills they need to grow up safely in a world in which 
they face myriad risks. Drug testing breaches young people’s right to 
privacy and is inadmissible with the principles of school-based health 
promotion; it constitutes a policy of harm promotion rather than 
harm reduction. It does harm through labeling students; through 
excluding students from school; through creating perverse incentives 
to switch to more harmful substances; and through the costly 
disruption to school life and the loss of trust, ultimately undermining 
the principles of a healthy school environment. It does not address the 
social determinants of drug use but rather reproduces the contexts 
via which drug-related harms occur. And as with all wars, the most 
vulnerable young people are most likely to be the victims in the “war 
on drugs.”
School-based drug testing also provides an exemplary case study 
of why drugs policies that do more harm than good are implemented. 
It is a policy built on rhetoric and anecdotal evidence, and driven 
by technology rather than a coherent theory of human behavior. 
It is an example of political interventionism. As with military 
interventionism, such interventionism in schools involves aggressive 
state activities. Stephen Ball of the University of London has 
documented the flood of government initiatives and “concomitant 
interventionism” in education, highlighting how twenty-first-century 
schools are subject to directives from a local level and global trends, in 
addition to having to implement a wide range of policies and practices 
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determined by national government.28 Reflecting on this phenomenon 
of interventionism, professor of pediatrics at the University of 
Oklahoma, Mark Chaffin, explains:
Once taken to scale, once institutionalised and heavily funded, 
and once imbued with a sense of mission and mass commitment, 
programs take on lives of their own and subsequent hard data 
on program effectiveness are welcomed only if the news is good.29
Yet, we have better, evidence-based policy instruments already: 
school-wide interventions that promote school engagement and 
positive connections between staff and students, and reduce 
disaffection have been found to be effective in reducing overall levels 
of substance use and supporting students’ development and well-
being.30 These health-promotion approaches, which focus on ensuring 
that schools are safe, trusted, and inclusive social environments and 
also recognize and promote the rights of the child to privacy (Article 
16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child) to education (Article 
28), and to health (Article 24) should be prioritized. These, rather 
than new surveillance and control technologies, are more “appropriate 
measures” (Article 33) to protect children from drugs.
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15. “I’ve Been Waiting for This My Whole 
Life”: Life Transitions and Heroin Use
by Jovana Arsenijevic and Andjelka Nikolic
Introduction
One of the most significant aspects of drug abuse is that it affects the 
most vulnerable of demographics, namely, youth. The transition from 
adolescence to adulthood is a crucial period, during which a person is 
most likely to begin experimenting with drugs. Drug use can strongly 
affect young people who start searching for their own identity and 
a sense of independence. This age group is more prone to several 
issues that make them more susceptible to drug use. Curiosity and 
the search for new experiences, peer pressure, resistance to authority, 
low self-esteem, and problems with forming and maintaining positive 
interpersonal relationships can all be factors that make young people 
more vulnerable to drug use and dependence. Furthermore, drugs 
can be used as a strategy to deal with problems that include neglect, 
unemployment, violence, sexual abuse, and shell shock.
Various research data confirm that drug use is more common 
among the populations of youth living in vulnerable conditions (such 
as families with low socioeconomic status, large families, households 
with conflict and violence, alcoholism, etc.).1 This group needs support 
and encouragement for the development of individual capacities. At 
the same time, drug use is also present among socially integrated 
young people. This is partially caused by the fact that many young 
people grow up under the influence of pop culture, which has a 
tolerant attitude toward drug use. Growing up under this influence 
is becoming even more risky in combination with a lack of knowledge 
about the risks and consequences of this lifestyle. Moreover, there 
are indicators that first experiments with drugs and the initiation 
of young people into injecting practices is happening at earlier ages 
than was previously the case.2 Considering the developmental and 
psychosocial characteristics of youth, they have less ability to assess 
the risks and possible consequences of this behavior. Therefore, the 
development of individual mechanisms for resolving these issues is 
extremely important.
According to life-course theory, life trajectories are intersected by 
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various transitions that can affect the period of growing up—either 
in an affirmative way by helping us find constructive solutions to 
our future problems or in a negative way by causing stagnation or 
regression in the development of our personality. Our study presents 
the main aspects of transitions that take place in childhood or early 
adolescence and that can affect the lives of adult heroin users. 
Using descriptive analysis of eight life stories, we focus on the first 
memories from early childhood, family environment, peer relations, 
the beginning of sexual development and first sexual intercourse, the 
first encounter with psychoactive substances, and age at the time of 
first use of heroin. Most of the eight people on whom we focus also had 
experiences of war.
These life stories differ in many ways: from the environment in 
which childhood was spent, to the beginning of involvement with 
subcultural groups, to first experiences of love and sexual intercourse, 
and the first use of psychoactive substances. A particular factor, 
however, the introduction to heroin, is stable in all eight regardless 
of age differences among participants. The only variant involves the 
first encounter with heroin, which, nonetheless, is almost always 
connected to late adolescence.
The stations along the trip to the final destination—the world of 
heroin—are the main subject of this chapter. Following the tracks 
that led us there, we were told many stories that all ended in a similar 
sentiment, exemplified in the following quote:
I have only one girl, I make love to her every day. It’s heroin. The 
risk is too great, the price you have to pay is too high for a little 
satisfaction that lasts an hour or two.
Characteristics	of	Young	Injecting	Drug	Users
In order to better understand the characteristic behavior of this 
demographic we studied forty-one injecting drug users, of which 
thirty-four were male and seven female. Through the Get Connected! 
project run by the nongovernmental organization Veza, in Serbia, 
which targets young injecting drug users aged fifteen to twenty-
one, an initial questionnaire was used to collect information on the 
characteristics of our clients. The average age was just over seventeen 
(17.66). The age at the initial ingestion of any psychoactive substance, 
regardless of gender, was twelve (12.21), while the average age of first 
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use of heroin by injection was, again, just over seventeen (17.59) for 
thirty-four participants. At the time of the study, all of the participants 
were heroin users.
Just under a third of participants (31.71 percent) had used some form 
of psychoactive substance between the ages of nine and twelve, while 
over two-thirds (68.29 percent) had used some form of psychoactive 
substance between the ages of thirteen and seventeen. This implies 
a particularly young age of first usage of these substances. The 
majority of participants had their first experience with a psychoactive 
substance through marijuana (78.05 percent), followed by glue (12.19 
percent), and heroin (12.10). Considering the more prevalent use of 
amphetamines in the club scene, however, this short survey does not 
accurately depict their usage.3
From the data gathered, the earliest case of heroin use was at 
age eleven. Day-to-day work with injecting drug users led us to 
the conclusion that individuals among the Roma population are 
most likely to begin using heroin at younger ages. In the general 
population, young people rarely, if ever, have their first experience 
with drugs through heroin—in most cases it is marijuana. On the 
other hand, the majority of young people from the Roma population 
are not directed toward any particular substance; rather, they begin 
experimenting with whatever they are most likely to encounter in 
their community. In the past, this was glue, but today heroin is 
becoming more prevalent. Upon inquiring into their family life, we 
concluded that the majority of participants live with their primary 
family (68.29 percent) and a considerably smaller proportion (9.57 
percent) with their secondary family, defined as family gained by 
marriage. Some of those studied (7.32 percent) lived under conditions 
that substitute for a primary family, defined as any type of foster 
care. Considering the age and size of the data sample, the proportion 
of young people who are living on their own is significant at 14.63 
percent.
In another study that took place at Veza, the social and health 
status of participants as well as their experiences with police 
were investigated. The sample size was fifty-seven participants, of 
whom forty-five were male, eleven female, and one who identified 
as transgender. One important topic that was investigated was the 
degree of education achieved, and why no higher education was 
pursued. Seven categories can be created from the responses received, 
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one of which includes the percentage of participants who completed a 
form of higher education. The variance between categories is shown 
in Table 1.
Table 1.	Reasons	for	Lack	of	Higher	Education/Achievement	of	Higher	Education
Category	 %
Problems	in	school	and	lack	of	motivation	 27.6
Beginning	drug	use	 13.8
Joining	the	workforce	 17.2
War	period,	sanctions,	and	bombing	 6.9
Family	problems	 19.0
Other	transitions	in	life	 10.3
Have	completed	a	higher	education	 5.2
These data imply that regular schooling most often ceased due to 
problems in school and a lack of motivation. Second in significance was 
family problems followed by joining the workforce, which participants 
attributed to a poor economic situation within the family (this makes 
it worth debating whether or not to include this factor within the 
“family problems” category or to separate it out). Drug use was the 
fourth most likely reason.4
Life	Trajectories	of	Eight	Injecting	Heroin	Users
Following on from this snapshot of the characteristics of the relevant 
demographic, by using the case study method, we have mapped the 
life trajectories of eight individuals who told us their life stories—
six male, two female. The ages of the interviewees today vary from 
twenty-five to thirty-two, and one who is now forty-two. To introduce 
these life stories, Table 2 compares the socioeconomic status of the 
participants while they were still living in the primary family and 
that in their later lives when they were living independently. The 
table shows a clear decline for most.
 Table 2. Socioeconomic	Status	of	Interviewees	While	Living	with	the	Family	and	
Living	Independently
Socioeconomic	status	 Life	in	primary	family	 Independent	living
High	socioeconomic	status	 2	 1
Middle	socioeconomic	status	 5	 2
Low	socioeconomic	status	 1	 5
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In order to understand the differences shown in Table 2, it is 
important to consider that only two of the participants were currently 
employed, three were homeless, two were sex workers, and three were 
involved in acquisitive crime to support themselves financially. The 
decline in socioeconomic status happens parallel to heroin use, mostly 
because of family rejection and unemployment.
First	Memories
Each interview began with an inquiry into the participant’s first 
memory. However, the first memory of most of those we interviewed 
was deeply repressed and unavailable for interpretation. As far as 
first memories go, family relations were often mentioned, or some 
knowledge the interviewee gained while growing up. This did not 
actually have to be a real memory, but information they considered to 
be memories diluted by the experiences of others, or other experiences 
and emotions that they had come to associate with a particular story. 
The answers indicated some degree of understanding that they simply 
could not remember events from their early childhood. The following 
is the only story focusing on early memories.
I remember a series of memories, a series . . . Very nice ones. My 
favourite is when I come home wet, it’s snowing outside, I lean on 
the radiator and watch cartoon movies. . . . That was Sundays at 
the time. 
Family
Family descriptions and the relations within each of these 
microsystems5 showed a lot of variance. In six of the eight cases, 
parents divorced during the participant’s childhood. Complete 
cessation of relations with the father was present in five cases. The 
reasons for divorce were heterogeneous and were accompanied by 
new lives for the parents, leaving the children in a shadow of neglect.
Family descriptions were particularly confusing, leaving room for 
the interpretation that the individuals themselves were not completely 
clear on when their family situation transformed with the introduction 
of a stepfather, grandparents, or foster parents as caregivers. Their 
adaptation to this new situation was not complete, and several years 
down the line they tried to contact their biological parents.
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Through two stories we found instances of attempted sexual abuse by 
stepfathers, and one case of rape by a biological father. The individual 
was fourteen years old at the time.
The remaining three recollections told the story of functional family 
relations. One of these included a foster father, but the story indicated 
a history of caring and acceptance. In all but two cases, maternal 
relations were unstable. Often, the mother had a passive role in the 
family, aiming toward a life that discontinued the primary instinct 
of protecting a child. It is important to note that these women were 
themselves the victims of abuse within the family, in multiethnic 
marriages, and it is obvious that they could not conquer their own 
trauma, which prevented them from dedicating themselves to their 
children.
The following excerpts exemplify some of the participants’ 
experiences:
I have a mother . . . I have a mom, no dad. Dad’s not there, I’ve 
never seen him. I’d better never see him or hear from him ever.
When I was little I had a good time, I didn’t have any brothers 
or sisters. Only a mom and dad. They didn’t really argue when I 
was young, but they got divorced when I was in the eighth grade. 
They killed my old man after the war. They killed my father. They 
killed him over money.
I haven’t lived with my mom or dad, I am the child of divorced 
parents, they left me when I was six months old. Because my mom 
is Muslim and my dad Serbian. I grew up with my grandparents, 
they put me through school. My mom and stepfather lived 
separately from us, I couldn’t live with my stepfather . . . when I 
came to their house before my brother was born, . . . I mentioned 
I was going to change my clothes, he opens the door, you know, 
and “Oh, I didn’t know you were there.” And that’s how it was for 
a while . . . then I stopped coming. 
The absence of an open conversation with my father left its mark, 
which will influence my future psychological development. When 
I confront him, his reaction was like, go on back to bed, something 
like that as far as I remember. Anyways, I was just shrugged off. 
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Peer	Relations
There were significant gender differences when it came to 
relationships with people in their own age group. Two of the individuals 
interviewed were female. They described relationships with their 
peers as meager at best, mentioning that they had one female friend, 
if any. The role of friends to them was particularly significant; it was 
their only way of compensating for the emotional deficit caused by 
a lack of communication with their families, especially with their 
mothers.
Male subjects, on the other hand, mentioned that their friends 
belonged to both a subculture and the mainstream population. We 
found different explanations for belonging to a subculture. There was 
the aspect of revolt, belonging to the group due to issues of identity, or 
simply due to an attraction to the activities of the group. It is evident 
that membership in these groups lasts for an extended period of time, 
further alienating them from the rest of their peers. An extreme case 
of this was being friends with children within an orphanage, where 
the ability to choose with whom you spend your life is gone.
With initiation into drug use, the circle of friends narrowed 
significantly for those interviewed. From then on, their friends were 
almost exclusively drug users:
Parallel groups of friends, that I spent time with, that I met up 
with, well when I started doing drugs more, I started spending 
less and less time with the people that weren’t a part of that world 
and that’s normal, every idiot knows that. 
First	Love
Stories about first love were told with a different expression and 
a small smile, even after years had gone by. Regardless of whether 
their relationships with these people were long or short, it is obvious 
that they left a very meaningful impression. First experiences with 
love happened between the ages of fourteen and twenty. This was also 
the time of initiation into sexual relations. We consider it significant 
that four of the individuals had an experience with heroin not far 
from, or as part of experiencing love for the first time. In addition, 
two individuals are homosexual, and their first partners were of the 
same sex.
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I got married right before the war, somewhere over there, more or 
less near the end of 1988. To my English teacher. Nine years older 
than me. I got high with her before we hooked up. It was really 
simple, drug addicts recognize each other, always.
I fell in love with him and though he wouldn’t give it [heroin] 
to me, I asked him for it. He said no. Once I tried snorting it, I 
jacked my guts out. I didn’t like it the first time . . . I never said 
that he got me hooked. I wanted to try it because I’m an idiot. You 
know what I said? If you’re gonna kill yourself [by using heroin], 
I’ll kill myself too.
He was a dealer. In order to spend time with him, I bought heroin 
and threw it away. 
War
All of the subjects were of different ages but despite this their 
life trajectories all included war. Whether during the time that the 
former Yugoslavia split up or when NATO bombed Serbia in 1999, 
by telling their life stories it was inevitable that they all included 
at least one segment of war stories. Other than the stress that was 
caused by a constant state of danger and a lack of public services 
such as a police force, war exacerbated many problems, particularly 
within already weakly integrated and noncohesive families. This was 
more influential with multiethnic families and families living under 
multiethnic conditions. War also brought about decreased control 
within each individual state, and with it a decrease in societal care for 
young people and family care for children, and more readily available 
weapons, drugs, and opportunities to commit crime.
Four characteristic examples of wartime experiences are presented. 
The first concerns a part of the former Yugoslavia that was only 
indirectly affected by the war, while the next three involve territories 
that were more directly affected.
Her brother Fuad, me and Fudo were lying down and watching 
the news. It felt like it was still Yugoslavia. The speakers were 
Senad Erzefejdzovic, Ljubomir Ljubovic, Ivica Puric. So three 
nations, multiethnic. And then an argument broke out. Like Mr. 
President stop your green berettas. Karadjic said, why don’t you 
stop the Chetniks, let him stop that, then Mr. President. . . . And I 
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see clearly how the war’s starting, I can hear the shooting outside. 
And we’re inside, lying down and listening to the war start . . . 
What comes after the war, what then, what . . . Nobody’s talking, 
it’s awkward for everybody . . . What you did to them here, what 
you did to them there.
A mountain. Night, the moon makes it as bright as daytime. 
You can see the deer running. . . . Two girls tried to escape from 
Bulgaria, they have light border control there. They shot at those 
two girls like it was a battle at Neretva, you know, they killed 
the two girls, who weren’t to blame for anything. You should be 
ashamed, how are you not ashamed?
Then in 1995 I went to Kosovo. Why did I decide to? Drugs. And 
it’s all the same to me, I ride my bike at 3:30 a.m. as the sun is 
coming up. There’s a guy with a broken knee, this guy with no 
hands, with no legs, I’m riding around on my bicycle . . . All the 
drugstores are mine, all the morphine you want. And I’m cruising 
on my bicycle, on drugs and having a good time. You come into 
whatever house you want and take their drinks, take whatever 
you want, what do you care? People are running away. I don’t 
care. Up ahead these guys are burning Albanian houses, those 
guys are burning Serbian houses, burning this, burning that . . . 
I don’t care. ’Cause I’ve already seen it twice, I saw it in Croatia, 
I saw it in Bosnia and it’s all normal to me, I know what’s going 
on, I know what’s going to happen.
So I was in Tuzla during the war, for a while, the first two years, 
then I was in Sarajevo for a year and that’s how I caught shrapnel 
a couple times, I was injured in the legs twice. 
Initiation	into	Drug	Use
The first contact with drugs happened for the participants between 
the ages of thirteen and twenty, but most at about age sixteen. This 
corresponds to the survey described above. Glue, marijuana, and 
prescription medication were listed as the first drugs they came into 
contact with. Only one girl did not pave her way to heroin with other 
drugs. Heroin was her primary choice.
Among the male participants, introduction into the heroin scene on 
average happened at about seventeen years of age, and within their 
214	 children of the drug War
peer group, again corresponding to the survey above. Both females 
who were interviewed were initiated into heroin use through young 
men with whom they were romantically involved. The use of heroin 
significantly affected their life, narrowing the friends in their social 
circle, and eventually completely ending relations with their family 
and pushing them toward criminality.
First experiences with heroin use were sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative, but in any case did not inhibit future use. The 
participants’ whole world quickly narrowed and became concentrated 
on heroin and how to acquire money to obtain it. Attempts at 
abstinence and recovery were short-lived. A lack of motivation or the 
inability to perceive their lives without heroin influenced long years 
of use. Among the eight interviewed, only one had achieved long-term 
abstinence (four years, following seven years of heroin addiction). He 
was then employed, and had a family and a very active social life.
I remember that first time, of course. I thought, I’ve been waiting 
for this my whole life. I dreamed of this a long time ago, I’ve been 
waiting for this my whole life.
I remember the first time I saw it (heroin). I remember the stench 
of death, I’d call it like that. I remember the physical experience . 
. . when he opened the package, I simply felt something . . . It was 
a thrill. Djole was like: “Did you feel it?” “What was it?” It was 
the stench of death. 
No one is perfect enough not to get hooked on heroin. There is 
no perfect person that can resist getting hooked on heroin. It can 
literally find something that is bugging anyone, something that 
makes any person feel great, something with which anyone could 
be bought. You will be bought very fast. At the moment you are 
not aware of what is happening, you are not aware that you sold 
yourself. You sometimes think about it, when you feel withdrawal 
symptoms, but you finally become aware of it when you stop using 
it and when some time passes.
As soon as you get caught in a circuit with the devil (heroin), 
strange things start happening. You decide to stop using it, you 
go to the seaside, where you don’t know anyone and it shows up 
the next day. Some incredible guy appears, or dealer calls to bring 
you some. You don’t have a chance. It is always going to find you.
First you start to compromise with yourself. You say ok, I’ll do it 
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once a month. Then you do it twice a month, then every weekend 
and the next second, you are taking it every day. 
Criminality
A wide spectrum of reported criminality could not be completely 
attributed to heroin. A fair amount happened before the first use 
of heroin. Examples included smuggling cigarettes, committing 
robberies with underage gangs, violent behavior, selling psychoactive 
substances, and prostitution. In one very extreme case a murder 
was committed (explained further below). Motives for such criminal 
acts included gaining material possessions, rebelling against one’s 
social circle, and lack of acceptance of sexual orientation. Heroin 
use, however, completely changed the motives for criminality with 
participants moving between two points—gaining the money for 
heroin and using it. Crimes specifically attributed to heroin use were 
robberies and prostitution.
At seventeen years old I had my first robbery. I did it with a sort of 
bomb, so they didn’t want to run after me, to grab me by the arm, 
instead they shot at me. Then I realized you really shouldn’t do 
that ’cause you can end up losing your head.
I stole and I took, that’s how I supported myself. At eighteen years 
old, in my second robbery we stole 16 million dinars. They quickly 
arrested us. In jail I befriended a guy from some gang, he died in 
my arms. He died from heroin. 
The following example refers to the murder noted above. The 
person involved was in a romantic homosexual relationship with 
the victim. The victim insisted that this individual had to accept his 
sexual orientation and “come out of the closet” so they could reveal 
their relationship in public. He rejected this but continued seeing the 
victim as well as his official girlfriend in their social circle. He defined 
their relationship as loving and full of common interests. The love he 
was talking about, however, turned into possessiveness and obsessive 
persecution.
I took a cable and strangled him . . . I sat there beside him, I don’t 
know, a certain amount of time, five minutes, ten, fifteen minutes, 
I don’t know how long I sat there beside him. So I sat with him 
without being bothered . . . I felt casual. Without any emotions, 
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absolutely none. He never protected himself, not this time either. 
. . . Before that he told me that he loved me. I looked him in the 
eyes when I strangled him. 
While he was telling this part of the story, he was expressing 
certain forms of sociopathic behavior: manipulating and redirecting 
the conversation, shifting all blame onto the victim, and not showing 
emotions. He did not seem agitated. It is important to stress that this 
is a unique and extreme case. It is included here to give a full view of 
the experiences that the interviews uncovered.
Conclusion
There is no universal explanation for addiction to heroin. The reason 
lies in a complex range of factors that influence the development of 
one’s addiction. On the other hand, there are number of factors that 
come up in the life stories of most users.
In order to understand the lack of the first memories, we tried 
to find a connection between heroin use and memory deficiency. 
Heroin is a substance that causes memory deficiency, causing 
certain information to be inaccessible.6 Merely applying any findings 
regarding the effects of heroin on brain activity, however, would be 
inadequate in this case. The unavailability of first memories can also 
be caused by various influences such as powerful systematic defenses 
including suppression, or the use of other psychoactive substances. 
As was previously shown, only one individual interviewed had 
particularly vivid early memories. This individual had spent his 
childhood in a functional family, so the aforementioned memories 
were associated with strong emotions.
Even though there are discrepancies regarding the influence of 
the family setting on boys and girls during the periods of childhood 
and adolescence, the general conclusion is that children from 
single-parent homes, as with step-parent families, show lower self-
esteem and more symptoms of loneliness and anxiety, as well as 
other dysfunctional behavior on the social and psychological levels.7 
Parents’ lack of attachment and their nonresponsiveness to the needs 
of a child are risk factors that, depending on other factors, can have 
differing effects. As we found through the stories of these individuals, 
a need to develop parental attachment existed for many years, and 
therefore, as adults, the participants yearned to compensate for this 
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missed period and to come to terms with their own emotional injury 
during their childhood.
The strategic process of selecting peers is based on certain 
attributes, such as similar interests, personal skills, attitudes, and 
behavioral predispositions.8 Initiation into drug use happened within 
peer groups for all the males interviewed. For the females it was 
through an intimate relationship. During adolescence, young women 
are more prone to forming intimate relationships with their peers 
than young men are. In the absence of peer attachment, the potential 
for emotional investment emerges with first love. As with boys, drug 
use was seen as an accepted norm.
Regarding the social context in which these interactions take place, 
affiliation with a subculture was manifested in persistent clashes with 
accepted norms. The social context and the norms changed during 
the war. A system of values formed in these conditions, allowing for 
involvement in illegal activity, which in turn became “normal” and 
socially accepted. A wide spectrum of criminality is not exclusively 
tied to heroin use and may also be seen as the product of accepting 
this system of values during the period of war.
In society, drug users are, for the most part, represented as weak, 
with no moral values, rebellious, and incapable of fitting in. On the 
other hand, it is expected that these “weak” and “bad” people should 
change and become useful members of society. Ignoring the risk 
factors that influence personality development, as well as the lack 
of acceptance of heroin addiction as an illness, puts all of the blame 
on the individual. Heroin addiction is often differentiated from other 
illnesses in that the individual is seen as “choosing” to become ill. 
From this, it follows that it is up to you to decide whether or not you 
will be “cured.”
Considering the life stories above and the multitude of factors 
involved, the question that arises is whether there is enough 
understanding and support from the family and wider social 
environment to assist those who decide to seek help. Based on 
previous experience, in most cases, such support is either unavailable 
or fictitious. As much as the user’s personality may be “weak” and 
unable to fight against addiction, the personalities of people in the 
user’s closer and wider social context are just as weak and unable to 
accept the stigma that their child, sibling, partner, or friend carries. 
Conservative views and the ignorance of society in Serbia are the main 
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causes of intolerance toward drug users. The question that needs to 
be answered is whether heroin, as a substance, is so addictive that 
it makes dependence almost incurable, or the reaction of our social 
environment makes it seem that way. This is reflected in a common 
phrase used in Serbia: Once a junkie, always a junkie.
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16. Why Should Children Suffer? 
Children’s Palliative Care and Pain 
Management
by Joan Marston
There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way 
in which it treats its children.
 Nelson Mandela1
Introduction
Children’s palliative care is a professional and compassionate response 
to suffering caused by life-limiting or life-threatening conditions. It 
is a combination of excellent assessment of the child’s body, mind, 
and spirit; management of pain and other distressing symptoms; 
and emotional, developmental, spiritual, and social support of the 
child and the family that continues into the bereavement period. 
Many of these children, with conditions such as cancer, AIDS, 
neurological conditions, genetic anomalies, metabolic conditions, 
severe disabilities, organ failure, and neonatal conditions, experience 
pain throughout the course of the disease, and often more severely 
toward the end of life.
Children cannot make pain an existential issue or understand the 
cause and effect of why they are experiencing it. When a child has 
pain, that is his or her whole world, and there is no understanding, 
just a desire to be comforted and pain free. They also cannot advocate 
for themselves and need a compassionate community to see their pain 
and feel outrage at their neglect. Older children may have the courage 
and the opportunity to speak on their own behalf, but what of the 
neonate, the infant, and the young child?
Palliative care is an answer to childhood pain. It is not just end-of-life 
care, or care when “nothing more can be done,” but should be available 
from the time of diagnosis of any life-limiting or life-threatening 
condition, and can be given alongside potentially curative treatment. 
Treatment of pain is an essential element of palliative care, and access 
to medicines for this is crucial. Chronic pain is common in cancer and 
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in AIDS. Research has shown that between 60 percent and 90 percent 
of people with advanced cancer will experience moderate to severe 
pain,2 as will about 80 percent of people with advanced AIDS.3 While 
there are at present no similar studies that involve only children, we 
assume that the percentage of children with pain would be similar to 
that of adults. While they have many elements in common, however, 
the World Health Organization recognizes palliative care for children 
as different from that for adults.4
The special vulnerabilities of children, their right to health and 
freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment are recognized 
worldwide, as children are born into a world where most countries 
have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; where 
the world is striving to reach the Millennium Development Goals, a 
number of which influence the health and development of the child; 
where the UN and strong international partners have a Global 
Strategy for Newborn, Maternal and Child Health;5 and where most 
countries have special laws and policies protecting children and 
their rights. But in almost every part of the world, children continue 
to suffer with life-limiting conditions and untreated moderate to 
severe pain. This chapter provides a brief overview of the global 
state of child palliative care before considering the many barriers 
to improving access to controlled medicines for pain treatment, 
including the impact of overly restrictive or burdensome narcotics 
laws. It goes on to highlight the human rights case for addressing 
this issue, and sets out a series of recommendations necessary to 
ensure that children in pain have the chance of being free from 
unnecessary suffering.
The	Global	State	of	Child	Palliative	Care
The good news is that most pain can be controlled with relatively 
simple-to-prescribe and inexpensive drugs, all of which are on the 
World Health Organization’s Model Formulary for Children (2010) 
and updated Essential Medicines for Children (2010).6 The WHO 
Pain Ladder has been used as the universal guide to the management 
of pain, and has three steps that are followed as the pain increases.7 
At each step of the ladder, adjuvant drugs (drugs that enhance the 
effect of opioids and other analgesics) can be given alongside the pain-
relieving medication.
Part 4: Justification 	 221
Step 1  is nonopioids such as paracetamol and nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory medicines.
Step 2 is weak opioids such as codeine and tramadol.
Step 3 is strong opioids such as morphine.
All of these drugs are relatively inexpensive and easy to use. The 
WHO Ladder has been shown to be effective in widely different parts 
of the world,8 but it cannot be implemented when any of the steps are 
missing because there are no medicines for that step.
The bad news is that child palliative care is severely underdeveloped 
worldwide. An as yet unpublished research project by Caprice Knapp 
of the University of Florida, Michael Wright of the International 
Observatory for End-of Life Care in Lancaster, England, and the 
Scientific Committee of the International Children’s Palliative Care 
Network (ICPCN), carried out in 2010, indicates that, at present 
pediatric palliative care development in countries can be assessed at 
one of four levels:
Level 1 No known hospice or palliative care activity for 
children;
Level 2 Some capacity-building activity;
Level 3  Localized pediatric hospice and palliative care 
provision with some access to morphine and other 
palliative care drugs;
Level 4  Reaching a level of integration with mainstream 
health providers, with access to morphine and other 
palliative care drugs.9
Of the 192 member states of the United Nations, the researchers 
found that 66 percent were at Level 1; 18 percent were at Level 
2; 10  percent at Level 3 and a mere 6  percent were at Level 4. 
Only in 16 percent of the world’s countries would children have 
any chance of receiving palliative care that could include access to 
pain relief.
Europe has the best spread of palliative care programs for children, 
with 27.9 percent of countries at Level 3 and 11.6 percent at Level 
4. Oceania has the highest percentage of countries at level 4 with 
14.3  percent, but has no countries at Levels 2 and 3, and 85 percent 
at Level 1. Africa, with the highest burden of disease and 2 million 
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children infected with HIV, has only one country at Level 4, South 
Africa, and 83 percent of countries at Level 1.
The United Kingdom is probably the most successful country in the 
world in implementing palliative care for children. The first children’s 
hospice, Helen House, was started in 1982 by Sister Frances Dominica, 
in Oxford, and the movement has since spread across the country. The 
UK has two national associations working closely together and very 
effectively to promote children’s palliative care—the Association for 
Children’s Palliative Care ACT and Children’s Hospice UK. Government 
has supported the movement and committed relatively large sums 
of funding, providing some funding to children’s hospices each year. 
Pediatric palliative care as a discipline and as a speciality has been 
taught at Cardiff University and Great Ormond Street with University 
College London for many years. The first True Colours Chair of Palliative 
Care for Children and Young people was established in London in 
2009; and the community in the UK is very supportive of the children’s 
hospices. Children’s hospices are places where children receive high-
quality palliative care and respite, in beautiful child- and youth-friendly 
environments with wonderful activities and well-trained and qualified 
staff and volunteers.
Scotland has an excellent model of a countrywide, well-managed 
children’s hospice movement: Children’s Hospice of Scotland, or 
CHAS, as it is fondly known. CHAS carried out a national survey 
to identify the number of children needing palliative care in 2002, 
assessed the requirements to care for these children, and built two 
beautiful units (Rachel House and Robin House) to provide respite 
and end-of-life care for them. Both houses have outreach teams 
working in the community, and there is a home-care team working in 
the north of the country.
But it is not just rich nations where such positive developments 
have taken place. Belarus has a national network of branches of 
the Belarusian Children’s Hospice. Uniquely, in this country, the 
children’s hospice movement was responsible for developing the adult 
hospice movement. Poland also has an extensive network of children’s 
hospice services throughout the country and a strong chaplaincy 
program. South Africa has expanded the number of children’s 
palliative care programs from six in 2007 to 62 in 2010 thanks to the 
vision of the Hospice Palliative Care Association of South Africa to 
implement a pediatric portfolio with a national manager; the support 
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of international donors; and the acceptance of the importance of 
palliative care programs for children by the member hospices.
And yet, with all that, many children are still not receiving 
palliative care. Why are there still barriers when, clearly, so much 
has been achieved?
“Mind the Gap!”
If you have traveled on the London Underground, you will have 
heard the voice over the loudspeakers continually warning commuters 
to “mind the gap” between the train and the platform. In the children’s 
palliative care community we are aware of the gap in development 
between adult and pediatric palliative care. St. Christopher’s Hospice 
in London, the first modern hospice for adults, was established in 
1967, while Helen House, the first children’s hospice was opened in 
1982—a fifteen-year gap that we are working to close. Indeed, it must 
be closed if we believe that children have the same right as adults to 
good palliative care.
When the development of children’s palliative care was compared 
with the development of (mainly adult) palliative care in the world as 
assessed by the International Observatory for End-of-Life Care, the 
disparity was highlighted:10
Level	 Observatory	 Pediatric
1	 33%	 66%
2	 18%	 18%
3	 34%	 10%
4	 15%	 		6%
Even in the palliative care world, a world known for its compassion 
and commitment to the relief of suffering, children have been neglected
In the WHO publication Achieving Balance in Opioid Control 
Policy, it states that “Most, if not all, pain due to cancer could be 
relieved if we implemented existing knowledge and treatments. . . 
. There is a treatment gap: it is the difference between what can be 
done, and what is done about cancer pain.”11 This statement could 
equally refer to all chronic pain in children. The treatment gap—
the difference between what is and what should be in the treatment 
of pain in children—can take many forms. When countries do not 
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accurately assess the level of need, and order stock accordingly, there 
will be a gap in provision for pain management and the danger of too 
little stock to treat pain. When countries provide stock only to one 
or very few hospitals in the country as in Cameroon and Tanzania, 
patients living far from those centers will have an unacceptable gap 
between pain being diagnosed and pain being treated. When there 
is no effective supply chain there will be a gap between procurement 
and supply. And when pain medications are available only at limited 
sites in a country and families need to travel great distances to obtain 
the prescribed medicine, there will be significant gaps in accessibility.
So how do we close the treatment gap and go on to ensure access to 
all children in need?
Barriers	to	the	Provision	of	Palliative	Care	and	Pain	Management
To make palliative care work, a range of complex components are 
required simultaneously:
• Access to opioids and palliative care drugs.
• International and national laws and policies that support 
access to these medicines.
• Government support for palliative care.
• National Association that supports pediatric palliative care.
• Training courses for professionals, caregivers and families.
• Donor support.
• Model children’s palliative care programs for training and 
mentorship.
• A national advocacy strategy.
• Hospice and palliative care organizations that include 
children’s palliative care.
With all of these components in place, a child has a chance of 
receiving palliative care and having chronic pain managed. But 
considerable barriers block the way. They are legion and operate at 
the local, national, and international levels:
• Intergovernmental forums for drug policy discussions that 
have neglected access to controlled essential medicines.
• Governments that do not recognize the need for palliative 
care and opioid availability to treat pain, and that see 
palliative care as an unaffordable luxury, not an essential 
part of the health-care system.
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• Lack of health policies that include palliative care.
• Health systems that do not include palliative care.
• Failure of governments to order sufficient opioids to meet the 
need in the country.
• Failure of supply chains for opioids.
• Failure to take seriously international legal obligations to 
ensure access to medicines.
• Overly restrictive narcotics laws and regulations.
• Failure of health-care professionals to prescribe opioids, or 
underprescribing of opioid dosages.
• Training of undergraduate health-care professionals that 
does not include palliative care and has little content on pain 
management.
• Health professionals who have not received any training in 
palliative care and pain management and still have fears 
concerning the use of opioids, addiction, and respiratory 
suppression.
• Community members who retain fears of using opioids and 
equate the use of morphine with death.
• Beliefs that neonates and babies do not feel pain.
• Traditional health practitioners who use traditional 
medicines and block the use of opioids.
• Social barriers that prevent children from accessing 
palliative care and pain relief, such as poverty, orphanhood, 
homelessness, and vulnerable caregivers such as the elderly 
or youth.
• Traditional adult-focused palliative care practitioners who do 
not recognize the different palliative care needs of children, 
or are not trained to provide palliative care to children.
• National palliative care associations that do not ensure that 
children receive the same attention as adults.
We need to identify and fully understand these and other barriers 
that prevent children from receiving the care they require before we 
can move forward. But many cannot see the need, or understand the 
human effects of the word “pain.” The issues above seem clinical and 
legalistic when read in isolation. It is therefore vitally important to 
illustrate the importance to children of surmounting these obstacles.
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A	Tale	of	Two	Children	(and	Two	Countries)
Bongani’s12	story	in	Bloemfontein,	South	Africa
Bloemfontein is the judicial capital of South Africa, situated in 
the center of the country in the Free State province. It is home to 
one of South Africa’s few children’s hospices, St. Nicholas Children’s 
Hospice, which has a children’s in-patient unit, Sunflower House, and 
a large home-based care outreach program.
South Africa’s consumption of opioids is below the world mean 
but is still the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.13 Morphine and all 
basic palliative care drugs are on the Essential Medicines List 
for the country.14 South Africa has training programs for doctors, 
nurses, social workers, and spiritual care workers in palliative 
care and, more recently, pediatric palliative care. While there is 
as yet no adopted national policy on palliative care, a policy has 
been developed, and the government sits together with a number 
of national organizations on a National Alliance for Access to 
Palliative Care.
Meet Bongani—she is nine years old, diagnosed HIV positive 
when she was five and presented with severe pain in both feet and in 
parts of both hands when she was eight. Bongani was one of the 14.1 
million children orphaned by AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, and cared 
for by her elderly grandmother who first took Bongani to a traditional 
healer who was unable to manage her pain.
When Bongani came to the district hospital she was in severe pain, 
and both feet, two fingers on her right hand, and three on her left 
hand, were cold and blue. She was diagnosed with a rare circulatory 
problem in her extremities, and with advanced HIV disease. Bongani 
was seen by a medical doctor who was trained in pediatric palliative 
care and who was also the medical director of St. Nicholas Children’s 
Hospice and Sunflower House, where Bongani was admitted for pain 
management and palliative care. Cared for by a multiprofessional 
team trained in pediatric palliative care, Bongani was started on 
antiretroviral therapy, oral morphine and other palliative care drugs, 
and other nonpharmacological interventions such as play therapy 
and massage. Bongani’s pain was well-controlled and she was able to 
play with the other children and even go out for special treats.
However, the hands and feet did not improve and Bongani needed 
an amputation of half of both feet, and the affected fingers of both 
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hands. She was supported throughout the time in the hospital, and 
the palliative care team ensured that she continued on her morphine 
and had adequate pain control. Her grandmother was kept informed 
of her progress and brought in to visit her granddaughter.
Bongani lived for two months after the amputations, played 
happily with her friends until the day she died, and died peacefully 
in Sunflower House, without pain, and with her grandmother and the 
hospice chaplain next to her. Before she died she spoke openly to the 
chaplain of her mother and her wish to be with her, and said that she 
did not fear dying.
Where opioids are available and on the Essential Medicines List 
and this is linked to a pediatric palliative care team whose members 
understand the correct use of opioids, with a doctor trained in pediatric 
palliative care, a child’s pain and suffering can be effectively relieved 
and that child can enjoy and participate in life. But all elements need 
to be present for this to succeed. Having opioids without staff trained 
to use them correctly, or having trained staff without access to opioids 
will leave children in pain.
Michael’s	Story	in	Kisumu,	Kenya
Michael15 is eight years old, orphaned by AIDS, and living with 
his elderly aunt in Kisumu. He has sickle cell anemia, a life-limiting 
blood disorder characterized by episodes of severe pain.
The over-the-counter pain medicines that his aunt buys for him are 
not strong enough to relieve the pain. This causes him to lose out on 
schooling and he is not able to play with his friends. Michael says the 
pain makes him unhappy and at times he wishes he could die to get 
away from it. Michael is suffering in his body, mind, and spirit. Good 
pediatric palliative care with access to oral morphine to control his pain 
would give Michael back his childhood and improve his quality of life.
Kenya is a country with morphine on its Essential Medicines List16 
and a strong national palliative care association, the Kenyan Hospice 
and Palliative Care Association, which has made big strides in the 
development of palliative care in the country. Unfortunately, as with 
many countries in the world, government policies actually block 
access to morphine for pain management. According to a recent report 
by Human Rights Watch,
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the Kenyan government has erected legal and regulatory barriers 
to using morphine to treat severe pain. The Kenyan narcotics law 
focuses on the illegal uses of morphine and other opioids and 
makes illicit possession punishable by life imprisonment and a 
heavy fine. There are exceptions for medical use, but no detailed 
guidelines about lawful possession by patients and health care 
workers. . . . Consequently, the medicine is unavailable at the 
vast majority of public hospitals in Kenya, in contravention of the 
country’s international legal obligations.17
In other words, the government is more concerned with controlling 
drug trafficking than with ensuring a supply of morphine for pain 
management. Added to this, pediatric palliative care is almost 
nonexistent, although with some interest and the support of the 
national association for development (Level 2). And there is inadequate 
training of health-care professionals in pain management of children. 
Meanwhile children suffer unnecessarily—Michael continues in pain 
and suffers from depression.
International	Commitments	and	National	Narcotics	Laws
International	Obligations	Relating	to	Drug	Control
The major barriers to children’s receiving pain management 
and palliative care lie with national governments operating at 
home and on the international stage. There must be political will 
and an unwillingness to stand back and watch children suffer. But 
governments, especially in poorer countries, often prioritize other 
public-health emergencies, and fail to see that pain and suffering is 
itself a public-health emergency. They are quick to sign international 
conventions that protect human rights and require access to 
medicines, but slow to live up to these obligations. On the global level, 
the “international community” has been far more concerned with 
recreational use and supply reduction than with ensuring access to 
essential medicines.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in1961 and 
has to date been ratified by almost every state in the world. It is a 
treaty best known for its approach to “illicit” uses of narcotic drugs, 
but in its opening paragraphs the treaty also proclaimed that narcotic 
drugs were “indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering.” While 
morphine is strictly controlled under the international drug control 
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system, the obligation relating to palliative care could not be clearer. 
States’ parties were instructed to ensure they had sufficient stock to 
meet the medical needs in each country.18 The International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) was mandated to monitor this obligation. 
However, in 2008, the WHO estimated that despite the international 
acceptance of the Single Convention, 80 percent of the world’s 
population still had little or no access to pain relief.19 For the past 
twenty years, the WHO and the INCB have reminded governments of 
their obligations to ensure access to medicines for pain treatment, but 
with little effect on children. Meanwhile, vast sums have been spent 
on law enforcement and supply reduction in the decades since the 
adoption of the Single Convention, eclipsing by far the efforts to ensure 
access to essential medicines. While the shortfall in access is mainly in 
middle- to low-income countries, it is not exclusively so. The ICPCN is, 
in 2010, advising some very high-income countries to develop their first 
children’s palliative care services.
Opiophobia	and	the	“Chilling	Effect”	of	Restrictive	Drug	Control	Laws
Many people fear that morphine may be addictive, and believe that 
it is only given when the patient is near death. Health professionals 
often state that they fear morphine will suppress respiration, and 
show a lack of understanding of use of opioids in the treatment of 
chronic pain. This became clear in Human Rights Watch’s study in 
Kenya in 2010, according to which:
In Kenya, morphine is widely viewed not as an essential, low-
cost tool to alleviate pain, but as dangerous. . . . Until recently, 
medical and nursing schools taught that morphine must only be 
administered to the terminally ill, because of unwarranted fear 
that it would cause addiction, and hospitals often only offer the 
drug when curative treatment has failed. . . . Even at the seven 
public hospitals where morphine is available, doctors and nurses 
are sometimes reluctant to give it to a child, because they believe 
it amounts to giving up on the fight to save the child’s life, and 
because unwarranted fears of addiction remain.20 
For many years messages about opiates have, for the most part, 
been rooted in scare tactics aimed at deterring recreational use 
and preventing addiction. While that aim has not been achieved, 
the fears instilled in relation to these drugs remain. Those fears 
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are closely related to narcotics laws that can act as barriers to full 
access to palliative care medicines. In the 1961 Single Convention, 
within which access to essential controlled drugs is included as an 
obligation, addiction to drugs is referred to as an “evil,” threatening 
the fabric of society.21 There is certainly an imbalance within the text, 
and this is reflected in international drug control efforts in recent 
decades. In Kenya, narcotics laws have had a “chilling effect” on 
access to palliative care medicines. As documented by Human Rights 
Watch, Kenya’s 1994 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Control Act (Narcotic Drugs Act) regulates morphine and other opioid 
pain medicines and is widely seen among health-care professionals 
as prohibiting these drugs. Heavy penalties are imposed for illicit 
possession, and, for medical workers, this can mean a loss of their 
license. According to the Kenyan Pharmacy and Poisons Board, “Due 
to the punitive nature of the 1994 Act, most providers have shied 
away from selling opioids.”22
While morphine is safe, effective, easy to use, and usually inexpensive, 
there is the potential for abuse. For this reason morphine is a controlled 
medicine, and the manufacture of morphine, its distribution and 
dispensing are controlled internationally and regulated in each country. 
But governments can and often do order relatively small amounts of 
morphine, inadequate to meet the need for pain control in their country, 
as they fear that it will be diverted for illegal use. This is despite the fact 
that the INCB states that diversion is relatively rare. Each government 
has a responsibility to ensure the safekeeping of morphine, to prevent 
or minimize diversion, but those regulations also need to facilitate the 
medical use of morphine and not prevent its availability and its use. 
Where governments see control of illegal trafficking and diversion as 
more important than the relief of suffering, children will continue to 
suffer. We must set our priorities straight.
Access	to	Medicines	for	Pain	Treatment	as	a	Human	Right
Recently human rights monitors have increased their focus on 
access to medicines and pain treatment. The argument is, for the most 
part, made under two headings—the right to health, and freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Both, of course, 
are recognized in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
well as other international human rights treaties. Nongovernmental 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the Open Society 
Part 4: Justification 	 231
Foundations have made the issue a focused campaign, while UN 
human rights mechanisms have also begun looking more closely at 
the problem.
In 2009 the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling 
on member states to ensure access to medicines as a component of the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health.23 This echoed the 
view of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
that access to medicines is a core minimum obligation of the right to 
health24 as well as previous resolutions of the UN Economic and Social 
Council.25 In October 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
health, Anand Grover, submitted a report to the UN General Assembly 
in which he recommended that all states “amend laws, regulations 
and policies to increase access to controlled essential medicines”26 in 
order to “improve the quality of life of patients diagnosed with life-
threatening illnesses through prevention and relief of suffering.”27
In December 2008 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred 
Nowak, together with the UN special rapporteur on the right to 
health, wrote the following to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
in the lead-up to the adoption of the 2009 political declaration and 
plan of action on drug control:
Governments also have an obligation to take measures to protect 
people under their jurisdiction from inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Failure of governments to take reasonable measures 
to ensure accessibility of pain treatment, which leaves millions 
of people (including children) to suffer needlessly from severe 
and often prolonged pain, raises questions whether they have 
adequately discharged their obligation.28 
In 2010, the commission, for the first time in its 53-year history, 
adopted a resolution on access to controlled medicines, calling on 
member states to “identify the impediments in their countries to the 
access and adequate use of opioid analgesics for the treatment of pain 
and to take steps to improve the availability of those narcotic drugs 
for medical purposes.” It should be noted, however, that the fear of 
diversion and addiction was still very clear, and included in the very 
title of the resolution.29
The Open Society Foundations have taken up the challenge of 
access to palliative care drugs as part of a new campaign called the 
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“Campaign to Stop Torture in Health Care.” Many children’s palliative 
care practitioners and the ICPCN are supporting this campaign as 
we believe children who experience inadequate pain relief for both 
chronic and procedural pain are subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. According to the Open Society Foundations:
at a time when many governments are regressing on their health 
commitments, using a torture framework to address human rights 
violations in health settings mandates immediate state action to 
stop them. A torture framework provides health advocates with 
an opportunity to connect with new, potentially powerful partners, 
including mainstream human rights and anti-torture organizations 
that may neglect vulnerable populations subjected to torture and ill 
treatment in health care settings, and traditional civil and political 
rights organizations that have yet to engage in health and human 
rights issues. A torture framework also places responsibility for 
patients’ suffering where it belongs: with governments, who too 
often place health workers in a dynamic where they are enlisted 
in violations of human rights. In practical terms, the Campaign to 
Stop Torture in Health Care is not a campaign against individual 
health workers as such, but against the failure of governments to 
protect all people (patients and providers) in health care settings.30 
These are strong statements, and we hope that governments will 
be forced to listen and to act accordingly; and that children will be 
among the beneficiaries of this campaign.
A	Country	with	a	Vision:	Progress	in	Uganda
Uganda is a country in East Africa with a population of 31 million, of 
whom 1 million people are infected with HIV. Much of the population 
lives in poverty and in rural areas, and more than 50 percent of the 
population is under the age of eighteen.
Uganda has a government that recognized that its people had 
the right to palliative care and pain relief, and it became the first 
country in Africa to recognize palliative care as an essential part 
of their health service. Working together with a visionary team of 
advocates from Hospice Africa Uganda, and in collaboration with the 
WHO and nongovernmental organizations, Uganda developed a five-
year National Palliative Care Strategy that included the development 
of nurses and clinical officers who would be able to prescribe oral 
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morphine, and looked at introducing drug regulations to promote an 
adequate supply of morphine that could reach those in pain quickly 
and effectively. Along with most African countries, the number of 
health-care workers is low and the country has lost many of these 
professionals to more developed countries. Therefore, this was an 
innovative and effective way of increasing the number of prescribers 
to meet the need for pain control.
While there are still challenges to the implementation of this 
strategy, Uganda has increased access to oral morphine for adults 
and children, and become a model for other African countries. South 
Africa has a regulation at government level, supported by the South 
African Nursing Council, to allow nurses trained in palliative care and 
prescribing, to prescribe and dispense all palliative care medicines.
Conclusion	and	Recommendations	for	Action
Children and adolescents with life-limiting conditions have very 
specific palliative care needs that are often different from those 
of adults.
If the physical, emotional, social, spiritual, and developmental 
needs of these children and adolescents are to be met, the 
caregivers require special knowledge and skills.
We ask that the voices of these children and adolescents be 
heard, respected, and acknowledged as part of the expression of 
palliative care worldwide.
The ICPCN Statement of Korea on Palliative Care for Children, 
2005
How do we close the treatment gap? How do we ensure access for 
all children in need to palliative care and pain treatment? We must 
start with the belief that the suffering of a child is unacceptable and 
that this can and must be changed. From there, we have much work 
to do:
• We need to continue to advocate for the rights of each 
child to relief of pain—with governments, educational 
institutions for health care providers, donors, medical and 
nursing associations, palliative care organisations, drug 
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suppliers, and international agencies—working together 
with organisations that are advocating to improve opioid 
availability.
• The voice of children themselves should be the most powerful 
voice in that movement. It is, however, seldom heard.
• All health care workers must receive training in palliative 
care for children as an integral part of their undergraduate 
training. This training must include pain management 
and use of opioids; as well as assessment of pain, and 
communication with children.
• Governments must be held responsible for setting in place 
properly funded policies and procedures to ensure an 
adequate supply of opioids, especially oral morphine.
• These policies and procedures must take precedence over 
concerns about diversion (which is, in any case, rare).
• Drug control laws that restrict access to opiates for palliative 
care must be amended to ensure that they do not operate as 
a barrier to the relief of suffering.
• Where there is a lack of doctors to prescribe, the government 
should look at alternative models, such as nurse prescribing 
(e.g. as in Uganda).
• Prescription procedures should be simple and not impede 
access to pain relief.
• Tools used for assessing pain in children should be available, 
simple to use, culturally acceptable and be used correctly.
• Donors must be encouraged to provide funding for palliative 
care for children—at present very few do so.
• Manufacturers must be encouraged to develop child-friendly 
formulations.
The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs must direct more of its 
attention to this issue, reflecting the true balance of its mandate.
In the words of the Beatles ballad, we have been on a “long and 
winding road” to get where we are in developing palliative care for 
children. The road ahead promises to be long and winding as well, 
with many obstacles along the way before we reach our vision of 
quality palliative care for all children wherever in the world they 
are. We acknowledge our failings in not advocating as vociferously 
as we should, whether with governments, international bodies, 
other nongovernmental organizations, or within the palliative care 
community itself. And we end with words from the community we 
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work for, a child who had pain and who received good palliative care, 
morphine, and supportive therapies. Rosie is six years old, with an 
osteosarcoma:
“I was sad and cried because I had pain like a knife in my leg. Now 
I have the pain medicine and the kind nurse to visit me, I can sing 
again, even if I can’t dance”
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Discussion	Questions
1. “Drug addiction is a choice.” Discuss with reference to children 
and adolescents.
2. What are the differences in the ways young boys and young 
girls begin using drugs? What are the implications for early 
intervention?
3. To what extent are laws and policies relating to drug use driven 
by morality? How can this be reconciled with scientific evidence-
based responses?
4. The majority of young people use drugs recreationally. What 
are the consequences for this majority of focusing policy on 
problematic use? What might be involved in a harm reduction 
response to recreational drug use? 
5. Fletcher argues that random school drug testing does more harm 
than good. What are the harms he identifies and what is the 
potential “gain” intended by such policies? Is there a hierarchy?
6. It is now a greater imperative to ensure access to controlled drugs 
for medicinal purposes than to restrict access for recreational use. 
Discuss.

Contributors 	 239
CONTRIBUTORS
Damon Barrett (editor) is a cofounder and Project Director of 
the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy. He 
is currently Senior Human Rights Analyst at Harm Reduction 
International in London.
Atal Ahmadzai is currently working as research officer at the Center 
for Policy and Human Development, Kabul University, Afghanistan.
Jovana Arsenijevic is the coordinator of the Get Connected! project 
run by the nongovernmental organization Veza, a program specially 
tailored for young injecting drug users in Belgrade, Serbia. 
Aram Barra is a youth activist working in HIV/AIDS and harm 
reduction issues in Latin America. He is currently Projects Director 
of Espolea, a youth-led, human rights organization based in Mexico.
Gretchen Burns Bergman is Executive Director and cofounder of 
A New PATH (Parents for Addiction Treatment and Healing), based 
in California. She served as State Chairperson for Proposition 36, 
mandating treatment instead of incarceration for nonviolent drug 
offenders.
Catherine Cook is Senior Analyst for Public Health Policy and 
Research at Harm Reduction International in London.
Amy Druker works with the Pathways to Healthy Families Program 
at The Jean Tweed Centre, Toronto, Canada, providing outreach 
services and support to pregnant and parenting women who use 
drugs.
Jennifer Fleetwood finished her PhD on women in the international 
drug trade in 2009, and is in the process of publishing her research. 
She is a currently a lecturer in criminology at the University of Kent 
in the UK.
Adam Fletcher is a lecturer in sociology and social policy at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Britain’s national 
school of public health.
Asmin Fransiska is a lecturer and Vice Dean at the Faculty of Law, 
Atma Jaya University, Jakarta, Indonesia. She is also coordinator of 
the Indonesian Coalition for Drug Policy Reform.
240	 Children of the drug War
Erik D. Fritsvold is an assistant professor in the Crime, Justice, 
Law & Society concentration in the Sociology Department at the 
University of San Diego, and coauthor of Dorm Room Dealers: Drugs 
and the Privileges of Race and Class.
Michelle Gueraldi is a human rights lawyer and lecturer in 
international law based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Ricky Gunawan is Program Director of the Community Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH Masyarakat), based in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Jess Hunter-Bowman, Associate Director at Witness for Peace, is 
an expert on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America with a focus on 
Colombia.
Daniel Joloy is a human rights researcher working at Espolea, a 
youth-led organization based in Mexico. He also collaborates with 
Amnesty International Mexico, being responsible for the Dialogue 
with Authorities Program.
Kathleen Kenny works with the COUNTERfit Harm Reduction 
Program at South Riverdale Community Health Centre, Toronto, 
Canada, on community-development initiatives and wellness 
programming for people who use drugs and have mental-health 
struggles.
Christopher Kuonqui is currently Senior Policy Adviser to the 
United Nations Development Programme Sudan Country Office 
based in Khartoum, and recently served as policy research adviser to 
the Center for Policy and Human Development in Kabul.
Ajeng Larasati is assistant manager on legal aid and human 
rights at the Community Legal Aid Institute (LBH Masyarakat), 
based in Jakarta, Indonesia. She focuses on drug law and policy 
and has been involved in the organization’s casework on drug-
related offenses.
Joan Marston is chair of the International Children’s Palliative 
Care Network and is based in South Africa.
A. Rafik Mohamed is the chair of the Department of Social Sciences 
at Clayton State University, Georgia, and coauthor of Dorm Room 
Dealers: Drugs and the Privileges of Race and Class.
Andjelka Nikolic is responsible for monitoring and evaluation of 
the Get Connected! project run by the nongovernmental organization 
Contributors 	 241
Veza, a program specially tailored for young injecting drug users in 
Belgrade, Serbia. 
Steve Rolles is Senior Policy Analyst for Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation, based in the UK, and author of After the War on Drugs: 
Blueprint for Regulation.
Rebecca Schleifer is Advocacy Director in the Health and Human 
Rights Division at Human Rights Watch.
Michael Shiner is a senior lecturer in criminology and social policy 
at the London School of Economics. He specializes in drug and alcohol 
studies.
Deborah Peterson Small is the founder and Executive Director 
of Break the Chains: Communities of Color and the War on Drugs, 
based in the United States.
Andreina Torres is currently a graduate student at the City 
University of New York. In 2005, as part of her MA studies at 
FLACSO-Ecuador she conducted research on women in prison in the 
country. Her work was published in 2006 under the title of Genero, 
carcel y drogas: la experiencia de mujeres mulas.

